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The Republic of Korea and the Republic of Indonesia share common history in 
having been former Japanese colonies during the period of the Second World War.  
At that time, women from both countries were made victims of wartime sexual 
violence in alleged violations of human rights. The victims are recognized as the 
“comfort women.” The issue has since then grown into a legal debate between Japan 
and the national states of the victims pertaining to whether or not Japan was legally 
responsible for those crimes and whether the terms of the peace treaty between the 
states at the end of the war conclusively settled the matters.  
Some scholars have argued that the government omission of not exercising 
diplomatic protection on behalf of the victims constitutes violation of the women’s 
fundamental rights, while others contend that the government has no legal duty to do 
so. The research will focus on this legal problem through a comparative study of 
comfort women diplomatic protection in Korea and Indonesia and analysing whether 
the classical principle of diplomatic protection can be a mandatory norm in the case 
of human rights and jus cogens violations. Based on the aforementioned analysis, 
this piece of work would proceed to discuss whether the new developed norm could 
be applied to the case of Korean and Indonesian comfort women. 
ii 
The current prevailing view is that diplomatic protection is solely a 
discretionary right of a state and there is no obligation in international law to provide 
such protection. However, emerging state practices through three stages: provision 
of the right to diplomatic protection to individual or as a compulsory obligation 
through the national law, invocation of the right to diplomatic protection through 
constitutional or administrative track and judicial review of the discretion pertaining 
to diplomatic protection by competent judicial body, play a significant role in 
providing the missing link between diplomatic protection and international human 
rights. This is due to the ability of those domestic mechanisms to control the 
executive discretion and dilute the state-centric nature of diplomatic protection. As 
a result, diplomatic protection could be utilized effectively to enforce individual 
rights that have been violated and secure the reparations. This was known as the 
progressive practices of international law which are embodied in Article 19 of  Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection and its commentaries, adopted by the International 
Law Commission in 2006. 
The states of nationality of the former comfort women are recommended to 
implement the progressive practices to solve the case, in order to ensure due process 
in enforcing the victims’ human rights. It will also open a bigger opportunity for the 
victims to receive the appropriate reparation under international law. Furthermore, 
the compliance to the progressive practice will help to achieve the goal of 
contemporary international law, namely the advancement of individual human rights. 
keywords : comfort women, diplomatic protection, human rights, state 
responsibility 
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Introduction 
The case of comfort women exploited by the Japanese military is a critical and 
currently unresolved international human rights issue. The issue has since then 
grown into a point of intense debate and political friction between Japan and the 
national states of the victims. There are two key element to this issue. The first is to 
settle whether or not Japan was legally responsible for those crimes and the second 
asks if the terms of the peace treaty at the end of the war conclusively settled the 
matters regarding the practice of comfort women.  
Two of major elements constituting the crime against comfort women, such as 
sexual slavery and racial discrimination, are undeniable violations of  the jus cogens 
norms. The crime was systematic and widespread all over Asia, particularly within 
Japanese colonial territories. However, Japan has never been held liable for these 
crimes in any domestic and international courts.  
The reluctance of the victims’ national states to exercise diplomatic protection 
in order to invoke Japan’s legal responsibility and secure proper reparations further, 
exacerbated the problems. Survivors and family of the deceased victims all over Asia 
have been seen trying to exhaust possible local remedies in Japanese courts. When 
these efforts ultimately failed, they tried to demand diplomatic protection by sending 
petitions to the ministry of foreign affairs in their respective states, even suing their 
government in domestic courts on the grounds that the omission of not performing 
diplomatic protection violated their rights to seek remedies under international law. 
For instance, former comfort women in the Republic of Korea filed a constitutional 
complaint against their own government in 2011. Philippines’ survivors sued their 
government before the supreme court in 2010 and most recently, former Chinese 
comfort women petitioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic 
of China in 2017. Some of their requests were met with a granting of diplomatic 
protection, but most were ignored as government prioritized hospitable diplomatic 
relations with Japan over the rights of these women. Through not supported by data, 
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there is also little doubt that the dominance of gender biased male elites occupying 
the majority seats in foreign affairs might also have been influential in those 
decisions. 
Koreans occupied the largest percentage among comfort women victims, which 
explains why their activism has been the most prominent. The effort to seek justice 
was initiated in 1991 when the first testimony of former comfort woman Kim Hak 
Sun was published. Subsequently, the government of the Republic of Korea took a 
stand in 1992 through the United Nations forum to demand that the Japanese 
government investigate the crime against the comfort women. Independent activism 
in Korea was also massive as it is mainly guarded by a coalition of women groups 
embodied in the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery 
by Japan which was established in 1990. 
In contrast to the comfort women activism in the Republic of Korea, the voice 
of women in Indonesia has remained largely unheard, even in the international forum 
such as the United Nations. Not a single memorial to remember the comfort women 
has been erected inside the country. Their stories maybe made well-known overseas 
to gain the sympathy from international society, even among Japanese mass media,1 
but have not received due attention in Indonesia itself. Moreover, Indonesian law 
scholars have yet to amass proper legal research pertaining to the comfort women. 
This is perhaps due to the relatively lower number of Indonesian women who 
revealed themselves as victims, the lower number activists, limited databases and 
access to invoke diplomatic protection. 
The research herein will reveal in greater detail the legal problems faced by 
Indonesian comfort women. It will focus mainly on comparing the situation of 
former comfort women in the Republic of Korea and Indonesia, beginning with the 
early emergence of activism up to the current status of having achieve the desired 
                                                          
1  Keiji Hirano, “Photo Exhibition Shows Pain of Indonesian Former Comfort Women,” Japan Times 
online, last modified  October 19, 2015, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/culture/2015/10/19/arts/photo-
exhibition-shows-pain-indonesian-former-comfort-women/#.XLXZ4-gzbIU. 
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diplomatic protection. The differing cases of comfort women in the two states will 
be used to show how diplomatic protection can be employed as a tool to enforce the 
rights of victims who have suffered from gross violations of human rights and 
violations of jus cogens norms, once the current prevailing state-centric 
characteristic of diplomatic protection is set aside and replaced by a more individual-
centric approach. 
Throughout this thesis, terms such as “comfort women”, “survivors” and/or 
“victims” will be used interchangeably to address the women who were victimized 
by Japanese military-enforced prostitution during World War II. In Korea, the term 
‘jeonggun wianbu’ is widely used to describe the women, whereas in Indonesia the 
Japanese term ‘jugun ianfu’ is more prevalent. The term ‘comfort women’ is widely 
contested because it gives the impression that the victims voluntarily entered into the 
servitude, rather than depicting the actual experience of forced sexual slavery or rape. 
Yet regardless of the opposition, the term remains in popular use. Therefore, it will 
be used frequently in this thesis. 
Also, in addressing the states to whom the comfort women are nationals, terms 
such as “states of nationality” or “national states” will be used interchangeably. The 
usage of the former is based on Article 3 Paragraph (1) of Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection 2006 which defines, “The State entitled to exercise diplomatic 
protection is the State of nationality.” Whereas, the latter is a term which can be seen 
frequently in the commentary of the draft articles and some ICJ cases on diplomatic 
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Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework 
1.1. Scope of Research 
This thesis will only include the situation of comfort women in the Republic of 
Korea (hereafter Korea or the Republic of Korea) and will not include the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as the object of research. Regarding the 
victims of the comfort women system in the Republic of Indonesia (hereafter 
Indonesia), this research will only include victims who held Indonesian nationality 
after the country gained independence. I am aware that Dutch women also became 
the victims of the practice within the period of transition from Dutch colonial to the 
Japanese colonial government. However, they will not be included in this research 
because Dutch victims are no longer associated with Indonesia and the main focus 
of the research is to highlight the Indonesian victims as the object of comparison. 
1.2. Time Period of Research 
This research will focus on historical facts surrounding the comfort women 
system during the Second World War (1939-1945). The research covers a longer 
period for Korea, from 1939 to 1945 and a shorter period for Indonesia, from 1942 
to 1945. Time discrepancies exist because Japan colonised Korea for a longer period 
than Indonesia. After the liberation of the two states, the timeline will hop to 
international tribunals held to adjudicate Japan’s crimes in World War II. These 
tribunals span the Tokyo Trial in 1946 to the Women’s International War Crimes 
Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery in 2000. The peace treaties conclusion 
process between Japan and Korea in 1965, as well as between Japan and Indonesia 
in 1958 will also be highlighted. 
The time flow will continue to the period when former comfort women in the 
two countries expanded their advocacy until they obtained diplomatic protection 
from their respective governments. In the case of the Republic of Korea, the timeline 
will span from the Korean comfort women activism that started in 1991, through the 
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Korean constitutional court decision in 2011 to the comfort women bilateral 
agreement between Japan and Korea signed in 2015. The debate on the legality and 
validity of that agreement has continued in both national and international forums 
from the beginning of 2016 until now. Regarding comfort women activism in 
Indonesia, the timeline of facts will start from 1992, when Indonesian and Japanese 
lawyers investigated the case. Subsequently, it will lead to the involvement of the 
Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) from 1997 to 2003 in the project, claimed by the 
Japanese government, as a form of redress for Indonesian comfort women.  
1.3. Methodology 
The research will focus on legal problems in the field of international law, 
particularly those related to diplomatic protection and international human rights. In 
every legal research study, sources of law are utilized to analyse legal facts. 
Generally, there are two types of law sources, primary sources, and secondary 
sources. 
Primary sources contain the law itself and are mandatory in legal research.2 The 
primary sources used in this research are divided into two types, covering 
international and national scope: 
1. Sources of international law 
As the research is thoroughly focused on international law, the sources of law 
stipulated in Article 38 (1) of Statute of the International Court of Justice such as 
the followings will be utilized as tools to analyse the legal facts. 
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by states 
Conventions in the scope of international human rights and humanitarian law 
will be used to point out the Japanese government’s legal responsibility in the 
case of comfort women system, particularly conventions concerning 
                                                          
2  Carol M. Bast and Margie Hawkins, Foundations of Legal Research and Writing (Australia: Delmar 
Cengage Learning, 2010), 13.  
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trafficking in women in the 1910s and 1920s, as well as the 1907 Hague 
Convention on Land Warfare and Its Regulation to which Japan is a party. The 
explanation of these conventions will be brief since their function is only to 
confirm the existence of legal responsibility. 
b. Customary international law 
The topics in this research study will be dominated by customary international 
law. The comfort women issue involves the issue of state responsibility and 
diplomatic protection that have not been codified in any treaty yet. The norms 
are customary international law which evolves from state practices. 
International lawyers are certain of the binding force of the norms, thus the 
United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) successfully produced 
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts in 2001, as well as Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in 2006. 
Those draft articles will become the fundamental platform for the study. 
Besides, the norms of customary international law that have been crystallized 
in a treaty, such as the 1926 Slavery Convention, will also be consulted to 
determine the legal responsibility of Japan regardless of the fact that Japan is 
not a party to the convention. 
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations 
The most salient law principle to be highlighted by this research is the 
principle of legal fiction, particularly when it is applied to diplomatic 
protection.  
d. Judicial decisions 
The judgments of international and regional courts in the field of diplomatic 
protection involving violation of human rights will be used as mediums of 
reflection to measure whether the current advancement of state practices and 
opinio juris are sufficient to form a solid basis for customary international law.  
2. Soft law 
- 7 - 
 
Soft laws are law instruments that are not binding like treaties but have a purpose 
to promote norms which are believed to be good, and therefore have to be applied 
universally. The traditional list of international law sources provided by the ICJ 
statute does not identify soft law. However, it is undeniable that following current 
developments in international law, international actors frequently accept soft law 
as norms regulating the relationships among such actors since their non-legally 
binding characteristic results in lower sovereignty costs. Consequently, consent 
to be bound by the rules can be achieved more quickly and easily.3 
a. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
The ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion stated that General 
Assembly Resolutions, even if they are non-binding in nature, may sometimes 
have normative value. The resolutions can provide important evidence for 
establishing the existence of a rule or the emerging opinion juris.4  
b. Recommendations of human rights treaty bodies 
Due to the complexity of the case of the comfort women which involved 
violations of various kinds of human rights, the problem came to the attention 
of multiple human rights treaty bodies such as, the Human Rights Committee 
under ICCPR, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD Committee), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW Committee) and the Committee against Torture 
(CAT Committee). However, since the comfort women issue is composed 
primarily of women’s rights violations, only recommendations from the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter 
CEDAW Committee) will be used for analysis. The recommendations play a 
role as soft laws that emphasize the condemnation of the sexual slavery of 
comfort women as jus cogens norm.  
                                                          
3  Sean D. Murphy, Principles of International Law (St.Paul: Thomson Reuters, 2012), 111. 
4  Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.C.J. (July 8, 1996), at 226, 
254-255, para 70. 
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3. Sources of national law 
Since this study includes a comparison of how two states handled comfort women 
issue, regulations at the domestic level have to be investigated to assess the 
implementation and integration of international law norms in the states’ national 
law systems respectively. 
a. Constitutions 
The Constitutions of the Republic Korea (last amended on October 29, 1987) 
and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (last amended in 2002) 
will be employed as tools to assess whether the fundamental rights of the 
comfort women are guaranteed and whether diplomatic protection is deemed 
to be a right protected by the constitution in the respective states. 
b. Statutes 
Statutes can be used to measure whether the states in question have made 
concerted efforts to guarantee the human rights of the former comfort women 
in the absence of official reparations from Japan.  
c. Decisions by national courts  
Recently there has been a tendency for the judicial branch of government to 
allow itself to review the discretion of the executive branch in the field of 
diplomatic protection when the case in questions involves violations of human 
rights. Thus, national courts’ judicial decision, typically the constitutional 
court decisions, will be utilized to analyse whether these practices are robust 
enough to emerge as a new customary international law norm, considering the 
fact that they have not been regulated in the ILC draft articles yet. The decision 
of the Constitutional Court of Korea regarding the government omission in 
protecting former Korean comfort women is probably the most notable one in 
Asia. 
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Secondary sources are commentaries on the law, documents or research reports 
that confirm the existence of law and tools used to find primary sources.5 Secondary 
sources used to support this research consist of: 
1. Reports of the special rapporteurs 
Special rapporteurs are members of the ILC who are appointed by the 
organization to perform research on particular topics in international law, which 
become the study agenda of the ILC over a particular period. ILC has appointed 
one special rapporteur from its members for every new topic of study, mostly 
international law academicians and foreign ministry legal advisors. After the 
topic is decided, a special rapporteur is required to present his or her research 
report to the ILC. Alongside the report, he or she is also expected to submit 
proposals and draft articles for a possible treaty regarding the international law 
topic that is being studied.  
The exposure of the comfort women issue cannot be separated from the efforts 
of several special rapporteurs, particularly Radhika Coomaraswamy from Sri 
Lanka and Gay J. McDougall from the United States. Coomaraswamy delivered 
her reports on the study of violence against women in 1996, 2001, and 2003. All 
of her written reports during those years cover the investigation of the comfort 
women issue in Korea and other countries. On the other hand, Mc Dougall’s 
reports which exposed the comfort women issue were written in 1998 and 2000 
on the main topics of systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices 
during the armed conflict. Although there are still many comfort women-related 
reports from other special rapporteurs, this research will prominently use the 
reports of the two aforementioned experts as sources, since theirs presented the 
most comprehensive facts and analyses as discovered throughout the research 
period. Reports of the special rapporteur are perfect example of the writings of 
                                                          
5 Bast and Hawkins, Foundations of Legal Research, 13. 
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the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations stipulated in Article 38 
(1) Section d of the Statute of the International Courts of Justice. 
The reports of ILC special rapporteurs that are related to the development of 
diplomatic protection as customary international law norm will not be excluded 
from scrutiny. In particular, a brief look will be taken at reports written by the 
special rapporteur Mohamed Bennouna published in 1998, followed by a detailed 
investigation on John Dugard’s reports published between 2000 and 2006. 
2. Documents of Universal Periodic Review conducted by United Nations’ human 
rights treaty bodies 
Subsequent to the utilization of the CEDAW Committee recommendation, the 
documents submitted by state parties on which the recommendations are based 
will become the objects of observation. The documents consist of state parties’ 
reports, shadow reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
summaries of meetings. Since the objects of this research are the Republic of 
Korea, Indonesia, and Japan, the universal periodic review documents concerning 
those three states were observed. In particular, this research used the periodic 
review document of Japan in 2009 and 2016, as well as the Republic of Korea’s 
which were issued in 2007 and 2018. Unfortunately, the comfort women issue 
could not be traced in Indonesian universal periodic documents at all. This finding 
will be explained further in the following chapters. 
3. Other documents published by the International Law Commission 
Other documents issued by the ILC analysed in this research comprise of treatises 
and commentaries of UN member meetings regarding deliberation process in 
formulating the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006.  
4. Books 
Historical aspects of the comfort women issue could only be traced from the 
works of the academicians who specialized in the history of World War II. As it 
would constitute a herculean task to conduct direct fact findings by visiting the 
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victims and the involved government officials in terms of time, language barriers 
and availability, referring to the commonly used academic works on the comfort 
women issue is an oft-utilized alternative. Several infamous and frequently cited 
works written by historians, such as Yuki Tanaka and Yoshimi Yoshiaki will be 
used as references to explain the legal facts surrounding the reality of the comfort 
women system. 
5. Law reviews and periodicals 
This type of source will be used restrictively to explain the legal facts in the 
comfort women case, but it will be mostly utilized to elaborate recommended 
state practice in the field of diplomatic protection stipulated in Article 19 of the 
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in 2006. Since this concept still 
constitutes a lex ferenda, works of literature that discussed the issue are still 
scarce. Thus, using law reviews and periodicals are the best options available. 
This thesis falls under the category of comparative study. It will compare two 
countries, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Indonesia, in terms of how they 
perform diplomatic protection on behalf of former Japanese military comfort women 
who are nationals of their respective countries. The process will determine which 
country has more effectively handled the issue based on two indicators, domestic 
measures of protection and conformity with recommended practices stipulated in the 
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006.  The result of the comparison will be 
used in a convergent manner to grasp whether there is a tendency for state practices 
and opinio juris to consider diplomatic protection as a compulsory duty for states in 
the case of serious human rights violations. Korean and Indonesian practices will be 
used to represent Asian practices in general and they will be further compared with 
the practices on other continents, such as Europe and Africa. The continental 
comparison will be used to seek out a commonality in the international legal order, 
namely whether diplomatic protection as a compulsory legal duty can be accepted 
worldwide as a new emerging customary international law, in line with the current 
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development envisaged in Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006. Last but 
not least, the following section of this thesis will be linked back to the result of the 
comparison between the Republic of Korea and Indonesia. Whichever country to this 
research has more practices in conformity with international human rights law, will 
be analysed further to suggest the practical revisions for the less conforming one. 
The literature review of the sources mentioned above is the only tool that will 
be employed to collect qualitative data about the legal facts and development of state 
practices in respect to diplomatic protection regarding the comfort women issue. The 
analysis method employed is the IRAC approach that is commonly used in legal 
research. IRAC stands for Issue Rule Application and Conclusion.6 The first step in 
this research will be the process of laying out the main issue regarding comfort 
women as it pertains to diplomatic protection, followed by an elaboration on 
international law rules related to how diplomatic protection should be exercised. The 
next step will be examining the application, which is to compare and contrast the 
facts of the case and figure out whether the relevant international law rules have been 
applied appropriately in the issue. These steps will lead to the conclusions of this 
research. 
1.4. Objectives of the Research 
All of the aforementioned methods were employed to answer three legal 
inquiries. First, the research aims to assess which state, the Republic of Korea or 
Indonesia is more effective at exercising diplomatic protection on behalf of their 
nationals victimized by the comfort women system during World War II. After 
assessing the effectiveness of such measures, based on the theories of international 
law, I will analyse the legal rationale behind why one approach is more successful 
than the other. 
                                                          
6  Peter Jan Honigsberg, Legal Research, Writing and Analysis (Chicago: Thomson/West, 2006), 112-
113. 
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Second, regardless of which is more effective in protecting its citizens in the 
case of comfort women, the reluctance of the government to exercise the right of 
diplomatic protection was shown hypothetically in the two countries. This reluctance 
hinders the states from performing their obligations under human rights law to 
protect the rights of their citizens. This reluctance is probably caused by a missing 
link between diplomatic protection, which is perceived solely as the right of the state 
currently, and international human rights law, which always emphasizes the 
protection of the right of individuals. Therefore, as the second objective of this 
research, I will try to find the said missing link and ways to restore it. 
Third, after finding the missing link in the second objective, this research will 
seek out suggestions for a more effective diplomatic protection system in Indonesia 
and Korea. Furthermore, I will elaborate on how such suggestions could influence 
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Chapter 2. Overview of Comfort Women Issue 
2.1. Comfort Women as an International Human Rights Issue 
Comfort women system that was manifested in the establishment of comfort 
stations, was initiated by the Japanese military in the 1930s during World War II. 
The motivation of setting up the comfort stations was to mitigate the problem of rape 
against civilian women committed by the Japanese Central China Area Army in 
Nanjing when they started to invade China in a full scale.7 The leaders of the army 
started to instruct the commanders of each military contingent to set up the comfort 
stations in 1937 because they believed that this strategy could prevent future rapes. 
 Initially, there were some Japanese professional prostitutes employed in the 
comfort stations. However, the increasing number of Japanese military personnel 
soon outstripped the number of prostitutes. Thus, they started to hired local women 
who resided in the area where military bases were established.8 As Japan expanded 
its empire and gained new colonies, the military started to hire local women from 
other colonies’ territory, such as other East Asians and Southeast Asians. It is 
impossible to know the exact number of women exploited as relevant documents 
were either hidden or destroyed at the end of the war. The prevailing estimates ranges 
from 80,000 to 100,000.9 Of these women, eighty per cent of them were Koreans. 
The rest were from Taiwan, China, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.10 
The issue of the comfort women of the Japanese military came to light in the 
international community when the United Nations Commission on Human Right 
(UNCHR) began a series of hearings in 1992. The hearings were triggered by a class 
                                                          
7 Ibid., 28. 
8 Ibid., 13. 
9 “Amerika Minshu-shugi no Shinzui”, Yomiuri Hochi, September 23, 1945. 
10Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women, 31. 
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action suit brought by a number of former Korean comfort women against the 
Japanese government in December of 1991.11 
The first critical statement about the comfort women issue was delivered to the 
Japanese government by a Japanese lawyer, Totsuka Etsuro, in February of 1992 at 
the UNCHR meeting. He spoke as a representative of East Asia for International 
Educational Development (IED), a non-governmental organization (NGO) based in 
Japan.12 The statement was followed by a joint statement by IED and the Korean 
Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (hereafter Korean 
Council) in May of 1992. The two organisations raised the comfort women issue at 
the UNCHR Sub-Commission Working Group on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery.13 
The term “comfort women” is used as a euphemistic term for the issue, whereas 
the official name of the human right violation is either “military sexual slavery” or 
“enforced prostitution by the military”. Those official terms are found in numerous 
international human rights documents, resulting from an investigation conducted by 
international human rights lawyers subsequent to the revelation of the issue in 1992. 
The lawyers worked within the frame of UNCHR and current United Nations human 
rights treaty bodies. The documents are mostly not in the form of treaties or 
conventions because the particularity of the comfort women issue had not been 
regulated through contemporary human rights instruments when the case was 
brought to light. 
The 1995 Preliminary Report on Violence against Women, Its Causes and 
Consequences by Special Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy was the first 
international document which addressed the system of comfort women as “sexual 
                                                          
11 Chunghee Sarah Soh, "Prostitutes versus Sex Slaves: The Politics of Representing the Comfort 
Women," in Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II, ed. Margaret Stetz and Bonnie B.C. 
Oh (New York: Routledge, 2015), 69. 
12 Etsuro Totsuka, “Chonggun Wianbu, Kangje Yonhaeng Munje wa U.N.,” in Congsindae Charyojip 
IV (Seoul: Chongdaehyeop, 1993), 69-76. 
13 Soh, “Prostitutes versus Sex Slaves,” 69. 
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slavery by the military”. The special rapporteur remarked that the comfort women 
system is a unique form of human right violations since it was created from two 
simultaneous elements, forced mobilization and sexual slavery. Japanese imperial 
forces were reported to practise systematic mobilisation of women of the occupied 
area by force, under pretence or kidnapping, in order to employ them in comfort 
stations.14 
Coomaraswamy described the element of sexual slavery as multiple rapes on an 
everyday basis in the military comfort houses which were strictly regulated by the 
military and set up in such places where the military was stationed. 15  The 
involvement of the Japanese government was depicted when the soldiers were 
recommended by their commanding officers to use the comfort stations in order to 
stabilize their psychological condition, revitalize their combat spirit and protecting 
them from venereal infections, as well as a measure to prevent looting and 
widespread rape during military operations in villages.16 
The main focus of the 1995 Preliminary Report on Violence against Women, 
Its Causes and Consequences was to urge the Japanese government to provide 
compensation to the victims. She stated that the right to appropriate compensation is 
well recognized under international law, even though the precise losses cannot be 
clearly established. The perpetrator should keep in mind that the obligation to 
provide compensation as a means to provide restitution for international wrongful 
act is a well-established principle in international law.17 
In her re-issued Report written in 1996, special rapporteur Radhika 
Coomaraswamy criticised the usage of the term “comfort women” by the Japanese 
                                                          
14 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Preliminary report  
submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences in 
accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/45  by Radhika Coomaraswamy, 
E/CN.4/1995/42 (1995), 68. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Paper prepared by the non-governmental organization Korean Women Drafted for Military Sexual  
Slavery by Japan, Seoul, August 1994, quoted in Coomaraswamy, Preliminary report, 68-69. 
17 Ibid. 
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government because it does not reflect the suffering, which included multiple rapes 
on an everyday basis and physical abuse suffered by the women. That was the reason 
why the rapporteur did not use the term “comfort women”. Instead, she used 
“military sexual slaves” as a more accurate terminology.18 
The aforementioned report was written based on the special rapporteur’s direct 
investigation in Korea and Japan. Thus, it provides more elaborate and 
comprehensive details than the 1995 preliminary report, especially since it broke 
down the elements of human rights violations in the comfort women system, which 
are nowadays prohibited in the contemporary human rights’ treaties. Besides the 
element of sexual slavery, the report also pointed out the element of forced 
mobilisation, arbitrary deprivation of freedom and deprivation of life.  
The element of sexual slavery in the comfort women system was reiterated in 
the 1996 report by noting that sexual services were rendered by the women with 
inadequate to no payment at all. Only a few of the women received some income at 
the end of the war.19  
The element of forced mobilisation is manifested by the fact that the comfort 
women, who were mostly Koreans, were forcibly transported to comfort stations in 
other regions where military operations were being conducted, such as China, 
Taiwan, Borneo, several Pacific Islands, Singapore, Burma and Indonesia. Many of 
them did not know where they were, even until the end of the war and some of them 
were simply abandoned at such sites without information on how to go back to their 
home countries.20 
Arbitrary deprivation of freedom is shown by the fact that comfort station sites 
were surrounded by barbed wire fences, guarded and patrolled. Movements of the 
                                                          
18 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Addendum of Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences: Report on the 
mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue 
of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime by Radhika Coomaraswamy E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (1996), 4. 
19 Ibid., 10. 
20 Ibid., 7. 
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women were monitored and restricted. Many of them were not allowed to leave the 
sites. Escape was almost impossible due to the strict guard patrols by military 
officers.21 
Arbitrary deprivation of life was manifested in the fact that some of the 
remaining comfort women were killed by the retreating Japanese troops at the end 
of the war. They killed the women because they felt that the women would be 
possible witnesses of their crimes, were they to be captured by the Allied Forces 
troops. Many women were also forced to participate in suicide missions with the 
Japanese soldiers.22 
It is thus concluded that the comfort women system was a complicated system 
which covers all possible violations of obligations stipulated in human right treaties, 
namely crime against humanity, slavery and forced prostitution. After collecting 
testimony from the victims, Coomaraswamy concluded that the victims demand the 
Japanese government to admit and recognise that the aforementioned violations and 
crimes were the true nature of the comfort women system, rather than a simple case 
of voluntary prostitution.23 It is also important to note that Coomaraswamy’s report 
also specifically provides some evidence of Japanese government involvement in the 
comfort women system. This evidence will be explained further in the following 
chapters.  
Eventually, Coomaraswamy concluded the 1996 report by demanding the 
Japanese government, in national level:24 
- acknowledge that the system of comfort stations set up by the Japanese Imperial 
Army during the World War II was a violation of its obligations under international 
law and accept legal responsibility for that violation; 
- pay compensation to individual victims; 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 10. 
22 Ibid., 7. 
23 Ibid., 16-17. 
24 Ibid., 31-32. 
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- disclose the documents and materials in its possession with regard to the comfort 
women system; 
- make a public apology and written apology to the individual victims; 
- raise awareness of these issue by amending educational curricula for the purpose 
of reflecting historical realities; 
- identify and punish perpetrators involved in the recruitment of comfort women and 
institutionalisation of comfort stations.  
At the international level, the 1996 report provided three recommendations. 
First, it summoned all non-governmental organisations to raise these issues within 
the United Nations system. Second, it suggested the victims’ national states to 
consider of requesting the International Court of Justice to help resolving the legal 
issues concerning Japanese responsibility and payment of compensation for the 
comfort women. Lastly, it urged the government of Japan to take into account and 
act according to the recommendation as soon as possible, considering the advanced 
age of the survivors.25 
The subsequent report dated August 12, 1998, submitted by Special Rapporteur 
Gay J. McDougall stated that although prohibition of gender-based violence, such as 
rape, is not considered as a jus cogens norm, prohibition of sexual slavery cannot be 
excluded since it contains the element of “slavery” which is certainly a part of jus 
cogens. The term “sexual” is used as an adjective to describe a form of slavery and 
does not refer to any other crimes. The comfort women system satisfied the 
definition of slavery in the sexual domain.26 Thus, it is undeniably a violation of jus 
cogens, which is defined as the norm accepted and recognised by the international 
                                                          
25Ibid. 
26United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during 
armed conflict by Gay J. McDougall (1998), E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 9. 
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community as a whole and as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.27 
Another reason to label the comfort women practice as the violation of jus cogens is 
that it exhibits a similarly egregious nature with other types of sexual slavery, such 
as systematic rape documented in the case of the former Yugoslavia.28 
McDougall adduced that the treatment of the comfort women falls within the 
most widely recognised definition of slavery as stipulated in the 1926 Slavery 
Convention. As understood from the convention, slavery is the status or condition of 
a person over whom any or all the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised.29 The substantive law conforms with the fact that the comfort women’s 
freedom was abrogated and they were recruited against their will. They had to move 
with military troops and equipment into and out of war zones and their sexual 
autonomy was denied, as they were subjected to restrictive regulations regarding 
their reproductive health for the purpose of protecting soldiers from venereal 
diseases.30 
The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal 
of a person with the intent to reduce him to slavery, acts of acquisition of slaves for 
the purpose of selling and exchanging slaves, and acts of disposal by sale or 
exchange of slave.31 In the comfort women practice, the ‘recruitment’ is similar to 
the activity of slave trading, as some of the women were ‘purchased’ in the exchange 
of money from their kidnappers, and sometimes even their parents or relatives.32 
The report further specified the type of sexual slavery into several categories, 
such as forced marriage, domestic servitude, rape by captors in armed conflict and 
                                                          
27 Article 53 of “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” entry into force January 27, 1980, United 
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, No. 18232 (1987): 331, 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-52%20AM/Ch_XXIII_01.pdf. 
28 McDougall, Report on the Contemporary Forms of Slavery 1998, 9. 
29Article 1 (1) of “Slavery Convention,” entry into force March 9, 1927, League of Nations Treaty 
Series, Vol. 60. No.1414 (1927): 254, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1926/09/19260925%2003-
12%20AM/Ch_XVIII_3p.pdf. 
30 McDougall, Report on the Contemporary Forms of Slavery 1998, 43-44. 
31 Article 1 (2) of Slavery Convention Signed at Geneva on September 25, 1926. 
32 McDougall, Report on the Contemporary Forms of Slavery 1998, 43-44. 
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forced prostitution. “Forced prostitution” or “enforced prostitution” is the term that 
McDougall chose as the most accurate nomenclature to address and describe the 
comfort women practice. It refers to the condition where a person is coerced by 
another to engage in sexual activity continuously to the point of harming one’s 
physical and mental health.  
However, the definition of forced prostitution in international human rights and 
humanitarian conventions have been deemed insufficient to be applied. The 
conventions often described forced prostitution in vague terms as mere immoral 
attacks on a woman’s honour, but it seems that they forgot to address the element of 
slavery encompassed by the crime. 33 Indeed, it is easier to prosecute and prove that 
forced prostitution is slavery, rather than as crimes against honour. This is because 
the elements of crime in slavery are more concrete, whereas the elements of crimes 
against honour, as McDougall states, are vague. First, it is difficult to define and 
prove what women’s honour is. Second, it is vague in the sense that the phrase or 
term of “sexual slavery” or “violence” is not explicitly mentioned to define 
“enforced prostitution” in international criminal provisions, and thus fails to describe 
the gravity of the deed. This is probably due to the subordination of women in 
societies.34 Moreover, without the element of slavery inserted in the definition, it 
would also be difficult to address and prosecute enforced prostitution as a violation 
of jus cogens. 
In December of 2000, as the complementary of the special rapporteur’s reports, 
the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japanese Military 
Sexual Slavery elaborately broke down several elements of slavery in the comfort 
women system. The elements are involuntary or forced recruitment, treatment of the 
women as commodities, deprivation of fundamental rights and basic liberties, non-
                                                          
33 Ibid., 10. 
34 Ibid. 
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existence of payment to compensate the sexual services and discrimination against 
women. 
According to humanitarian law perspectives, comfort women practice can be 
categorized as a war crime as it happened during the armed conflict. The term war 
in the context of comfort women must be interpreted broadly. It does not only cover 
war between states but also war for national liberation, namely situations when 
nations fight against colonial domination to exercise their right of self-
determination.35 The same was applied to the time period of comfort women cases 
when Korea and Indonesia were fighting for liberation against Japan. 
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War of August 12, 1949 (hereafter Geneva Convention 1949) has categorized 
women as protected persons by international humanitarian law.36 Protected persons 
are those who at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves in 
case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying 
power of which they are not nationals.37 In the case of comfort women, they found 
themselves in the hands of Japan as the occupying power of the countries in which 
they were nationals during World War II. Thus, it may be surmised that international 
humanitarian law treaties and customary law functioned to protect these women from 
various violations in armed conflicts. 
The Geneva Convention 1949 mentioned that protected persons shall be treated 
humanely at all the times and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence 
or threats, insult and public curiosity.38 Specifically, Article 27 of the convention 
regulates special provision that women shall be especially protected against any 
attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any form 
                                                          
35 G.P.H. Haryomataram, Hukum Humaniter [Humanitarian Law] (Depok: Rajawali, 1984), 119-122. 
36Article 27 of “Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of   War of 
August 12, 1949,” conclusion date August 12, 1949, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 75, No. 973 
(1973): 288, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2075/volume-75-I-973-
English.pdf. 
37 Article 4 of Geneva Convention 1949. 
38 Article 27 of Geneva Convention 1949. 
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of indecent assault. Thus, it is obvious that comfort women practice, which by nature 
was enforced prostitution, is strictly prohibited by international humanitarian law. 
The rules which play the role to protect women by condemning forced prostitution 
were also stipulated in the 1907 Hague Convention. Forced prostitution was 
categorized by interpretation of war tribunals (Nuremberg Trial and Tokyo Trial 
1945), as a crime against family’s honour and rights.39  
The treaty law, as well as customary international humanitarian law, on the 
prohibition of enforced prostitution, became the basis to adjudicate Japan in front of 
the Tokyo Trial. However, the tribunal was merely tried the force prostitution against 
victims from Allied Forced nationals. Asian victims, such as Koreans and 
Indonesians, were not covered. 
2.2. State Responsibility of Japan 
Japan has denied for many years any direct involvement by its military in 
establishing and supervising comfort stations during World War II. Eventually, the 
Japanese government recognised its own involvement in the establishment of 
comfort stations in an official document entitled “On the Issue of War Time 
‘Comfort Women’, issued on August 4, 1993 by the Japanese Cabinet Councillors’ 
Office on External Affairs and in the statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono 
Yohei on the same date.40  
However, the statement was subsequently withdrawn and the Japanese 
government resumed its denial, particularly by responding to the report by Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Violence against women, Radhika 
                                                          
39Article 46 of “1907 Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land,” ICRC Online, 
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/1d1726425f69
55aec125641e0038bfd6?OpenDocument. 
40United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Unofficial Translation 
of  Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary August 4, 1993 (Annex I of Note Verbale dated March 
26, 1996 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to 
the Centre for Human Rights), E/CN.4/1996/137 (1996), 10-11. 
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Coomaraswamy. The denial was based on a number of substantive grounds which 
include: 41 
1. that according to recent development, international criminal law may not be 
applied retroactively; 
2. the crime of slavery does not accurately describe the system of comfort stations 
and that the prohibition against slavery was not established as a customary norm 
under any applicable international law in the period of World War II; 
3. that acts of rape in armed conflict were not prohibited by the regulations annexed 
to the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 or by applicable customary international 
law at the time of World War II; 
4. that the law of war would apply in the conduct committed by Japanese military 
against nationals of a belligerent state, thus it would not cover the action of the 
Japanese military with respect to Japanese or Korean nationals since Korea was 
annexed to Japan during the World War II. 
The Japanese government also denied the claims for legal compensation by 
arguing that individual comfort women do not have the rights to such compensation. 
The individual claims were supposed to be handled by peace treaties and 
international agreements between Japan and other Asian states following the end of 
World War II. Besides, the claims would be inadmissible because any civil or 
criminal cases concerning World War II would now be deemed expired by the 
applicable statute of limitations provisions.42 
Regardless of the denial of legal responsibility and denial of the victims’ right 
for legal compensation, there was some written and unwritten evidence found that 
pointed out Japan’s extensive involvement in the system. This section will briefly 
elaborate on some of the evidence found and analyse whether the Japanese 
government’s conduct constitutes grounds for state responsibility based on the ILC 
                                                          
41 Coomaraswamy, Report on Violence Against Women, 1996, 24-30. 
42 Ibid. 
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Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 
(hereafter ILC Draft Articles 2001).43 
According to the ILC Draft Articles 2001, every internationally wrongful act of 
a state entails the international responsibility of that state.44 The state responsibility 
could be invoked if it satisfies two elements. The first element requires that the action 
or omission is attributable to the state under international law, whereas the second 
element requires that the act or omission constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the state.45 Draft Articles 2001 stipulates several types of attribution of 
conduct to a state. In particular, the acts and omissions conducted by Japan can be 
categorised in at least two types of attribution specified in Draft Article 4 and 8.  
Draft Article 4 (1) states, “The conduct of any State organ shall be considered 
an act of that State, under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the 
organization of State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central 
Government or of a territorial unit of the State.” The type defined in Article 4 (1) 
means that the organ directly executes the conduct without the help of any agent or 
the third person. 
In the comfort women system, there was some conducts by the Japanese 
military which satisfied the definition of conduct of state organs in Draft Article 4 
(1). The permanent mission of Japan to the United Nations office at Geneva, through 
Note Verbale March 26, 1996, disclosed the results of a study conducted by the 
government itself through July 6, 1992. According to the study, the government 
admitted that even though most comfort stations were run by private operators, there 
were also cases when the Japanese military directly operated the comfort stations. 
Even in the case of privately-run facilities, the Japanese military was involved in the 
                                                          
43Texts available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. 
44Draft Article 1 of  ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
2001. 
45Draft Article 2 of ILC Draft Articles 2001. 
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establishment and the management of the stations through the granting of permission 
to open such facilities, supplying the equipment used in the stations and drafting the 
regulations regarding hours of operation, tariffs and precautions for the use of the 
facilities. The role of the government was not only limited to the establishment 
process. Instead, it continued to supervise the comfort women by imposing measures 
such as the mandatory use of contraceptives, regular health check-up conducted by 
military doctors to prevent venereal epidemics and hygiene management measures 
for the women and facilities.46 
The study conducted through 1992 by the Japanese government also found that 
the Japanese imperial government’s administrative or military personnel directly 
took part in the recruitment of comfort women on several occasions. Then, the 
women were transported by military ships and vehicles to war zones. For the purpose 
of travel, the Japanese military had to approve the requests made by recruiters for 
such travel. In order to avoid suspicion, they gave the status of special civilian 
personnel serving in the military to the women so that they could obtain travel 
permits. The status was proved by certificates of identification issued by the Japanese 
government.47 
The official documents regarding comfort women practice can be found in a 
compilation called Jugun Ianfu Shiryo-shu (hereinafter JIS). This is a compilation of 
relevant parts extracted from 106 official documents related to the comfort women 
issue. The compilation was found within the Archives of the Defense Research 
Institute (ADRI) in Tokyo between the late 1980s and early 1990s. One of the 
documents which shows direct involvement by the military is the set of written 
instructions prepared by the Japan Ministry of War entitled “Matters related to the 
recruitment of female and other employees for military comfort stations,” which was 
                                                          
46 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Note Verbale dated  
March 26, 1996 by the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 
E/CN.4/1996/137 (1996), 16. 
47 Ibid., 17. 
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issued on March 4, 1938 to the Chief of Staff of the North China Area Army and 
Central China Area Army. It states: 
In recruiting female and other employees from Japan for the establishment of 
comfort stations…some deliberately make an illicit claim that they have 
permissions from military authorities, thus damaging the Army’s reputation 
and causing misunderstanding among the general population…In future, when 
recruiting those women, each Army must tighten control of the selection 
procedure by carefully selecting appropriate agents. In actual recruitment, 
each Army must work in closer cooperation with local Kempeitai or police 
authorities, thus maintaining the Army’s dignity and avoiding social 
problems.48 
Recent studies found that there were also some documents that recorded the 
transportation of women to war zones by the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy. The 
women who worked as comfort women outside of their home country would have 
gone through several steps as part of the travel documentation process. First, the 
women would be categorised as members of a working entertainer group. Then, the 
Imperial Army or Navy would issue a certificate of approval to travel. Once obtained, 
the certificate would be brought to the local police office and the police would issue 
a travel identification card. 49  
Between 1938 and 1939 there was significant increase in cross-border travel 
from Korea to China, Taiwan and Manchuria. This indicated that comfort women 
were being transported in large numbers overseas. Particularly, it was found that 
most of the identification cards and cross border related documents were issued by 
the Japanese Government-General in Taiwan and the documents are believed to be 
kept in the National Archives of Japan.50 
In addition to the type of conduct under the category of Draft Article 4 (1), Japan 
was also responsible for the omission by failure to investigate and prosecute the 
perpetrators of forced prostitution, torture, war crimes and other gross violations of 
                                                          
48 Government of Japan, Archives of the Defense Research Institute, “Document No.6,” in Jugun Ianfu 
Shiryo-shu (JIS), ed. Yoshimi Yoshiaki (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1992), 105-107. 
49 Sin Cheol Lee and Hye In Han, “Comfort Women: A Focus on Recent Findings from Korea and   
China,” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies 21:1 (2015): 46. 
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human rights committed against the women under the comfort women system. The 
failure was proved by a controversial policy issued by the Japanese government in 
the 1950s regarding the rehabilitation and release of surviving war criminals 
convicted in international military tribunals.51 
 Although Japan has stated that civil or criminal cases concerning World War 
II would now be deemed expired by the applicable statute of limitations provisions, 
it is well established that there is no statute of limitation to prosecuting serious crimes 
under international law. This idea was supported by the Special Rapporteur of the 
Sub-Commission on the impunity of perpetrators of violations of civil and political 
rights, Louis Joinet. In his report, Joinet noted, “Prescription is without effect in the 
case of serious crimes under international law…it cannot run in respect of any 
violation while no effective remedy is available.”52 The exemption of the statute of 
limitation in the case of gross violations of human rights is one of the principles 
outlined in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and 
Reparation. It states, “Where so provided for in an applicable treaty or contained in 
other international legal obligations, statutes of limitations shall not apply to gross 
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which constitute crimes under international law.” The same also 
applies to the domestic statutes of limitations for civil claims and other procedures.53 
This principle is binding on every member of the United Nations since it was 
codified in General Assembly Resolution No. 60/147. 
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Reparations for Victims of Gross Violation of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Resolution No. A/RES/60/147 (2006), 5, paras. 6-7. 
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Those aforementioned facts demonstrate that on the contrary to the denial that 
the comfort women worked in brothels operated by private businessmen, the 
operations and management of those brothels were directly conducted or with the 
knowledge and support from the Japanese military. Thus, it satisfies the criteria of 
“conduct by state organ attributable to state” stipulated in Draft Article 4 (1).  
Draft Article 8 regulates that the conduct of a person or group of persons shall 
be considered an act of a state under international law if the person or group of 
persons is, in fact, acting on the instructions, direction or control of that state carrying 
out the conduct. In the case of comfort women, these acts depicted by the control of 
the Japanese colonial government over private agents (both Japanese and locals) who 
ran and operated the comfort stations, as well as those who procured the young girls 
and women by means of force and deception.  
Proof that the private operators of the comfort stations were controlled by the 
Japanese government was recorded in documents investigated by the Japanese 
government from December of 1990 to June of 1991. For instance, the investigation 
documented in a compilation entitled Iwayuru Jugunianfu Monndai ni Tsuite (On 
the issue of so-called military comfort women) published in 1993 confirmed that the 
Japanese Imperial Army was involved in selecting personnel for recruiting the 
comfort women. It also prepared and distributed Comfort Station Regulations in the 
form of booklets to guide private entities on how to operate the stations and issued 
identification cards to personnel linked to the comfort stations.54 These documents 
proved that the conduct of the private operators of comfort stations could be 
attributed to the Japanese government since they acted based on the instructions, 
direction or control of the government’s imperial army. 
More proof was found in recent studies that concluded that the recruitment of 
comfort women in Korea was conducted within the framework of the Labour Affairs 
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Control Act as a part of the colonial National Total Mobilization regime of Japanese 
imperial government imposed on Korea as an annexed territory and it involved the 
role of private Japanese brokers. In accordance with the Employment Agency 
Ordinance passed in 1940, the Japanese brokers who wanted to recruit comfort 
women came to Korea and submitted applications to the Japanese government 
authority in Korea. Then, the brokers in Korea, who received a license from the 
Provincial Governor, a local administrative clerk or the police would recruit the 
comfort women.55 The overall recruitment process and the role of the brokers were 
depicted in a publication entitled Ilponkun wianso kwalliin ui ilki (The Diary of a 
Japanese Military Comfort Station Manager) published in 2013.56 
Following the example of proof provided in the aforementioned paragraphs, it 
can be concluded that the role of brokers and private operators of comfort stations 
are identical with the category of “conduct of private persons or entities attributable 
to state” stipulated in Draft Article 8 of 2001 ILC Draft Articles. Thus, since the 
actions under the category were attributable to the Japanese imperial government, 
they bore the state responsibility of Japan. 
Special rapporteur McDougall stated in her 1998 report that there are at least 
three different sources of law used as legal frameworks of responsibility in sexual 
slavery and sexual violence. The three sources are international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law. Each of these has its 
roots in treaties and customary international law. Therefore, these three sources of 
law are also applicable to Japan in the case of comfort women. However, the regime 
of individual responsibility in international criminal law will be excluded since the 
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research will only revolve around the responsibility of Japan as a state.57 Specifically, 
McDougall also stated that there are three types of the most egregious international 
crimes that fall under the comfort women practice, which Japan is responsible for. 
They are the crimes of slavery, crimes against humanity and war crimes.58 
By taking into consideration McDougall’s opinion that limited the comfort 
women issue around the scope of international human rights and humanitarian law, 
in 2009, the CEDAW Committee found that Japan had violated international 
obligations under several international agreements pertaining those two fields. Japan 
was a party to the following international agreements: 
1. The conventions concerning traffic in women in 1910s and 1920s 
Japan was a signatory to the following conventions in 1925: 
- International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic of 1904 
- International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic of 1910 
- International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children 
1921 
Japan was required under Article 2 and 3 of the 1921 Convention to prosecute 
persons engaged in the trafficking of women and children. These provisions were 
applied for most of the comfort women were minors. Japan argued that its 
colonized territories could not be included in the ratione territorii of the 
convention. However, the convention regulated that the obligation remains intact 
regardless of the victim’s state of origin.59 
2. The 1930 International Labour Organisation Convention Concerning Forced 
Labour (ILO Convention No.29) 
                                                          
57 McDougall, Report on Contemporary Forms of Slavery 1998, 10. 
58 Ibid., 38. 
59 United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, An NGO Shadow 
Report to CEDAW: Japan, The “Comfort Women Issue” (New York: United Nations, 2009), 7. 
- 32 - 
 
Japan ratified this convention in 1932. ILO Committee on Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) pointed out that 
Japan’s military sexual slavery until 1945 was in breach of this convention.60 
3. Japan also violated its obligation under an international humanitarian law treaty, 
The 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare and Its Regulation. It ratified this 
convention in 1911.  
Japan also violates international customary law as expressed in the 1926 Slave 
Convention, although Japan was not the party of this convention. The prevailing 
customary international law consists of three kinds of responsibilities:61 
1. Slavery and the slave trade 
Slavery and the slave trade were prohibited even when the comfort women 
system were established. It has clearly attained jus cogens status since the 
nineteenth century when many countries had already banned the importation of 
slaves. The prohibition was followed by the development of multiple 
international agreements so that it marked the formation of opinio juris 
necessitatis among states until it was codified in the 1926 Slavery Convention. 
State practice was also achieved as all the states prohibited slavery under national 
laws, including Japan.62 Thus, its status as a customary international law has been 
declared at least since the beginning of World War II.  As a result, Japan’s denial 
that it did not have any obligation because it did not ratify the 1926 Slavery 
Convention was unacceptable since the obligation to prohibit slavery were born 
from customary international law. 
2. Rape as a war crime 
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The laws of war also prohibited rape and forced prostitution. It was held as a 
customary international law until it was codified in Article 27 of The Fourth 
Geneva Conventions. Although Japan has not ratified the conventions, it is well 
established that the conduct was prohibited under customary international law by 
at least around 1937, when the first comfort stations were established. 
3. Crimes against humanity 
The widespread and systematic enslavement of persons has been long recognised 
as a crime against humanity. So does the comfort women practice since it 
qualified the element of “slavery” and systematically applied to the Japanese 
imperial subjects. The sexual violence, which is regarded as an element of 
comfort women practice, has been explicitly listed as a crime against humanity 
when committed in the course of armed conflict and when directed against 
civilian populations.  
Draft Article 31 of State Responsibility states that the responsible state is under 
an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally 
wrongful act. The injury includes any damage whether material or moral caused by 
the conduct. In accordance with Draft Article 31, in order to release itself from the 
state responsibility Japan has to fulfil its duty to redress the victims. The forms of 
reparation shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either 
singly or in combination.63 
However, the government of Japan denied the duty to redress the victim under 
three grounds: 
1. The right to reparation of individuals under international law was extinguished 
generally by the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the subsequent peace 
treaties concluded between Japan and the Asian countries. 
2. Satisfaction to the victims had been delivered in the statement and apology by 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei in 1993. 
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3. Compensation to the survivors had been paid and distributed through Asian 
Women’s Fund founded in 1995, with the letters of apology to each individual. 
The denial was responded critically by the international community in Japan’s 
2009 periodical review session by the CEDAW Committee. First, 1951 San 
Francisco Treaty did not cover the countries and regions that are not parties or have 
not signed a bilateral peace agreement with Japan. The category may include the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Furthermore, the sexual damage 
suffered by women under the Japanese military was not addressed at all in the 
bilateral negotiation with the Asian countries, for example in the 1965 Treaty of 
Basic Relations between Japan and Republic of Korea.64 
Second, the satisfaction and compensation through government statements, as 
well as the Asian Women’s Fund, was inadequate to redress the victims. Besides, 
Asian Women’s Fund was a disguised private fund with government donation, thus 
it could not be deemed as official compensation. The government of Japan has never 
established the Diet for resolution through legislative and administrative approach 
to support the compensation.65  
It is suggested by the Special Rapporteur Coomaraswasmy in her 1996 report 
that the way to distribute the compensation should be official through the enactment 
of special legislation, so it enables the settlement of individual claims through civil 
lawsuits at Japanese municipal courts.66 Another option is setting up a limited time 
framed special administrative tribunal to manage compensation claim, considering 
the advanced age of the survivors.67 
2.3. Failure of International Tribunals to Adjudicate the Case 
When Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces, forced prostitution that 
constituted a type of war crime became one of the material jurisdiction in the 
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International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter IMTFE) or Tokyo Trial. 
The tribunal was initiated on January 19, 1946 by seventeen members of the Allied 
Forces. It had material jurisdiction over crimes against peace, conventional war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Each type of crimes was divided into more 
specific elements. For example, what constituted crimes against humanity included 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population.68 Forced prostitution itself was included 
in the list of war crimes. However, there was no enumeration of rape and sexual 
slavery as either war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
Regardless of the lack of explicit mention of rape or sexual slavery in the charter, 
the rape committed by the Japanese military in Nanjing was addressed in the 
indictment under the 1907 Hague Convention IV and 1929 Geneva Convention. 
However, neither rape and sexual slavery committed against the comfort women in 
Korea and Southeast Asian countries was addressed in the indictment, nor was the 
relevant evidence presented.  
There were also charges against Japanese military officials who committed rape 
in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), but the evidence provided only covered Dutch 
and European victims. Korean and Indonesian victims were not thoroughly 
recognised.69 This fact highlights that racial discrimination by Allied Force military 
authority who did not perceive the crime as serious unless it involved their own 
citizens. In other words, the trial was merely an exercise of the victors’ justice. 
It was peculiar that the sexual slavery was not included in the statutes of the 
IMFTE and that indictments delivered by the prosecutor in spite of the fact that 
United Nations War Crimes Commission listed not only rape but also “abduction of 
women and girls for the purposed of enforced prostitution” as grounds for 
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prosecution.70 The United Nations War Crimes Commission was set up before the 
trial in October of 1945 on behalf of 17 Allied nations and the body was responsible 
for ensuring the detention, trial and punishment of the listed war crimes.71 In other 
words, the mandate of the commission to include abduction and enforced prostitution 
should have been met with compliances by the Allied Forces, especially the 
prosecutors. However, in reality, the Tokyo trial only included rape as the type of 
war crimes proved in relation to the Nanjing incident and it failed to try the sexual 
slavery and enforced prostitution of the comfort women. 
The failure to prosecute sexual slavery and enforced prostitution as part of the 
Tokyo trial was based on a number of presumed reasons, including the redundant 
focus on the defendants which resulted in ignorance of the victims, alleged fixation 
on crimes committed against victor nations and the construction of a victim hierarchy 
based on national identity, race, class and gender. There were also other reasons, 
such as the victims’ reluctance to testify about the sexual violence they had 
experienced in front of the court.72 Japanese scholar Yuki Tanaka argued that the 
exclusion of sexual slavery was intentional in order to avoid exposure to the fact that 
the Allied Forced themselves had utilized the comfort stations under the framework 
of Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) for almost one year, until all of 
the facilities were closed down in 1946.73 
Law scholars further alleged that another reason why the tribunal failed to 
address the systematic enslavement of the comfort women was the military tribunal’s 
heavy dependence on reports and archives. Although there were many prosecution 
and defence witnesses, they were rarely present during the trial to give live testimony. 
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Instead, they only submitted written affidavits.74 This lack of individual participation 
in military tribunals inspired the foundation of the contemporary international 
criminal court which pays more attention to the victim participation.75 
In terms of procedural aspects, the tribunals were weakened by their emphasis 
on the individual responsibilities of the perpetrators. This ignored the fact that the 
active involvement of the Japanese military in the formation of the comfort women 
system depicted a form of organized crime supported by a state.  Moreover, the 
damage caused by the system was massive and could not be remedied through 
individual responsibility alone. Thus, it was necessary to demand not only the 
individual responsibility of the perpetrators who were involved in the system, but 
also demand state responsibility from the Japanese government. 
On December 8, 2008, the women’s group, Violence Against Women in War-
Network Japan (VAWW-NET Japan) held the Women’s International War Crimes 
Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (hereinafter Tokyo Tribunal 2000). The 
purpose of the tribunal was initially to demand that Japan take legal responsibility 
since crimes against comfort women failed to be prosecuted in IMTFE. However, 
the government of Japan was not represented at the tribunal despite the invitation. 
Instead, the tribunal focused on gathering testimony from the victims, highlighted 
the continuous denial of the right to compensation, as well as the impunity of the 
perpetrators.  
Evidence from sixty-four former comfort women living in the two Koreas, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, East Timor, China and the Netherlands was gathered and 
recorded. The indictment and evidence of the injustice of the Japanese military’s 
comfort women system were presented by the international prosecutors from ten 
countries before a panel of international judges. Four prominent international 
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lawyers, led by Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, former President of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as the presiding judge, served as judges 
for the tribunal.76  
Tokyo Tribunal 2000 issued its final judgment in The Hague on December 4, 
2001. Although its ruling was non-binding, the tribunal returned some significant 
findings on Japanese legal responsibility. First of all, the tribunal stated:   
We note that women, either as individuals or as a group, did not have an equal 
voice or equal status to men at the time of the conclusion of the Peace Treaties, 
with the direct consequence that the issues of military sexual slavery and rape 
were left unaddressed at that time and formed no part of the background to the 
negotiations and ultimate resolution of the Peace Treaties. The Tribunal 
considers that such gender blindness in international peace processes 
contributes to the continuing culture of impunity for crimes perpetrated 
against women in armed conflict.77 
In other words, the judges emphasised the victim’s right to adequate remedies and 
noted that such right was not extinguished by either the 1951 San Francisco Treaty 
or any other peace treaties concluded between Japan and Asian countries following 
World War II. Thus, the responsibility of Japan to provide redress to the women 
remains intact. 
Conclusively, the tribunal stated that the comfort women system resulted 
widespread and systematic sexual violence that constituted war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The judges of the tribunal also reiterated treaty obligations that 
Japan has violated, including the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of Law on Land, the 1921 International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Traffic in Women and Children, and the 1930 ILO Convention Concerning 
Forced Labour. It also violated the norms of customary international law, including 
those prescribed in the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1926 Slavery Convention. 
Further, it urged the government of Japan to punish the perpetrators of the crimes 
                                                          
76 CEDAW Committee, An NGO Shadow Report, 7. 
77 The Prosecutors and The Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v. Hirohito Emperor et.al. and the 
Government of Japan, PT-2000-1-T (December 4, 2001) at 252, para. 1051. 
- 39 - 
 
and provide redress to the victims.78 However, the government of Japan has not 
followed the recommendations made by the tribunal until now. 
Regardless of the inaction of Japan in carrying out the recommendations of 
Tokyo Tribunal 2000, the tribunal itself was successful in collecting valid evidence 
and identifying the elements of rape, sexual slavery, as well as providing proof of 
widespread and systematic elements of the comfort women system. It was also 
relatively more effective than the IMTFE which did not address sexual slavery and 
forced prostitution as part of its material jurisdiction. Moreover, the tribunal thrived 
from the stagnant progress of the case by identifying the individual perpetrators of 
the crimes. 
In the Southeast Asian region, Temporary Court Martial Tribunal was also held 
in Batavia (currently Jakarta), Indonesia. It was a court administered by the 
Netherlands, representing the Allied Forces. The court found that the Japanese 
military defendants, who had participated in enslaving 35 Dutch women and girls in 
comfort stations, guilty of war crimes for rape, coercion into prostitution, abduction 
of women and girls for forced prostitution and ill-treatment of prisoners.79 However, 
the court failed to provide redress to the Indonesian women and girls as victims due 
to the indifference and racial discrimination by the Netherlands within Indonesia, its 
former colony. 
2.4. International Responses to the Comfort Women Issue 
As a response to the gross violation of human rights conducted by Japanese 
military towards the comfort women during the World War II, the CEDAW 
Committee issued a recommendation as a response to the Universal Periodic Review 
on the compliance of Japan to the CEDAW in 2009. The recommendation urges 
Japan to find a lasting solution for the situation of comfort women which would 
include the compensation of victims, the prosecution of perpetrators and the 
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education of the public about these crimes, for instances through the establishment 
of museum or memorial and the inclusion of comfort women issue in the history 
book used in schools.80 
UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, as the main forum for 
comfort women in the 1990s, recommended that Japan and victims’ national states 
to consider submitting the dispute about comfort women to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) since the arbitral body is open to all states as well as individuals. 
The idea was supported by the comfort women activists, such as the Korean Council. 
However, this seems to be the least preferred solution to the state parties, probably 
due to the apprehension of diplomatic relations severance.81 
Another form of international pressure voiced by victims’ national states, 
including Korea, is the strong demand that Japan should be banned to gain a  
permanent seat on UN Security Council unless it resolves the issue of the wartime 
comfort women. Korea and the former comfort women opposed Japan’s UN Security 
Council bid in 1993.82 The protest was repeated in 2005 and was conveyed to UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan during the UN Conference on Conflict Prevention.83 
The People’s Republic of China also led the same protest from 2007 to 2008 
following controversial statement of Japan Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, who denied 
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Chapter 3. Comparison of Diplomatic Protection 
Measures for Comfort Women in Korea and 
Indonesia 
This section will elaborately compare how the Republic of Korea and Indonesia 
constructed systems of diplomatic protection on behalf of victims of Japanese 
military sexual slavery who are nationals of the two states. The explanation is built 
gradually, starting with the general situations of the comfort women in both states. 
Then, it will move to the post-facto struggle of comfort women, such as the rise of 
activists who help the women struggle to win their rights back and the effort to 
exhaust local remedies in the domestic courts. It will also highlight the attitudes of 
the governments of the two states in handling the former comfort women by recalling 
the responses of the governments to the offer from a Japanese private fund. It will 
also examine the governments’ roles in enacting regulations and measures to protect 
the rights of these women. These series of events will lead to the conclusion of 
whether diplomatic protection has been achieved and whether the process provides 
satisfying results to the victims.  
3.1. Comfort Women in Korea 
Sexual exploitation of Korean women through what are termed comfort women 
cannot be separated in long history of the Japanese colonization of Korea. Korea was 
annexed by Japan in 1905, after Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War. The 
victory also saw the British and Americans accept Japan’s control over Korea.85 
Following the victory, the so-called “Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty” was sealed 
on 22 August 1910.86 The colonialization period then lasted until August of 1945. 
Korean comfort women were not only recruited to work as military sex slaves 
in Korea and Japan but also in other territories occupied by the Japanese, such as 
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China, Taiwan and countries in Southeast Asia. The records of forced mobilization 
of these women have been kept as evidence thus far in certain museums in Japan, 
Korea and China. For instance, The National Archives of Korea (NAK) claimed to 
keep a large number of papers on cross-border travel IDs issued by the Japanese 
government-general of Taiwan to mobilize women from Korea to Taiwan. Other 
documents were permits for travelling and for entry into Jinan, China, issued by the 
Japanese colonial government on January 14, 1938.  It identified the travel records 
of 115 Korean women who were sent to Jinan. In the documents there were 
mentioned “comfort station” and the women were identified as the “special ladies,” 
kisaeng (artist), chakpu (bar hostess) and yokup (bar girl).87 
Koreans accounted for approximately eighty per-cent of all comfort women, the 
greatest share compared to the number of comfort women who hold other 
nationalities. This occurred not only because of the political and economic 
environment of the country as a Japanese colony at that time, made young women 
easy to procured, but also because of its cultural closeness to Japan. In addition, the 
physical similarity between Japanese and Koreans may have been a factor in the 
preference to procure comfort women from this country.88 
Japan began to draft Korean women for the sexual service around 1937, 
following the rape of Nanjing incident. The Japanese army began carefully to select 
and control the recruiting of brothel agents approximately in 1938. Some of them 
were Japanese and some were Koreans. The majority were those who had 
experiences in the prostitution business, labour brokers and the like.89 
Most of the girls and young women were also coercively recruited under the 
Cheongsindae (Voluntary Labour Service Corps). Cheongsindae was part of the 
National General Mobilization Law imposed on Korea by the Japanese government. 
In this framework, both men and women were called upon to contribute to the war. 
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Systematic mobilization was enforced in 1939.  Japan sent Korean labourers to Japan, 
Sakhalin, the Soviet Union and to other parts of Asia. Although in reality some 
women integrated in Cheongsindae volunteered to work in factories and hospitals, 
many were recruited with deceit, in the form of false promises of employment with 
good compensation, and be sent to Japan or in the other Japanese occupied territories. 
Indeed, contrary to the promises, they were sent to comfort stations to work as sex 
slaves.90 
Under the framework of Cheongsindae, Japanese police in Korea collaborated 
with labour brokers to recruit women. Usually, the daughters of poor families were 
approached by the labour brokers and promised jobs as factory workers, nurses, 
laundry workers, kitchen helpers or other types of labour which were prevalently 
performed by women. From recruitment until the transportation process, the women 
were treated well, but the treatment changed as soon as they arrived at their working 
destinations. Without knowing the nature of the work initially, they were brought to 
the comfort stations and they experienced sexual violence by the members of the 
Japanese armed forces.91 
There were several occasions when local policemen themselves acted directly 
to run comfort stations. The police usually used force or threats to make the girls 
follow their orders. In other words, this method could be defined as kidnapping. 
After arresting the girls, the policemen detained them in the police stations or 
detention centers, from which they could not escape because the places were heavily 
guarded by the Japanese soldiers.92 
When the young girls realized the true nature of the work, they attempted to 
refuse the job. Some demanded that their comfort station managers send them back 
home because they were promised false employment. The manager typically 
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responded by saying that a large advance payment had been made to their parents 
and it had to be paid back before they would be sent back home.93 
Comfort stations where the women lived varied from hotels, restaurants and 
expropriated civilian houses. Sometimes Japanese converted schools and temples for 
such purposes. In cases of remote front lines of a battle zone, military tents or parts 
of army barracks were used.94 While living in these comfort stations, Korean comfort 
women mainly experienced sexual slavery by Japanese soldiers and the owners of 
the brothels on a daily basis.95 Other than sexual slavery, they also experienced 
sufferings resulted from inhumane living conditions. For instances, regulations to 
prevent venereal diseases were unfollowed, and therefore many comfort women 
suffered from these diseases. The sexual crimes also caused the women to suffer 
from other reproductive diseases. There were times when pregnancy was 
unavoidable, thus forced abortions was common. The comfort women also rarely 
received any payment from their managers. They even physically punished the 
women when they failed to meet their target, when they were infected with VDs or 
when they became ill.96 
The situations of the comfort women varied when the war ended. Many of them 
died owing to the sufferings as a comfort women itself or because of suicide.  Others 
were killed by soldiers to erase war secrets or died as a result of direct involvement 
in the warfare. Most of the comfort women who worked away from their home 
countries were simply abandoned by the Japanese. Some of them were rescued by 
the Allied forces and eventually sent home. However, some decided not to go home 
because they felt ashamed by the sexual abuse they had experienced and were afraid 
to meet their families and relatives again.97 
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3.2. Comfort Women in Indonesia 
In contrast to the Korean comfort women, there are very few studies regarding 
the comfort women system in Indonesia. The scarcity of studies may be caused by 
the fact that the colonization time of Indonesia was far shorter than that of Korea. As 
a result, fewer women were victimized. According to information compiled by 
Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Indonesian Commission for Human Rights) 
and Jaringan Advokasi Jugun Ianfu Indonesia (Indonesian Comfort Women 
Advocacy Network), approximately 25.000 former comfort women have been 
identified in Yogyakarta and Bandung city. However, there remain many from other 
cities who have not been identified.98 
It all started when Japanese troops conquered the Dutch and seized its colony, 
the Dutch East Indies (current Indonesia). On March 8, 1942, the Dutch forces, led 
by General Ter Poorten, officially surrendered to Japan. This became the beginning 
of a three and a half year occupation of Indonesia by Japanese Imperial forces.99 
The first target for comfort women recruitment consisted of Dutch women who 
were still living in Indonesia at that time. Nevertheless, Indonesian local women 
recruited as well.100 The recruitment of Indonesian comfort women was slightly 
different from how their peers in Korea were recruited. Instead of deception, they 
used kidnapping as a means of recruiting women from low economic classes. 
Japanese policemen randomly selected women working at restaurants or walking on 
the street. They were taken to the police station and interviewed by a Japanese officer 
as to whether they had venereal diseases or not. Those who admitted that they were 
healthy were brought to a hotel for further examination by a Japanese military doctor. 
The women who passed this examination were detained in the hotel before they were 
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transported to other cities in Indonesia. Upon arrival in other cities, they were picked 
up by brothel managers and transferred to comfort stations. 101 
Instead of using force, the Japanese military authorities used deception to recruit 
Indonesian women from the upper middle classes. The Japanese military made it 
known to the public that the daughters of public civil servants would be offered the 
opportunity to study in Japan. This false information was passed on to local public 
servants through provincial Japanese residents or governors. Many Indonesian 
public servants who collaborated with the Japanese were pressed to show their 
loyalty to Japan, and thus they decided to send their own daughters first.102 The girls 
were put on a ship in the central harbour of Indonesia, Tanjung Priok. They believed 
that the ship was going to Japan, yet it went to one of remote islands of Indonesia. 
Among them, some were transported abroad, mainly to other Southeast Asian 
countries such as Thailand, New Guinea and Singapore. As soon as they arrived at 
their destination, they were put into a camp and were forced to serve Japanese 
soldiers sexually. When the soldiers moved to another island for a military operation, 
they were transported to that location as well, where they were put into a military 
compound.103  
In the comfort stations, each woman had to serve Japanese soldiers and officers 
every day. Each of them was expected to reach a designated target every week.104 
The practice continued until the end of the war. Many of the girls died as the result 
of this maltreatment. Others who could survive suffered psychological trauma for 
the rest of their lives. The brothel managers claimed to receive a decent amount of 
money from the soldiers as an exchange for the service, yet the comfort women 
rarely received payment from the managers. From these sequences of the story, it 
can be concluded that in terms of living conditions at comfort stations, the 
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Indonesian comfort women situation was identical to that experienced by Korean 
comfort women.105 
Upon the end of the war, the Indonesian comfort women, who worked in 
Indonesian remote islands and overseas, were found by the Allied Forces, mainly 
Dutch and Australian. They gave the women medical treatment and rehabilitation 
with the intention of sending them back to their hometowns. However, some of the 
women were afraid to return home because of the shame related to their experiences, 
while some others committed suicide.106 
World War II came to the end and Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces. As a 
follow up to the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, which stated that Japan should pay 
reparations to Southeast Asian countries, the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the 
Republic of Indonesia was concluded in Jakarta on January 20, 1958. The treaty 
included a payment of US $223 million over 12 years,107 the cancellation of trade 
debt of US $177 million108 and US $400 million of economic aid. The annex of the 
treaty explicitly specified that the money would be used to support Indonesian 
infrastructure projects such as those related to transportation, communication, power 
development, agricultural, fishery, industrial development, water supplies, education 
and social welfare.109 However, there was no mention at all of reparation for the 
injuries suffered by Indonesian comfort women. 
3.3. Existence of Comfort Women Activism 
The activism of former Korean comfort women began when the Korean Church 
Women United sponsored the International Conference on Women and Tourism on 
Jeju Island in April of 1988. One of the speakers at the conference, Yun Chung-Ok 
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of Ewha Womans University, presented her research on the Chongsindae issue to 
help the participants see the connection between comfort women in colonial Korea 
and the kisaeng tourism of modern Korea. Yun Chung-Ok then led various women’s 
organisations along with Lee Hyo-Chae, her fellow professor at Ewha Womans 
University, to form the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual 
Slavery by Japan or Cheongsindae Munje Daechaek Hyeobuihoe (hereafter the 
Korean Council) in 1990. 110  The council is classified as a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) and aims to achieve the resolution of the comfort women issue, 
as well as appropriate and adequate redress for both the deceased victims and the 
survivors. Not all members of the Korean Council are former comfort women, some 
of them are forced labourers drafted by the Japanese colonial government. 
The Korean Council submitted a petition to the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) on March 4, 1992. The content of the petition was a request 
to the commission to investigate Japanese crimes committed against Korean women 
during the World War II and help to push Japanese government to provide 
reparations as a consequence of its internationally wrongful conduct.111 The petition 
was received by the UNCHR Sub-Commission Working Group on Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery in May of 1992. The UNCHR responded by placing the comfort 
women issue on its official Geneva meeting agenda in August of 1992, where 
delegates from the Korean Council and one former comfort woman named, Hwang 
Keum Ju, testified her experience. 112  
The intense lobbying by  the Korean Council resulted in the conclusion of the 
UNCHR’s Sub-commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection 
of Minorities to condemn the Japanese military comfort women system as a crime 
against humanity that violated the international human rights of Asian women, 
Japan’s international obligations under international humanitarian law and the ILO 
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agreement prohibiting forced labour that Japan ratified in 1932.113 Thus, it officially 
marked the issue as elevated from a mere civil lawsuit to an international human 
rights problem of concern to the international community. 
In August of 1991, with the support of the Korean Council, Kim Hak Sun from 
the Republic of Korea became the first former comfort women who spoke publicly 
about how she was abducted and work as a comfort woman in the comfort station at 
the age of 17. This testimony was followed by several unsuccessful lawsuits against 
the Japanese government before the Japanese domestic courts.114 
Because the international pressure pursued by the Korean Council and former 
comfort women was not fruitful, the Korean Council initiated the weekly Wednesday 
noon demonstrations in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. The demonstration 
program started in January of 1992.115   Another activity hosted by the Korean 
Council was a nationwide fund-raising even in December of 1992 to help building 
the House of Sharing (Nanum ui Jib) for the survivors.116 In legal fields, the Korean 
Council advocated and facilitated the former comfort women to exhaust local 
remedies available in Japan. However, most of these efforts were done in vain due 
to the persistent denial from the Japanese government. 
The most significant role of the Korean Council occurred in 2011, when it 
supported Korean comfort women in their effort to file a constitutional complaint 
regarding the omission of the Korean government for taking no steps to protect them. 
After the Japan-Korea bilateral agreement was achieved in 2015, it still protests to 
the government regarding the lack of a victim-centered approach in the execution of 
the agreement. 
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The Republic of Korea appears to have the most persistent activists on the 
comfort women issue. This is likely triggered by the longer period of the colonisation 
of Korea (1910-1945), the treatment of Koreans as Japanese imperial subjects and 
the impact of Korean democratization in the late 1980s.117 In contrast, Indonesian 
comfort women activists were not as active due to the shorter term of Japanese 
colonisation period and the smaller number of victims. These factors were combined 
with the lack of robust criticisms toward the Japanese occupation, from either 
citizens or from the government side.118 
While the activism of comfort women in Korea was initiated by the Korean 
citizens and the comfort women themselves, the activism of Indonesian comfort 
women was initiated by concerned Japanese human rights lawyers. In 1993, lawyers 
from the Japanese Bar (Nichibenden) paid a visit to the Indonesian Advocates 
Association (Persatuan Advokat Indonesia) in Jakarta. The purpose of the visit was 
to collect evidence pertaining to Indonesian war victims. Some of this evidence were 
related to the comfort women practice in Indonesia. Subsequently, matters were 
discussed in the symposium of the Japanese Bar Association in October of 1993 with 
the potential initiation of legal claims against the Japanese government. However, 
the Japanese lawyers certainly could not represent the interests of Indonesian 
comfort women due to the eligibility of representative issue. 119  Therefore, they 
passed the case to the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan 
Hukum Indonesia, hereafter LBH), which was the only human rights organisations 
allowed by the Indonesian government at that time. 
LBH then called on all war victims, including the former comfort women, to 
come to its offices throughout Indonesia to collect their testimonies. LBH did not 
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work alone in the interview process, but in cooperation with several Japanese human 
rights activists. The Japanese activists served to convince the victims that their 
testimony would not be in vain because the potential existed to negotiate the problem 
with the Japanese government. However, they could not promise payment in the 
form of compensation.120 
The effort of LBH, helped by the Japanese activists, was fruitful in that more 
than one thousand women appeared at the LBH office in Yogyakarta. Most surviving 
women were willing to register their personal identities and provided testimony 
about their experiences of recruitment, detention and violence which had occurred 
in their past as comfort women. One of the survivors was Mardiyem. 121 She told 
LBH that not only did she experience sexual violences, but also forced abortion by 
the Japanese soldiers. Her story was recorded by journalists and reported in at least 
five newspapers, including both local and Japanese newspapers. Through these 
articles, she demanded a personal apology from the Japanese government in written 
form and also from the Indonesian government.122  
The testimony of Mardiyem and several other former Indonesian comfort 
women did not receive a response from the Indonesian government. This was due to 
the higher value that the government attributed to its relationship with Japan. It also 
should be noted that the time when this testimony came to the fore was during the 
Soeharto regime.123 The system was dominated by the military and the government 
strictly controlled the establishment and operation of any human right organisations, 
making it difficult for these organisations to proliferate.  
Regardless of the ignorance of the Indonesian government, Indonesian comfort 
women disclosed their story in many international forums. For instance, they 
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attended the Tokyo International Forum on War Compensation for The Asia Pacific 
Region held in 1995 and spoke about comfort women issue on behalf of the other 
Indonesian survivors.124 
In August 1992, Ex-Heiho Communication Forum (former Indonesian Japanese 
colonial police) also offered help by registering 20,000 former Indonesian comfort 
women and collecting proof and testimony about their past. The results were 
submitted to the LBH Yogyakarta branch in the hope, that the institution would come 
forward to represent them by claiming the compensation from the Japanese 
government. Ex-Heiho consists of members, mainly men, who were enslaved as 
Japanese police officers and civil servants during the Japanese colonial period. The 
leader of the forum demanded US $700,000 as collective compensation for the 
former Indonesian comfort women and Ex-Heiho members themselves. The demand 
was conveyed to the Japanese government at a meeting of the International 
Committee in Tokyo.125 However, this effort did not receive a positive responses. 
3.4. Government’s Response to the Asian Women’s Fund  
The Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) was a private fund established in 1994 by the 
Japanese government, consisting of donations from the Japanese public with some 
government support. The fund was highly controversial among the comfort women 
activists, particularly to the Korean Council because the Japanese government 
camouflaged the foundation as a private affiliation in order to avoid international 
legal responsibility. The activists persisted in demanding the admittance of legal 
responsibility and official compensation, which according to the prevalent 
international practice, must be withdrawn from the national budget and through 
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national legislations by the delinquent state. This section will discuss how the 
government of Korea and the government of Indonesia responded to the AWF 
proposal. 
The government of the Republic of Korea was initially supportive of the 
establishment of the AWF. However, the attitude changed to reluctance after the 
Korean Council vigorously campaigned for repudiation against the AWF. The 
comfort women showed mixed responses. Some criticized the fund and rejected it, 
while others wanted to accept the financial benefits, although some in this group 
were not satisfied with the establishment of the fund.126 
In December of 1996, a dialogue team composed of members of the AWF 
Advisory Committee paid a visit to Korea and met several victims in order to explain 
the fund’s project. Kim Hak Sun and two other comfort women stated their 
repudiation of the projects of the fund. Others stated that it was not acceptable to 
consider the fund as a sincere move. In December of 1996, one of the victims 
announced that she accepted the efforts made by AWF and was willing to receive 
the benefits of the projects. However, the Korean Council and the Korean 
government hindered her intention with criticism. The AWF was only successful to 
deliver Prime Minister’s letter of apology and money to seven victims at a hotel in 
Seoul in January of 1997. The Korean government reacted by excluding the seven 
women from receiving the monthly allowance provided by the Korean government 
as a substitution for Japanese official compensation. Due to strong public and 
government criticism of every move made by the fund, the AWF decided to 
discontinue its project in the Republic of Korea.127 
The Korean Council explained the reasoning behind why they strongly refused 
the presence of the AWF on the occasion of the Japan Sixth Universal Periodic 
Report to the CEDAW Committee in 2009. The main reason for the refusal was that 
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while Japan may claim that the fund had been sponsored by the government, it did 
not state clearly that it was in the name of the State of Japan. Thus, it did not reflect 
Japan’s acceptance of responsibility for its international crimes. The Korean Council 
reiterated the survivors’ statement that the monetary gesture insulted them and 
strongly demanded justified and lawful compensation that is in proportion to the 
crimes.128 
The Korean Council cited several opinions of the international scholars about 
the nature of the AWF. First, it cited the opinion of Special Rapporteurs Radhika 
Coomaraswamy and Gay J. McDougall that the nature of the fund was not official 
and legal. The judges of The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the 
Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery stated that the AWF was not official because 
it did not constitute an acceptable mechanism for distributing compensation to the 
victims for the wrongful acts inflicted by the state. ILO CEACR also added that the 
manner of compensating the victims should be such that it will meet their 
expectations, instead of through unilaterally establishment of a private fund.129 
The Korean Council added its own argument that the secretive method of 
providing funds to the victims, instead of distributing them officially through support 
organisations, such as Korean Council itself, reflected the intention of Japan to refuse 
giving the impression that it accepted its legal responsibility. The secretive method 
triggered distrust between the victims and support organisations. Moreover, the 
establishment of the AWF and its activities had no legal basis according to Japanese 
domestic law.130 
The AWF did not initially acknowledge that there were comfort women from 
Indonesia perhaps due to the less vocal attitude of Indonesian activists. Thus, the 
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activists strongly demanded the Indonesian government to let the AWF realize their 
existence. The Indonesian government used this offer to suppress activists’ voices 
by signing a deal with the AWF in November of 1996.  The government, represented 
by the Indonesian Minister of Social Affairs, Intan Soeweno, received a lump sum 
of three hundred and eighty million yen. However, not individual victims but the 
Ministry had received the money. The money was used to support a nursing home 
projects for elderly Indonesians in towns where the comfort facilities had operated. 
The project was executed between 1997 and 2003.131 It was claimed that the project 
aimed to improve the social welfare of former comfort women, but in reality, not all 
living victims enjoyed the facilities. Moreover, enjoyment was impossible for the 
deceased victim and their families. They were supposed to receive individual 
compensation rightfully and yet did not receive any from the AWF. 
AWF offered the Indonesian government two types of projects, namely the 
projects that directly benefited the comfort women individually and the projects that 
gave collective benefits. The Indonesian government chose the second type. Intan 
Soeweno, the Social Affairs Minister of Indonesia during the Soeharto’s era, 
defended her decision in choosing AWF’s assistance to build welfare facilities over 
projects benefiting individual former comfort women with several reasons. First, it 
would be extremely difficult to authenticate actual former comfort women. Second, 
it was important to protect the honour of the former comfort women and their 
families and disclosing the issue to AWF and the public would taint their honour. 
Third, the question of war reparations from Japan to Indonesia had already been 
settled by two accords, specifically the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the 
Republic of Indonesia (hereafter the Treaty of Peace or the Peace Treaty) and the 
Reparations Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, it 
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was considered too late to re-negotiate this issue given that it took a long time for 
the Indonesian comfort women to step forward.132 
The Social Affairs Minister’s remarks, which were delivered on November 14, 
1996, depicted the ignorance of the government with regard to the rights of former 
Indonesian comfort women. The attitude revealed by stating that it is the culture of 
the Indonesian people to not open up the shameful past of Indonesian women and 
that it was too late to settle the problem using the Peace Treaty, was seemingly used 
to cover up the intentional reticence of the government to openly initiate legal claims 
against Japan and instead, choosing to  receive the AWF fund. 
Indonesian comfort activists were not satisfied by the decision of the Indonesian 
government for not allowing individual payments to the victims. However, there 
were no efforts to improve the situation. Research and data collection about these 
matters are gradually coming to a halt. It appears that the activism is cooling down 
these days as the number of survivors is waning. 
3.5. Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
There were several occurrences where local remedies had been sought by 
Korean former comfort women but mostly were unsuccessful. The first local remedy 
was initiated by Kim Hak Sun, the first Korean comfort women who told her story 
in an international forum. She and a group of Koreans filed a lawsuit against the 
government of Japan for damages incurred during the Pacific War in December of 
1991. She was sponsored by the Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved 
Families at that time.133 
Other former comfort women initiated separate lawsuits. One was filed in 1993 
by four former members of Cheongsindae at the Shimonoseki branch of the 
Yamaguchi District Court over their abduction to Shimonoseki to be comfort women 
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during the war. They demanded an official apology and compensation of damages 
for $2.29 million.134 
On February 6, 1994, the Korean Council and twenty-seven comfort women 
survivors filed a criminal complaint with the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors 
Office in order to seek criminal investigations and prosecution of the perpetrators of 
these crimes against the women. Nevertheless, the claim was in vain because it was 
not accepted on the grounds of being past the statute of limitation. Missing names of 
the perpetrators and facts damaged the case, as did the inadequacy of the penalty 
articles.135 
Similarly, the Japanese High Court of Justice rejected the appeal of a former 
Korean comfort woman on November 30, 2000. The court acknowledged her 
suffering, but held that she, as an individual, did not have the right under 
international law to file a claim for compensation against a state. The court also 
stated that the statute of limitations for Koreans living in Japan to claim 
compensation for war damages had ended in 1985.136 
In September of 2000, a group of fifteen former Korean comfort women filed a 
class action suit in Washington District Court demanding compensation for crimes 
committed against them.137 The suit was filed under the jurisdiction granted by the 
US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789. This act permits foreigners to file any 
civil action against foreigners only for tort, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.138 This also includes human rights violation 
cases. The federal court dismissed the claims on the grounds that Japan could not be 
sued because it had not waived its sovereign immunity and the court was not the 
proper forum for this type of tort. Instead, the court recommended that the claimants 
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use interstate (government to government) mechanisms to resolve the issue. The 
claimants appealed to the US Supreme Court only to have the dismissal upheld.139 
Generally, the comfort women who initiated local remedies presented similar 
demands. The demands are (1) a formal apology to individuals, (2) recognition of 
the existence of the comfort women system, (3) Japanese governmental recognition 
of the international crimes committed against comfort women, (4) official 
compensation from the state budget drafted based on a special legislation, (5) 
construction of monuments, (6) the correction of Japanese history textbooks to 
expose the truth about comfort women and (7) identification and prosecution under 
Japanese law of all perpetrators involved in military sexual slavery. These demands 
were summarized by the Special Rapporteur Coomaraswamy in her 1996 report.  
In contrast to the avid effort to exhaust local remedies by Korean comfort 
women and their activists, Indonesian comfort women, as well as their 
representatives,  have not filed any civil lawsuits or criminal complaints against 
Japan owing to a lack of knowledge and due to the reticence of the Indonesian 
government to facilitate the legal process. This is proved by the non-existence of 
proceedings records between former Indonesian comfort women and the Japanese 
government before any Japanese domestic courts. 
3.6. National Regulations Regarding Diplomatic Protection 
The Korean government appears to be more proactive in protecting the rights 
of former comfort women through national legislations. The most fundamental 
provision is Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea which, 
through further interpretation, grants the right to receive protection to its citizens. 
The provision itself does not literally confer the duty of the state to perform 
diplomatic protection. However, in the case of Korean comfort women, it may create 
legal obligation for Korea to perform diplomatic protection, either through 
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diplomatic channels or judicial proceedings, as instructed by the Constitutional 
Court of Korea in the case of the comfort women constitutional complaint concluded 
in 2011. 
As the first step to implement Article 2 Section 2 of the constitution, On 8 
October of 2008, the Parliament of Republic Korea issued a resolution in order to 
press the government of Japan to take responsibility for the crimes conducted against 
the former Korean comfort women. The resolution has three points of demand as 
follows: 
- The parliament demands that the Japanese government officially present a full 
apology to the former Korean comfort women as they were sexually enslaved by 
the Japanese imperial soldiers since 1930s until the end of World War II. 
- The parliament demands first that the Japanese government admit that the comfort 
women system was a crime against humanity and second that it provide adequate 
and effective compensation to the comfort women by decisive action, such as 
having the Japanese Diet establish related regulations.  
- The government of the Republic of Korea should ensure that the Japanese 
government officially apologizes, provides compensation to the victims and allows 
for the teaching of facts in Japanese history textbooks as a manifestation of Japan’s 
willingness to accept the recommendation by the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights and the CEDAW Committee. 
Due to the uncertainty when waiting for the adequate and effective 
compensation from the Japanese government, the government of Korea also used its 
own national budget in an effort to redress the former comfort women financially. 
This policy was implemented through the “Act on the Support of Livelihood 
Stability for the Former Comfort Women Drafted into the Japanese Forces under 
Japanese Colonial Rule.” Based on this regulation, the Korean government provides 
support for living expenses in a lump sum and on a monthly basis to the former 
comfort women. 
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In the case of Indonesia, there was no specific national legislations which aimed 
to protect and enforce the rights of the former comfort women. The only relevant 
legislation is the provision of Article 18 of the Indonesian Foreign Relations Act 
(Law No. 37/1999), which confers the duty to the Indonesian government to protect 
Indonesian nationals, both natural and legal persons, who faces difficult situations in 
foreign states overseas.140 This may imply the duty of the state to perform diplomatic 
protection of its citizens. 
However, following the peace treaty between Japan and Indonesia, and despite 
the testimony of the former Indonesian comfort women, no single instance of 
legislation was enacted to redress the injuries and enforce the rights of the women. 
Even after the acceptance of the AWF’s fund in 1996, not even any single regulation 
was established in order to distribute the funds to the individual comfort women.  
3.7. Domestic Measures to Enforce Human Rights 
Due to the uncertainty of the comfort women issue settlement with Japan, the 
Korean government enacted the “Act on Operation and Management of Claim Fund” 
on February 19, 1966 (repealed by Law No.3613 on December 31, 1982) following 
the reception of three hundred million US dollars from Japan in a non-payable grant 
which was based on the 1965 Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning 
Property and Claims and the Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea 
and Japan. However, the beneficiaries of the grant were limited to deceased victims 
who had been forced against their will to become sexual slave by Japan. The 
government enacted the “Act on the Support of Livelihood Stability for the Former 
Comfort Women Drafted into the Japanese Forces under Japanese Colonial Rule.” 
Based on this regulation, the Korean government provided support for living 
expenses in a lump sum on a monthly basis to the former Korean comfort women by 
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using its national budget. This also included priority rental for housing, living 
allowances and medical aid and nursing. 
The Korean comfort women were not satisfied with this measure and still felt 
that their fundamental rights were infringed upon the government’s non-exercise of 
diplomatic protection. Therefore, the women filed a constitutional complaint with 
the Constitutional Court of Korea. The substance of the complaint is that the Korean 
government had failed to resolve their damage claim problem against Japan through 
diplomatic channels or arbitration under Article 3 of the Agreement on the 
Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and the Economic 
Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan signed in June 22, 1965 
(hereinafter the agreement).141 This was due to the dispute between Japan and Korea 
over the interpretation of whether the rights of the comfort women to claim damages 
against Japan had been extinguished by Article 2 Section 1 of the Agreement.142 
Japan refused to provide them with compensation on the grounds that the claims had 
been quenched by the aforementioned provision, while the Korean government 
denied that the comfort women claims issue had been settled by the agreement. This 
omission to act by the Korean government was alleged to infringe on the comfort 
women’s fundamental right under Article 2 Section 2143 regarding the right to receive  
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protection  and Article 10 144  of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea  
(hereinafter the Korean Constitution) and is therefore unconstitutional. 145 
The Korean government, positioned as the respondent facing the complaint, 
stated that it had made its best effort to settle the comfort women issue by raising 
this issue continuously in the international community. The government was focused 
on the more important issue of calling on the Japanese government to conduct 
thorough fact-finding about the crimes, to deliver a formal apology and undertake 
reflection and to introduce the issue through proper history education of the Japanese 
young generations.146 
The government stated that the decision to postpone pursuing further settlement, 
which was perceived by the claimant as an omission, constituted a legitimate 
exercise of diplomatic discretion broadly enjoyed by the Korean government. 
Moreover, the government perceived that the pursuance of demanding that Japan 
accepts its legal responsibility had not resulted in a certain outcome.  Thus, the 
government decided not to hold the government of Japan financially accountable. 
Instead, the government claimed that it had made its best effort to provide the victims 
with financial assistance and compensation by itself.147 
As the first step in examining this case, the constitutional court adduced that the 
point of the case is whether the Korean government has the obligation to take 
diplomatic efforts or the like under the Article 3 of the Agreement. Then, the court 
had to answer the question whether the Korean government action or inaction in this 
case had infringed on the comfort women’s fundamental right of protection under 
the constitution. 
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The constitutional court responded to the Korean government’s argument, 
stating that the non-exercise of governmental power in the case of comfort women 
refers to the duty to use the dispute settlement procedures in Article 3 of the 
Agreement, in order to seek a clear interpretation of whether the damages are still 
valid to be claimed. This mechanism should be enforced by the government because 
Japan still believes that the agreement extinguished the damages claim, which in fact 
it did not. The diplomatic action that the government claimed had been exhausted, 
through raising the issue in international community, was proved to be insufficient 
for the victims’ and the damage claims were still ignored.148  
In addition, the willingness of Japan as a delinquent state in the comfort women 
case to admit its guilt and taking responsibility would be the most effective solution 
to restore the human worth and dignity of the complainants stipulated in Article 10 
of the Korean constitution, rather than the government’s provision of financial 
support to the victims. Thus, the duty of the Korean government to act according to 
the constitution was not accomplished merely by offering some livelihood support 
to the women.149  
The court recognised that the Korean government enjoyed wide discretion in 
the domain of diplomacy, thus it was wholly up to the government to exercise or not 
to exercise diplomatic protection of the comfort women. However, the rights of the 
women are guaranteed under the constitution and are binding with regard to all state 
powers. The domain of diplomacy is an aspect of executive power, which is not 
exempted from the binding force of the constitution. Consequently, it could not be 
excluded from those subject to judicial review. As a result, failure to fulfil the duty 
of taking diplomatic actions which heavily intertwined with the people’s 
fundamental rights, construed a clear violation of the constitutional duty to protect 
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fundamental rights. It should be declared as an act of fundamental rights 
infringement and is therefore unconstitutional.150 
In order to avoid this infringement, the discretion of the government should be 
restricted to the reasonable scope, which must be consistent with the binding force 
of fundamental rights on government power. This means that the discretion must be 
exercised by taking into account the significance of violated rights, the level of 
urgency, and possibility of providing a legal remedy and whether the act will be 
consistent with the national interests of the state.151 
Pertaining to the significance of the violated rights, the constitutional court 
agreed with the opinion of international jurists, that the crimes of sexual slavery by 
the Japanese military constituted a crime against humanity, which is undeniably 
identified as a grave violation of human rights. The comfort women victims’ right to 
claim damages from the government of Japan is not simply an aspect of property 
rights enshrined under the constitution, but also relates to the post-facto restoration 
of dignity, value and personal liberty that was and has been continuously violated. 
Therefore blocking the repayment of damage claims, is not simply infringing on 
property rights, but also infringing on the fundamental dignity and value of human 
beings.152 
The court argued that the need of legal remedy is urgent because although local 
remedies had been exhausted, almost none of them led to actual redress. It was 
already over 60 years since the end of the World War II, when the crime was 
committed against these women, and claims to the domestic courts of Japan did not 
bring any satisfying results. Moreover, the advancing age of the survivors and the 
fact that the number of living survivors is gradually being reduced made redress more 
urgent.153 
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The court is aware that it is difficult to impose a duty of action on the Korean 
government if there is absolutely no chance of providing a legal remedy to the 
complainants. However, a duty of action is not only required when a legal remedy is 
clearly guaranteed, but also when the possibility of obtaining one exists. In this case, 
the possibility to claim damages against the Japanese government existed, hence, 
Korean government should consider the victims’ requests. This is in line with 
recommended practice stipulated in Article 19 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection adopted by the International Law Commission in 2006 which states that 
the state must listen to an injured national’s opinion whether or not to exercise 
diplomatic protection.154 
The Korean government argued that its reason for restraint with regard to 
invoking Japanese legal responsibility was the fear of a destructive legal dispute or 
strained diplomatic relations with Japan. This was perceived by the Korean 
government as a threat to national interests. In contrast, the constitutional court 
rebutted that argument by stating that destructive disputes and severances of 
diplomatic relations were not qualified as proportional reasons to disregard legal 
remedies for complainants who are facing serious basic rights violations. Moreover, 
it neither constitutes a national interest to be considered seriously. Instead, the 
settlement of this issue would be more constructive to the future amicable 
relationship between Korea and Japan because all of the denial of historical facts and 
misunderstandings between the two states could be corrected. Thus, the mutual 
understanding and trust between the countries and their peoples could be deepened 
and the action could prevent the similar tragedies by learning from the past.155 
Eventually, the court concluded that the Korean government’s omission in the 
comfort women case violates the constitution and the fundamental rights of these 
women as enshrined in Article 2 Section 2 and Article 10 of the Korean constitution. 
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The court also added a sub-conclusion that the Korean government did not have the 
discretion to not take action and that all the efforts claimed to be taken by the 
government are not sufficient to be deemed that it fulfilled its duty of action to uptake 
a dispute settlement procedure against Japan under Article 3 of the Agreement.156 
Following the decision, the Korean Constitutional Court exhorted the Korean 
government to take the following concrete actions: 
1. fulfilling its duty of action to undertake dispute settlement procedures against 
Japan under Article 3 of the Agreement;157 and 
2. resolving the sexual slavery issue by the Japanese military at the interstate level 
with the utmost effort.158 
The court wrapped the above-mentioned recommendation with the recognition that 
its execution can only be entrusted to political power. The court could not force the 
Korean government to push the bounds of the constitution, laws, and constitutional 
interpretations either to implement the recommendation. This is the constitutional 
boundary that must be adhered to by the constitutional court under the principle of 
separation of powers.159 
While the Republic of Korea was successful in controlling governmental 
discretion in the field of diplomatic protection through a judicial review by the 
constitutional court, the Indonesian government did not exercise any measures to 
support the comfort women there since the acceptance of the AWF’s fund in 1996. 
Indonesian comfort women also could not file a protest against the Indonesian 
government regarding to its omission due to the lack of availability of a 
constitutional complaint mechanism in the Indonesian legal system. This vacancy of 
law has made legal remedy an unsolved issue until now.  
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3.8. Diplomatic Protection  
The Korean Constitutional Court decision was most likely the reason why the 
Korean government decided to hold high-level consultations with the Japanese 
government from February of 2015 to December of 2015. The result of the eight 
rounds of consultation in total was a bilateral agreement with Japan concluded on 
December 28, 2015 (hereinafter the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral agreement). The 
agreement has six elements of content consisting of the followings: 
1. The Japanese government’s responsibility 
The issue of comfort women was a matter involving the Japanese military 
authorities, that severely injured the honour and dignity of many women. In this 
regard, the government of Japan painfully acknowledges its responsibility.160 
2. Apologies by the Japanese government 
Prime Minister of Japan expressed anew sincere apologies and remorse from the 
bottom of his heart to all those who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable 
physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.161 
3. Monetary measures by the Japanese government 
The government of Japan will take measures with its own budget to heal the 
psychological wounds of all former comfort women. More specifically, the 
government of the Republic of Korea will establish a foundation for the purpose 
of providing assistance to the former comfort women. The government of Japan 
will contribute from its budget a lump sum of fund to this foundation. The 
governments of Korea and Japan will cooperate to implement programs to restore 
the honour and dignity and to heal the psychological wounds of all former 
comfort women.162 
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4. Final and irreversible resolution 
The issue of comfort women will be finally and irreversibly resolved on the 
condition that the above-mentioned measures are faithfully implemented.163 
5. Memorial statues in front of the Japanese embassy in Korea and overseas 
This was a non-disclosed element. From the early phase of the consultations, the 
Japanese government demanded to relocate the memorial statutes in front of 
Japanese embassy in Seoul and overseas. Japan also hoped Korea would persuade 
the concerned groups who initiated the erection of the statutes. 
6. Refrain from reprobation and criticism in international forums 
This was also a non-disclosed agreement in which Korea will refrain  from 
reprobation and criticism in international forums, if Japan implements the 
measures promised by its government faithfully. 
The bilateral agreement between Korea and Japan did not receive a positive 
response from the international community. For instance, the CEDAW committee 
through its Universal Periodic Review of Japan in 2016 (seventh and eight sessions) 
criticized the Japanese government’s attitude following the bilateral agreement with 
the Republic Korea and expressed regret with regard to certain points:164 
1. that the announcement of the bilateral agreement with Republic of Korea did not 
fully adopt a victim-centered approach; 
2. that some of the victims have died without obtaining unequivocal recognition of 
the state responsibility for the serious human rights violations they suffered; 
3. that Japan has not admitted its obligation under international human rights law 
towards comfort women in other countries; and 
4. that Japan still persists in deleting references to the comfort women issue in 
school textbooks. 
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Based on the findings above, the CEDAW Committee recommended that Japan 
execute the following measures:165 
1. recognise the right of victims to a remedy and accordingly provide full and 
effective redress and reparations, including compensation, satisfaction, official 
apologies and rehabilitation services; 
2. take into consideration the views of victims when implementing the bilateral 
agreement announced in December of 2015 and ensure their rights to truth, justice 
and reparation; 
3. integrate the issue of the comfort women in school textbooks and ensure that the 
historical facts are objectively presented to students and the public; 
4. inform concerned parties as to whether the afore-mentioned measures have been 
implemented in the next periodic reports. 
Not only the Japanese government, but also the Korean government, as the 
victims’ national state, could not escape from the CEDAW Committee’s criticism of 
its policy through the 2015 bilateral agreement. On the occasion of the eighth 
Universal Periodic Review of the Republic of Korea, the committee stated that the 
effort did not employ a victim-centered approach because there was clear opposition 
of victims/survivors and their families to the establishment of the Reconciliation and 
Healing Foundation. Therefore, it recommended that the Republic of Korea ensure 
that the views of the victims or survivors and their families be taken into 
consideration when implementing the bilateral agreement. It also obliges them to 
ensure that the victims, survivors and their families’ rights are fully upheld through 
rehabilitation and to provide prompt and adequate compensation without delay.166 
All of the criticism towards the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral agreement was rooted 
in the review report of the agreement conducted by a task force established by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea during the President Moon Jae In 
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administration. The members of the task force were inaugurated on July 31, 2017. 
The aim of the task force was to assess the content of the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral 
agreement. Among the objects of assessment, the substance and structure of the 
agreement, as well as a victim-centered resolution were legally significant to 
measure whether the agreement constituted a proper and effective form of diplomatic 
protection for the former Korean Comfort women.167 
First, the task force commented on the elements of disclosed agreement which 
are explained as follows: 
1. On the acknowledgement of responsibility, a redaction of the words which Japan 
used, “painfully acknowledges its responsibility,” is sought. These only imply 
moral responsibility, instead of legal responsibility, which is unacceptable for the 
Korean public.168 
2. The apologies made by the Japanese government were not implemented in the 
form of a cabinet resolution, which is irreversible and has higher formality, even 
after the agreement content was released to the public. This did not accord with 
what victims and pressure groups have been demanding continually.169 
3. After the announcement of the agreement, the Japanese government stated that 
the nature of the monetary funds allocated to the Reconciliation and Healing 
Foundation is not reparation based on any legal responsibility. The victims and 
activists could not accept this statement. Unless the legal responsibility issue is 
completely resolved, monetary funds promised by Japan will mean nothing.170  
4. The usage of “final and irreversible resolution” in the agreement became 
controversial in Korea after the agreement was announced. The task force found 
that the Korean government intended that the Japanese Prime Minister’s formal 
apology be backed by a cabinet decision to guarantee the irreversibility of the 
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apology. However, Japan does not interpret the phrase similarly to how Korea 
does.171 
Second, the task force regretted that in the structure of the agreements, there were 
indeed non-disclosed elements which were agreed upon by the parties. The non-
disclosed parts contained sensitive issues, particularly for the Korean public, such as 
the request from Japan to persuade pressure groups such as the Korean Council not 
to raise their voices in international forums, the measure regarding memorial statues 
in front of the Embassy of Japan in Korea and other countries and the request to stop 
using the term “sexual slavery.”172 
From the beginning of the negotiations, the task force discovered that the Korean 
government did not confirm the existence of the non-disclosed agreements to the 
public and accepted Japan’s request to keep these secret. The Korean government 
agreed to the request of persuading pressure groups and promised to use the term 
“issue of the comfort women victims of the Japanese military” to replace the term 
“sexual slavery.” Whereas the request to remove the memorial statues was rejected 
on the basis that it was not involved in setting up the monuments, it still accorded to 
refrain from supporting such efforts. The existence of these non-disclosed elements 
shows that the bilateral agreement was government-centered and not victim or 
people-centered.173 
Thirdly, the task force regretted that the nature of the agreement was not a treaty 
but a political agreement. Both governments of the states verbally confirmed at the 
meeting of foreign ministers the content of the agreement and announced it at a joint 
press conference thereafter. The announcements were separately posted by both side 
on their respective official website. However, what Japan posted was discordant 
relative to what Korea posted with regard to words redaction issue. These facts 
triggered suspicions and controversies regarding what was agreed upon in reality and 
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caused many to wonder whether the publication included all aspects of the 
agreements.174 The binding force of the agreement under international law is also 
uncertain because it was unwritten and informal. 
The Korean government during the Park Geun Hye administration initially did 
not deny that the victim-centered resolution must be applied to solve the problem. A 
victim-centered approach means that remedies and reparations should be made in 
accordance with the victims at the center. The task force argued that Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was initially in accord with this principle in that they contacted the 
victims and the pressure groups on more than fifteen occasions in order to record 
their demands. The Korean victims have repeatedly stated that they have three key 
demands to the Japanese government. They are the acknowledgement of 
responsibility, an official apology and individual compensation. These three 
demands were more important than anything else to be included in the international 
agreement in resolving the comfort women issue. Unless these demands are fulfilled, 
the issue will revert to where it started, even if the two governments seemingly reach 
an agreement. 175 
However, the Korean Ministry of foreign affair failed to implement a victim-
centered resolution when initiating the bilateral agreement with Japan. During the 
negotiation process, Korean government through Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
explained to the victims what was being negotiated. Nevertheless, it did not inform 
the victims that there were measures that bound Korea, such as the confirmation of 
the final and irreversible resolution, as well as refraining from criticism in 
international forums. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also failed to comprehend the 
victims’ views regarding the form and the amount of reparations As a result, the 
demands of the victims were not in accord with the content of the bilateral 
agreement.176 
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Without disregarding the commentary of the governments and the United Nations, 
the assessment as to whether the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral agreement could be 
addressed as a form of diplomatic protection, should be analysed in the light of the 
legal definition of diplomatic protection provided by the ILC Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection 2006. Draft Article 1 defines diplomatic protection as the 
invocation by a state, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful 
settlement, of the responsibility of another state for an injury caused by an 
internationally wrongful act of that state to a natural or legal person that is a national 
of the former state with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.177 From 
the definition provided, it can be concluded that several requirements exist for an 
action to be categorized as diplomatic protection. They are: 
1. The object of invocation must be the responsibility of another state regarding an 
injury caused by an internationally wrongful act or what is prevalently addressed 
as international legal responsibility. Thus, an invocation of moral responsibility 
is not included. 
2. Invocation should be done through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful 
settlement. 
The 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral agreement fulfilled the second requirement given 
that it was constituted a peaceful settlement in the form of bilateral negotiation 
between the Republic of Korea as the state of nationality and Japan as the delinquent 
state who is liable for the crime against the Korean comfort women. However, 
whether the negotiation fulfilled the first requirement must be assessed further. 
The term “invocation” in Draft Article 1 should be interpreted in conjunction with 
Draft Article 42 on State Responsibility 2001. Invocation for the purposes of this 
article should constitute a measure with a relatively formal character, for example, 
the raising or presentation of a claim against another state or the commencement of 
proceedings before an international court or tribunal. A state does not invoke the 
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responsibility of another state merely because it delivers criticism to that state for a 
breach and urges the conformity with regard to an obligation or even reserves its 
rights or protests. A plain protest against a breach of international law by another 
state or reminding it of its international responsibilities with reference to a treaty is 
not an invocation of responsibility. Such informal diplomatic contacts do not amount 
to an invocation of responsibility unless they involve specific claims by the state 
concerned, such as a demand for compensation as the consequence of the breach, or 
a specific action such as the filing of an application before a competent international 
tribunal or even the taking of countermeasures. 178  The scope of responsibility 
invoked must be based on the breach of international law or must possess a legal 
characteristic. Invoking moral responsibility without explicitly pointing out the 
violated international legal basis does not amount to “invocation” according to Draft 
Article 1 on Diplomatic Protection and Draft Article 42 on State Responsibility. 
The legal definition explained in the previous paragraph must be utilized to assess 
all of the elements of the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral agreement. First, the assessment 
should be based on the negotiation process when concluding the agreement. It should 
be verified as to whether the Korean government intended or had explicitly 
expressed itself to invoke the legal responsibility of Japan during the process of 
consultation and negotiation between the two states. This can only be revealed by 
examining the minutes or treatises of the negotiation. However, the real intent of the 
Korean government has remained unknown thus far, as those resources are not 
available to the public.  
Although draft articles on diplomatic protection permit the invocation of 
responsibility through diplomatic channels, the process of negotiation appears to be 
lacking legal formalities based on Draft Article 42 on State Responsibility 2001 
because during the negotiation process, the direction of invoking legal responsibility, 
such as presentation of comfort women claims was not envisaged and no plan to 
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elevate the proceeding to an application before a competent tribunal or even a plan 
of countermeasures to resolve the injuries was created. Thus, unless it was clear that 
the real intent of the Korean government is to invoke the legal responsibility of Japan, 
the negotiation process of the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral agreement could not be 
deemed an attempt at diplomatic protection.179 
The next step is to assess the outcome of the negotiation. Although the comfort 
women bilateral agreement does not qualify as a formal treaty, if Japan and Korea 
intended the agreement to have legal binding force, that force will be attached to the 
agreement. The most important factor to form this type of binding force is the 
intention of the parties to establish an international legal obligation to the agreement. 
This intention can be inferred from the operative wordings of the agreement and 
from other circumstances influencing the agreement.180 Usually, the wordings of 
legal obligation will involve operative words such as “should,” “oblige” or “must.” 
However, such norm identifiers do not appear in the purported text of the 2015 
Japan-Korea bilateral agreement published on the websites of both governments. 
There is no explicit provision regulating legal responsibility and/or consequences 
from non-performance of an obligation in the text either.181 In contrast, the text only 
declared that Japan “painfully acknowledges its responsibility,” which merely 
indicates the recognition of moral responsibility. There is also no establishment of 
formal proceeding to resolve the compensation issue. Thus, the agreement text did 
not express any intention of either government to establish an instance of legal 
binding force. Consequently, it only fell within the ambit of political agreement, 
rather than being an international legal agreement between the two countries. Since 
it is not a legal agreement, it failed to fulfil the definition of the invocation of 
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responsibility, which is required to satisfy the legal requirement of diplomatic 
protection. This failure resulted in the conclusion that the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral 
agreement does not constitute any action equivalent to diplomatic protection. 
If the assessment of the negotiation process and the result is combined, two 
probabilities can be assumed from the circumstances of the 2015 Japan-Korea 
bilateral agreement. First, the Korean government’s actual intent during the 
negotiation process was not to invoke the legal responsibility of Japan, resulting in 
non-acknowledgement of the said responsibility. Second and alternatively, the 
Korean government indeed intended to invoke the legal responsibility of Japan, but 
they failed to persuade Japan to admit any legal responsibility, resulting in the mere 
admittance of moral responsibility. Thus, from the point of view of the Korean 
government, two conclusions can be extracted. First, there may have been no 
diplomatic protection attempt from the beginning of the negotiation process. Second, 
by judging from the result, there may have been an attempt, but failed and thus it 
was reflected in the agreement. 
The 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral agreement could not be addressed as diplomatic 
protection because it is only a political agreement. However, it indeed constituted a 
measure to respond to the Korean constitutional court decision rendered on August 
30, 2011, which has a binding force on the executive organ, particularly in restricting 
its discretionary power. Following the court ruling, President Lee Myung Bak’s 
administration requested bilateral consultations with Japan twice, in September and 
in November of 2011, but did not receive a response. In December of 2011, President 
Lee Myung Bak rejected the humanitarian solution proposed by Japan, known as the 
Sasae Proposal, since it did not include acknowledgement of state responsibility. The 
effort to implement the court decision was passed down to the Park Geun Hye 
administration and starting in February of 2013, she adopted a policy of persuading 
Japan to hold working-level consultations. This pursuit led to the negotiations which 
took place in 2015, following the conclusion of the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral 
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agreement. The Korean government itself, through the Report on the Review of the 
bilateral agreement published on December 27, 2017, confirmed that the driving 
force behind these sequences of events was the government willingness to implement 
the constitutional court decision.182 
Presumably, the 2015 Japan-Korea bilateral agreement should have been a proper 
diplomatic protection attempt in accordance with the legal definition provided in the 
ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006, had it been executed properly 
with the sole purpose of invoking the legal responsibility of Japan. Despite the 
massive criticism received by the government regarding this agreement, the 
international community actually appreciates the efforts of the Republic of Korea to 
open a diplomatic channel and discuss the issue face to face with Japan. Although it 
still has issues with a victim-centered resolution and the admittance of legal 
responsibility, the efforts of the Korean government are still worthwhile since they 
were better than a refusal to do anything as in Indonesian case. 
The relationship between Indonesia and Japan after World War II was completely 
different from that between Korea and Japan. Instead of an economically competitive 
relationship, as observed between Korea and Japan, Indonesia and Japan has an 
interdependent relationship. During the cold war, the United States and Japan 
become allies. Indonesia took the side of the US and Japan under president 
Soeharto’s New Order Regime. Indonesia welcomed Japan as one of the largest 
contributors of financial aid and an investment to the country. Citizens strongly 
opposed Japan’s investment plan in Indonesia, even staging the Malari riot in Jakarta, 
considering that the citizens still held sentiments towards the Japanese occupation of 
Indonesia. Nevertheless, the protests and riots were repressed by the Indonesian 
military under the command of President Soeharto. 183  This indicates that the 
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government prioritized the help offered by the Japanese government for the sake of 
Indonesian economic development and thus chose to ignore the past.  
It was understandable that forgetting the past for the sake of amicable diplomatic 
relations between the two countries was a part of the Indonesian government’s 
foreign policy. However, due to Indonesia’s strong dependency on Japan in order to 
develop its economy, the comfort women issue appeared to be forgotten. The 
government chose to set aside the issue considering the large economic influence of 
Japan on Indonesia. If the comfort women issue was passed on to the negotiating 
table, a considerable loss leading to the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan 
could occur. 
It must be noted that there are ways other than an interstate agreements 
mechanism to demand reparations and compensations. These include unilateral 
declarations by responsible states or demands from the victims themselves. Seeing 
that counting on the government to initiate an interstate agreement with Japan would 
be in vain, Indonesian comfort women activists have voiced their demands for 
reparations and compensations directly to Japan through international forums. The 
movement has existed since 1993. However, with regard to international human 
rights violations in Asia, the most effective choice of methods to settle the problem 
is still dominated by the interstate mechanism. It is uncertain when the Indonesian 
comfort women and activists will use this method to pursue Japan to acknowledge 
its legal responsibility. The willingness of the Indonesian government to initiate the 
interstate mechanism is desperately needed for complete settlement of this issue. 
3.9. Overall Comparison between the Republic of Korea and 
the Republic of Indonesia 
Overall comparisons between Korea and Indonesia in the case of diplomatic 
protection of former comfort women are concluded in the following table. 
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Table 1: Comparison between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of 
Indonesia Regarding Former Comfort Women Diplomatic Protection 
Scope Republic of Korea Indonesia 
Existence of activism Activism is strong in terms 
of sufficient governmental 
support, strong structure 
of organisations and 
obvious activities in both 
national and international 
field. 
Activism is weak in terms 
of zero governmental 
support, unstructured 
organisations which led to 
dissolutions of some 
groups and lack of obvious 
activities both in national 
and international level. 
Response to AWF Rejected the fund Received the fund 
Exhaustion of local 
Remedies 
1. Lawsuit against Japan 
initiated by Kim Hak 
Sun on December of 
1991 
2. Lawsuit filed by four 
former comfort women 
in 1993 at Shimonoseki 
branch of the 
Yamaguchi District 
Court 
3. Criminal complaints to 
the Tokyo District 
Public Prosecutors 
Office filed by twenty-
seven survivors 
represented by the 
Korean Council on 
February 6, 1994 
4. Appeal of a former 
Korean comfort woman 
rejected by Japanese 
High Court of Justice on 
November 30, 2000 
5. Class action suit filed by 
fifteen former Korean 
comfort women filed in 
the Washington District 
Court 
None 
National regulations  1. Article 2 Section 2 of  
the Constitution of the 
Republic of Korea 
2. Republic of Korea’s 
Parliament resolution 
dated October 8, 2008 
None 
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3. Act on the Support of 
Livelihood Stability for 
the Former Comfort 
Women Drafted into 
the Japanese Forces 
under Japanese 
Colonial Rule 
Domestic measures Constitutional Court 
Decision on Challenge 
against the Act of 
Omission Involving 
Article 3 of “Agreement 
on the Settlement of 
Problem concerning 
Property and Claims and 
the Economic Cooperation 
between the Republic of 
Korea and Japan” No. 23-
2(A) KCCR 366, 




or any attempts that 
could have constituted 
diplomatic protection 
1. Petition submitted 
through UNCHR on 
March 4, 1992 in order 
to invoke Japan to 
investigate the crime 
against comfort women 




It is concluded through the table above that the government of the Republic of 
Korea provided better diplomatic protection to its former comfort women than the 
Indonesian government. This was caused by many factors, mainly differences in the 
legal and political position of the two states. This section will analyse those 
differences. 
Some legal factors influenced the difference between Indonesian and Korean 
government in considering the merit of undertaking diplomatic protection of the 
comfort women. The first legal reason was different views of the two governments 
in interpreting their respective peace treaty with Japan. The Republic of Korea 
perceived that the comfort women issue were not settled by their peace treaty and it 
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is in opposition to the Japanese persistent interpretation that the issue had been 
resolved by the agreement. In contrast, the Indonesian government accords with the 
Japanese view that their peace treaty resolved the issue of all individual injuries 
during World War II and supposedly included the comfort women damage claims. 
The government perceived that the comfort women and activists supposed to present 
this issue immediately after the treaty was concluded. However, when the victims 
finally came out and testified about the crime, the government said that it was too 
late to file a claim as the fund had been used up immediately for other damage claims.  
Thus, the Indonesian government decided that the best way to solve this problem is 
through the acceptance of AWF’s fund. It is shown from this fact that Indonesian 
government did not understand that the comfort women issue is a serious 
international human rights issue and the claim arising from the issue should be 
available to be presented anytime, regardless the treaty provisions or any statute of 
limitations. 
The second legal reason is that there are some significant differences between 
peace treaties concluded between Japan and the two states respectively. In order to 
obtain a better comparison of the peace treaty between Japan and the two states 
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Table 2: Differences between  Japan-Korea Peace Treaty 1965 and Japan-
Indonesia Peace Treaty 1958 
Points of 
Comparison 
1965 Japan-Korea Treaty 1958 Japan-Indonesia 
Treaty 
Official name 
of the treaty 
Japan and the Republic of 
Korea Agreement on the 
settlement of problems 
concerning property and claims 
and on economic co-operation, 
Signed at Tokyo, on June 22, 
1965184 
Treaty of Peace between 
Japan and the Republic of 
Indonesia, Signed at Djakarta 
January 20, 1958185 
Reparation 
clause 
Article I regulates the amount 
of reparation. 
 
The contracting parties confirm 
that the problem concerning 
property, rights and interests of 
the two contracting parties and 
their nationals (including 
juridical persons) and 
concerning claims between the 
contracting parties and their 
nationals including those 
provided for in Article IV, 
Paragraph (a) of the treaty of 
peace with Japan signed in the 
city of San Francisco on 
September 8, 1951 is settled 
completely and finally (Article 
II Paragraph 1). 
 
It is agreed that “property, 
rights and interests” means all 
kinds of substantial rights 
which are recognized under law 
to be of property value (Agreed 
Minutes to The Agreement 
Paragraph 1). 
Japan is prepared to pay 
reparations to the Republic of 
Indonesia in order to 
compensate the damage and 
suffering caused by Japan 
during the war (Article 4 
Paragraph 1). 
Waiver clause The High Contracting Parties 
confirm that the problems 
The Republic of Indonesia 
waives all reparations claims 
                                                          
184  “Japan and Republic of Korea Agreement on the settlement of problems concerning property and 
claims and on economic co-operation,” signature June 22, 1965, United Nation Treaty Series, Vol. 
583, No. 8473 (1966): 219, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-
583-I-8473-English.pdf. 
185  “Japan and Indonesia Treaty of Peace,” signature January 20, 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, 
No.4688 (1959): 228, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20324/v324.pdf. 
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concerning the property, rights, 
and interests of the two 
signatories and their nationals 
(including juridical persons) 
and the claims right between 
the High Contracting Parties 
and between their 
nationals…have been settled 
completely and finally (Article 
2 Paragraph 1). 
of the Republic of Indonesia 
and all other claims of the 
Republic of Indonesia and its 
nationals arising out of any 
actions taken by Japan and its 
nationals in the course of the 
prosecution of the war 




Any dispute between the 
contracting parties concerning 
the interpretation and 
implementation of the present 
agreement shall be settled, first 
of all, through diplomatic 
channels (Article III Paragraph 
1). 
 
Any dispute which fails to be 
settled under the provision of 
Paragraph 1 shall be referred 
for decision to an arbitration 
board (Article III Paragraph 2). 
Any dispute arising out of the 
interpretation or application 
of this treaty shall be settled 
in the first instance by 
negotiation, and if no 
settlement is reached within a 
period of six months from the 
commencement of 
negotiations, the dispute 
shall, at the request of either 
contracting party, be referred 
for decision to the 




Registered to UN by Japan on 
December 15, 1966 
Registered by Japan on 
March 2, 1959 
 
The table shows that the reparation clause in Japan-Korea treaty only covers 
“substantial rights which are recognized under the law to be of property value”, while 
Japan-Indonesia treaty’s reparation clause covers all “the damage and suffering 
caused by Japan during the war.” It means that according to literal interpretation, 
what is covered for reparation in the Japan-Indonesia treaty is wider than what is 
covered in the Japan-Korea treaty. The Japan-Korea treaty specified that the rights 
must be recognized to be of “property value,” which hinders the literal interpretation 
to cover the comfort women claim since it includes intangible psychological 
damages suffered. In short, the probability to interpret the clause inapplicable to fit 
into the case of comfort women still exists if other treaty interpretation methods are 
used, such as by looking the original intent of the parties or by teleological 
interpretation. Thus, it is still a debatable issue between Japan and Korea. Yet, it is 
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easier to put the damages suffered by the comfort women in the coverage of 
reparation clause of Japan-Indonesia treaty since the literal formulation is broader 
and not restrictive to the tangible and property valued rights. 
Despite the wider scope of reparation provided by Japan-Indonesia peace treaty, 
the existence of waiver clause and dispute settlement choices in Japan-Indonesia 
peace treaty are more legally restricting the probability of presenting the claim of 
comfort women than the provisions of Japan-Korea treaty. Both treaties have waiver 
clause, which extinguished the rights to diplomatic protection through interstate 
claims and the claims filed by individuals against individuals. However, the waiver 
clause in Japan-Korea Treaty could only be applied to property, rights and interests 
which defined in the Agreed Minutes annexed to the treaty as all kinds of substantial 
rights of which the property values are recognised based on the law. The category 
was not formulated rigidly so that it opened the way to different interpretation 
between Japan and Korea whether the comfort women claim includes in that 
category. Different perceptions about the interpretation of this provision were rather 
profitable for Korea because it led to the dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, 
the phrase “between the High Contracting Parties and between their nationals” in the 
waiver clause only extinguished the right to diplomatic protection and the right of 
Korean nationals to file claims against Japanese nationals, but it does not extinguish 
Korean nationals’ claim rights against the Japanese government. Thus, attempts by 
the comfort women to sue the Japanese government in Japanese domestic court are 
valid and may become the basis of local remedies exhaustion.186 
The waiver clause in Japan-Indonesia treaty obliged Indonesia to refrain itself 
for presenting a new claims of any type rights, either by itself through diplomatic 
protection or by its nationals against Japan and Japanese nationals. The waiver was 
a condition accepted by Indonesia so that Japan agreed to implement the reparation 
                                                          
186  Seok Woo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, The Making of International Law in Korea: From Colony to Asian 
Power (Leiden and Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2016), 74. 
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clause by paying the money to Indonesian government. Nonetheless, following the 
development of international human rights law, the existence of this waiver clause 
must not hinder the presentation of damages claims for reparation arise from the 
gross violation of human rights. The clause is not effective since human rights issue 
covered by jus cogens absolutely prevails over the treaty as stated in Article 53 of 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
The dispute settlement choice in Japan-Indonesia treaty is also a source of 
problem. Japan-Korea treaty provided wide selection of non-judicial dispute 
settlement choices, such as all types of dispute settlement through diplomatic 
channel and arbitration as the last resort. As stipulated in 2006 ILC Draft Articles of 
diplomatic protection, the range of diplomatic channels are wide, including protest 
and request for an inquiry of the case, negotiation, mediation and conciliation. 
Besides, those types of dispute settlement does not bear high political cost. On the 
other hand, Japan-Indonesia treaty only includes negotiation as the primary choice, 
thus it closed the probability to use other types of non-judicial proceedings. 
Furthermore, the parties chose judicial settlement under ICJ as the last resort. If it is 
used, it will certainly burden the parties with high political cost, particularly for 
Indonesia, whose economy is heavily dependent with trade activities with and 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan. Thus, this is probably one of 
the reason of Indonesian government reluctance in exercising diplomatic protection. 
Third, the lack of mechanism to invoke Indonesian government in performing 
the duty of diplomatic protection was another reason why it is difficult for Indonesian 
comfort women to obtain the protection. Republic of Korea has the right to 
diplomatic protection construed clearly in its constitution and if the government 
perform omission of not granting the right, there is constitutional complaint 
mechanism that can be used to sue the government. In reality, the mechanism was 
used by the Korean comfort women and the concerned group to invoke the 
responsibility of the Korean government and fortunately the constitutional court 
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upheld their right. On the other hand, the Indonesian constitutional court does not 
have jurisdiction over constitutional complaint or the like mechanism which can 
facilitate the former comfort women to sue Indonesian government for the act of 
omission of not performing diplomatic protection. They only rely on the helping 
hand of Indonesian and Japanese pressure groups who volunteer to raise the issue in 
international forums attended by Japanese government or its representative.  
The example of voluntary efforts was when Indonesian comfort women 
activists, supported by Japan Action for Resolution of the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue, 
arranged a resolution to invoke the responsibility of Japan in The Asian Solidarity 
Conference held in 1992. 187  Recently, one of non-governmental organizations, 
Amnesty International also helped Indonesian activists to remind Japan in the 
CEDAW Universal Periodic Review in 2016 that Indonesian victims are still waiting 
for Japan to acknowledge its legal responsibility on the crimes committed against 
the former comfort women. The reminder was delivered after the Japanese Cabinet 
Secretariat Chief, Yoshihide Suga, remarked that Japan does not intend to launch 
new negotiations about the comfort women issue with other countries after reaching 
a bilateral agreement with Republic of Korea in 2015. The organization stated that, 
it would not be fair if only Korean victims be the only one who have the access to 
redress. The victims of other countries, including Indonesia, must not be treated 
discriminatively based on their nationality.188 
Of all the legal restraints explained above, it could be concluded that it is still a 
long way to go to achieve the proper diplomatic protection for former Indonesian 
comfort women. However, following the development of international human rights 
law, there are indeed several newly discovered solutions to solve the legal problems 
                                                          
187 Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM),”Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery: NGO 
Alternative Information to the Government Reply to the List of Issues,” (paper, Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women 63rd  Session Meeting, Geneva/Japan, 2016), 13-14. 
188  Amnesty International, ”Japan Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (paper, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 63rd  
Session Meeting, Geneva/Japan, February 15-March 4, 2016), 3. 
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Chapter 4. Linking Diplomatic Protection and 
International Human Rights 
4.1. Problems Caused by Legal Fiction: The Missing Link 
Legal fiction forced diplomatic protection to be perceived not as a legal duty 
for a state. When a state decides to exercise diplomatic protection, usually it depends 
on these factors: the ability of the injured national to establish the facts of the ill-
treatment by the foreign state that he or she has experienced, whether the national 
has taken exhaustive steps to correct the wrong, whether the case is meritorious and 
whether the state itself is equipped with the effective tools and policies to face the 
delinquent state.189 
The provision of human rights treaties, which confer the right of individuals to 
claim protection against violations and the obligation of states to protect the 
individuals, has shifted the paradigm from emphasis of the state’s right to the 
importance of individual rights. However, the state-centric nature of diplomatic 
protection is in contradiction with the individual-centric nature carried by 
international human rights law. The legal fiction used in diplomatic protection 
denied the existence of individual rights by repeatedly stating that in exercising 
diplomatic protection, state does not assert individual rights, but its own right. 
Unlike diplomatic protection, human rights law did not permit a state to perform 
diplomatic protection only whenever it is willing. The language of international 
human rights treaties always proclaims the duty to protect its own nationals when 
subjected to serious violation of human rights, particularly in the case of a breach of 
jus cogens norms.190 For example, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) used the language that obliges state parties to 
“undertake to respect and to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
                                                          
189  Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2010), 
167. 
190  John Dugard, “Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights: The Draft Articles of the International 
Law Commission,” 24 Australian Year Book of International Law, 75 (2005): 81. 
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jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant.” Article 6 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) obliges that state parties shall 
assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, 
through competent national tribunals and other institutions, against violation of 
rights.  
Giorgio Gaja, Italian international jurist and current judge of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) once asserted that focus of the individual as the rights holder 
has two consequences. First, a state cannot exercise diplomatic protection or choose 
not to exercise it against the wish of an individual. Second, the individual has the 
right to reparation as the protection was exercised based on individual rights.191 
Those two consequences cannot be extracted from the International Law 
Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006 as the ILC admitted 
that the draft articles were not written in the language of human rights.192  
The legal fiction becomes unrealistic when applied in the case of human rights 
violations. Concretely, it results to the unwillingness of a state to exercise diplomatic 
protection, even in the case of violation of jus cogens. The states will always perform 
political calculation whether the policy of diplomatic protection will be beneficial 
for their national interests. This is proved in the case of Japanese military comfort 
women. Most states are unwilling to perform diplomatic protection on behalf of these 
women since doing so will risk their well-maintained economic and political 
relationship with Japan. 
                                                          
191  G. Gaja, “Droits des etats et droits des individus dans le cadre de la protection diplomatique [State  
rights and the rights of individuals in the context of diplomatic protection],” in La Protection 
Diplomatique, mutations contemporaines et pratiques nationales [Diplomatic Protection, 
contemporary changes and national practices] ed. J.F. Flauss (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003), 68-69. 
192  Dugard, “Diplomatic Protection,” 83. 
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4.2. Significance of Diplomatic Protection to the Application of 
International Human Rights Treaties 
The next question to answer is for what reason duty to perform diplomatic 
protection becomes necessary in the case of human rights violation. Do international 
human rights treaties confer human rights to diplomatic protection? The answer to 
the question is that there are no such human rights to diplomatic protection. However, 
similar to some examples of provisions mentioned before, international human rights 
conventions always oblige the state to ensure the human rights of their nationals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. The formulation of these 
conventions often triggers interpretation that the duty to protect is only limited 
beyond territorial borders of the state of nationality or state parties to the conventions. 
Thus, diplomatic protection is needed to extend the duty to protect human rights 
extraterritorially.193 
Special Rapporteur John Dugard pointed out the importance of diplomatic 
protection to extend the scope of duty to ensure human rights in human rights 
conventions by stating: 
If a State party to human right convention is required to ensure to everyone 
within its jurisdiction effective protection against violations of the rights 
contained in the convention and to provide adequate means of redress, there 
is no reason why a state of nationality should not be obliged to protect its own 
nationals when his or her most basic rights are seriously violated abroad.194 
This commentary envisages that diplomatic protection extends jurisdiction of 
international human rights convention not only on the basis of territoriality, but also 
on the basis of nationality. However, it should be noted that the extraterritorial 
exercise of human rights through diplomatic protection is restricted by foreign state’s 
                                                          
193  Noura Karazivan, “Diplomatic Protection: Taking Human Rights Extraterritorially,” The Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 44 (2006): 326-327. 
194  United Nations, International Law Commission, First Report on Diplomatic Protection by Special 
Rapporteur John R. Dugard, A/CN.4/506 (2000), 225-226, para.89. 
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sovereignty over its territory. This is the reason why local remedies must be 
exhausted before resorting to diplomatic protection.195 
4.3. Significance of Diplomatic Protection to Human Rights 
Enforcement in Asia 
Development of international human rights law has emphasized the protection 
of individuals, thus permitting an individual to directly file a claim against the state 
who violates his or her right in front of regional human rights court. One of the 
prominent example is individual applications under European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR). European Court of Human Rights may receive applications from 
any person or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of human rights 
violations by one of ECHR parties and of the kind of rights set forth in the convention 
and its protocols.196 Yet, unless all domestic remedies have been exhausted, the 
applications will be deemed inadmissible by the court.197 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies also offer procedures that permit 
individuals to directly complain about the violation of human rights committed by 
states. Anyone can lodge a complaint with a committee of treaties against a 
delinquent state if two conditions are satisfied. The state in question is a party to the 
treaty and it has accepted the committee’s competence to examine individual 
complaints under the treaties or its optional protocols. It is not mandatory to have a 
lawyer to prepare the complaint, although it is suggested to have one since the UN 
does not provide any legal aid under these procedures.198 
Unfortunately, the violation of comfort women’s rights mostly occurred in the 
jurisdiction of Asia and the continent does not have any regional human rights court 
                                                          
195  Ibid., 220, para.60. 
196  Article 34 of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
197  Article 35 (1) of ECHR. 
198  United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, Individual Complaint Procedures 
under the United Nations Human Rights Treaties, Fact Sheet No.7/Rev.2 (New York and Geneva: 
United Nations, 2013), 9. 
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or mechanism to enable direct claims of individuals. Another choice left is an 
individual complaint under human rights treaty bodies. There are several competent 
treaty bodies that receive the individual complaint under the comfort women issue. 
Among them are the Human Rights Council, CERD Committee and CEDAW 
Committee. However, there are some remaining issues that hinder the comfort 
women to use these procedures. First, neither Japan as the delinquent state has 
ratified the optional protocols of ICCPR199 and CEDAW200, nor has it accepted the 
competence of CERD under the convention.  Even if Japan received the competence 
of the committees to decide upon individual complaints submitted by the former 
comfort women, it would have led to the second issue that the committees’ decision, 
although represent authoritative interpretation of the respective treaties, only 
contains non-legally binding recommendations. 201  Third, it is doubtful that the 
contemporary human right conventions could cover the numerous list of crimes 
against comfort women committed during the World War II since most of the 
conventions was concluded after the occurrence of the crimes. 
Since individuals are not regarded as the subject of international law and Asia 
does not have any access to either regional court or individual complaints under UN 
human rights treaties, injured individuals cannot invoke the reparation at the 
international level directly. In other words, a basis to transform the individual claim 
to interstate claims and proceedings is needed. In the case of Asian comfort women, 
diplomatic protection is the only way to connect the link between the injured 
individual and the delinquent state, so that invocation of delinquent state’s 
responsibility, as well as the restoration of the victims’ rights can be achieved. 
                                                          
199 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol.999, 171, last updated on April 2, 2019, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV5&chapter=4&clang
=_en. 
200 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol.2131, 83, last updated on April 2, 2019, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en. 
201   United Nations Human Rights, Individual Complaint, 11. 
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4.4. Ways of Linking Diplomatic Protection and International 
Human Rights 
There is a debate between international scholars on how to implement a state-
centric diplomatic protection suitable for enforcing human rights. Some scholar 
argued that the legal fiction in diplomatic protection has become outdated, and thus 
it has to be discarded and replaced by agency doctrine. Agency theory means that 
when exercising diplomatic protection, the claimant state acts as an agent for the 
individual. As a result, the state will not assert its own right, but the right of the 
injured individual alone. However, this solution will not solve the problem, since 
individuals still lacks in personality despite the development of international human 
rights law.202 
International human rights law may confer the human rights directly to the 
individual, but it does not make her or him a subject of international law. If the state 
only assert individual rights when invoking the responsibility of the delinquent state, 
the remedies available are still limited and the enforcement could not be 
guaranteed. 203  For example, when the dispute between the injured individual 
(represented by the state of nationality) and delinquent state is settled, there is 
probably a need to conclude an international agreement pertaining to the reparation. 
However, since the individual lacks personality, it is not possible for the individual 
to sign and ratify the treaty by himself. A national state, although acting as an agent, 
will conclude the agreement in vain, since the international agreement cannot 
transfer the rights to the individual. Instead, it only confer the rights and obligation 
to state as a solid subject of international law. 
The legal fiction also cannot be abandoned when the injury suffered by the 
individuals also injured real national interest of the state. This can happen when an 
injury was suffered systematically by a significant number of nationals, indicating 
                                                          
202 Dugard, “Diplomatic Protection,” 76. 
203 Ibid., 77. 
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the practice of discrimination to a particular state’s nationals. In such case, the state 
of nationality is obviously injured.204 
Indeed, the legal fiction remains necessary to guard the certainty of reparation 
and enforcement. However, some modifications have to be carried out to repress the 
state-centric nature of the legal fiction, so that it can be used to enforce human rights. 
Concretely, the state will have to assert its own rights, but at the same time it has to 
assert the rights of the injured individual when presenting the claim. 
ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006 did not prohibit this double 
rights assertion since some of its provisions are in contradiction to the legal fiction 
itself. For example, the rule of continuous nationality established in Draft Article 5 
requires a state to prove that the injured national remained its national after the injury 
occurs and up to the time of the presentation of claim. Exhaustion of the local 
remedies rule and the practice of determining the form and amount of reparation to 
accord with damages suffered by the individual also show an element of effort to 
uphold individual rights.205 If we strictly rely on legal fiction, there is no need to 
impose those requirements as mandatory, for it is not the right of nationals asserted.  
However, this rule shows that a state in reality does not assert its own right only, but 
also the rights of its injured national.206 
Commentary of Draft Article 1 also discloses that when constructing the 
definition of diplomatic protection, ILC did not rigidly defined whose rights are the 
state asserting when exercising the right to diplomatic protection. Instead, it left open 
the question whether the state exercising the procedure does so in order to assert its 
own right or the right of its national or both.207 
Asserting both state and individual rights when performing diplomatic 
protection is the only way to link diplomatic protection and human rights. Linking 
                                                          
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid., 78. 
206 Commentary on Draft Article 1 on Diplomatic Protection 2006, para. (3). 
207 Ibid., para. (5). 
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means to omit or at least dilute the state-centric nature of diplomatic protection, and 
thus it can be employed as an effective tool to enforce international human rights 
law, which is individual-centric in nature. The process of linking mainly involves 
manipulating the existing norms of customary international law pertaining to 
diplomatic protection to become “individual friendly”.  The modification is possible 
as the norms of diplomatic protection are still open-ended in status and the treaty 
attempting to codify the norms is still in the form of a draft.  
Customary international law could emerge not only from international practices 
such as governmental actions or inactions in international relations, diplomatic notes, 
decision of international courts and tribunals, as well as practices and resolutions of 
international organisations, but also from national practices such as national 
legislations, government manuals, ministerial or official statements and judicial 
decisions of domestic courts. 208  For this reason, norms modification could be 
achieved by two means: 
1. Top-down mechanism 
Literally, top-down mechanism means directly negotiating the individual-centric 
norms and inserting them to the codified draft articles of existing customary 
international law. Another form is through the practice of regional and 
international courts that limit the discretion of executive power, albeit the cases 
are still rare. In these ways, there is a hope that states of nationality will follow 
the practice because the sense of legal obligation has been built at the 
supranational level since the beginning of the norms foundation. 
2. Bottom-up mechanism 
This mechanism involves proliferation of national legislations and national courts’ 
decisions which guard the right to obtain diplomatic protection, permitting the 
interference of the judicial organ to limit the discretion of the executive organ or 
empowering individuals to seek the protection. When these practices become 
                                                          
208 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 32-33. 
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solidly and consistently embodied in the national law of a big number of states, 
it will be sufficient to constitute opinio juris at the international level. As a 
consequence, international law makers will not have a choice, except of 
integrating the modified norms to the pre-existing system. 
The next sections will discuss several solutions or norms modifications that 
enable to build the missing link between diplomatic protection and international 
human rights. Some of the solutions may be possible for execution through both 
aforementioned mechanisms, while some others may be possible to employ just one 
of them. In the explanation below, the solutions are sorted from the ones with the 
least possibility to be carried out to the ones with the high possibility of enforcement. 
4.5. Diplomatic Protection as a Legal Fiction 
Diplomatic protection is defined as the invocation by a state, through diplomatic 
action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another state 
for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that state to a natural or 
legal person that is a national of the former state with a view to the implementation 
of such responsibility.209 Diplomatic protection emerged from the state practices to 
become customary international law and ILC has attempted to codify the law in Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006. 
The scope of diplomatic protection comprises the cases of ill-treatment of 
nationals abroad or extraterritorial.210  However, there is an accepted view that the 
limit of extraterritorial can be expanded in the situation of the injuring state’s 
effective control over the national state’s territory.211 It can also be categorized as 
territorial because the injuring state, through effective control of the national state’s 
territory and its inhabitants, exercises governmental authorities that are supposedly 
exercised by the occupied state. For example, in the case of Korean comfort women 
                                                          
209 Draft Article 1 on Diplomatic Protection 2006 
210 Commentary on Draft Article 1 on Diplomatic Protection 2006, para. (3). 
211 Karazivan, “Diplomatic Protection,” 335. 
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who are employed by the Japanese military inside the territory of Korea, Korean 
territory was counted as abroad since it was colonised by Japan at the time of the 
violations. 
The expansion is also possible in a different way, when the violations happen 
in a third state under the effective control of a delinquent state.212 For example, in 
the case of comfort women, Japan transported a huge number of Korean comfort 
women to third countries, such as Southeast Asian countries. When the breach of 
international law occurred, Japan who had to bear the legal responsibility to the 
Korean comfort women, not the Southeast Asian countries. This is because the 
countries were under the effective control of Japan at the time. 
Diplomatic protection through diplomatic action covers the lawful procedures 
employed by a state to inform the delinquent state of its views and concerns. This 
includes protest and request for an inquiry or for negotiations aimed at the settlement 
of disputes.213 The example of this type is the request for inquiry made by the Korean 
government to the Japanese government to investigate the crime conducted against 
comfort women during World War II in 1992. Other means of peaceful settlement 
constituted in Draft Article 1 ranges from negotiation, mediation and conciliation to 
arbitral and judicial dispute settlement.214 One of the examples covered in this type 
is the negotiations between Korea and Japan in 2015. 
In the early development years of international law, the individual had no place 
to assert its right in international legal order. Therefore, protection of individual 
rights could only be achieved by means of a fiction, that an injury of the national is 
deemed as an injury of the state itself.215 Thus, it justifies turning an individual claim 
that is impossible to be presented at the international level, into an interstate dispute. 
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This fiction was derived from a doctrine adduced by an international Swiss 
jurist, Emmerich de Vattel in 1758 who said, “Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly 
injures the state, which must protect that citizen.” The state of the injured citizen 
must avenge the deed of the delinquent state and if possible, force the state who 
caused injury to give full satisfaction. Unless the state of nationality does this, the 
citizen will not obtain the protection necessary in civil society.216  
It should be understood that Vattel’s notion of diplomatic protection was born 
from his influential perception on the law of nations. Vattel’s law of nation is the 
law of sovereigns.217 The fact that individuals have interest in law of nations does 
not make them significant to have shares in council of nations and participate in 
determining their policy.218 According to Vattel, human rights have no place in the 
international legal order as it only fosters merely because states voluntarily dilute 
their sovereignty for the sake of developing international relations.219 These thoughts 
have influenced the current concept of diplomatic protection as a system that are 
positivist, state-centric and lack of recognition of individual human rights.220 
Vattelian fiction trigger that diplomatic protection is associated with an absolute 
discretionary right. In the drafting process of Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 
2006, states showed their adherence to this concept. One prominent supporter, the 
United Kingdom, stated that whether or not to bring the claim on the basis of 
diplomatic protection and how to settle it are the prerogative decision of the state. 
This perspective has been reiterated in domestic law in the exercise of foreign affairs, 
thus positioning it outside the scope of judicial review.221 
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Second, the fiction was applied on the Permanent Court of Justice (PCIJ) 
judgment in the case of Mavromatis. The dictum of the judgment asserted, “by taking 
up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international 
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own rights, its 
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects respects for the rules of international 
law.”222 
The consequence of the fiction is that ILC Draft Articles 2006 curbed 
diplomatic protection as a discretionary right of a state223  and omit the possibility 
under international law to impose it as a duty or obligation to the pertaining state. 
The internal law of a state may oblige a state to extend diplomatic protection to a 
national, but international law does not impose such obligation.224 This also means 
that when exercising diplomatic protection, a state does not act as an agent on behalf 
of an individual, for it is solely invoking its own right. 
4.6. Diplomatic Protection as Obligation of States and 
Fundamental Right of Nationals 
ILC has stated that there are some obligations imposed to the state, although 
limited, either under international law or national law, to protect its nationals abroad 
when their human rights have been seriously violated. Under international law, the 
norm comes from customary international law codified in Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection formulated by ILC in 2006, while in national law, the norm is 
emerging from national legislation and judicial decisions of domestic courts.225 
At the international level, the concept of diplomatic protection as fundamental 
rights of nationals vis a vis the obligation of the state was brought up by John Dugard, 
a Special Rapporteur appointed by ILC in 1999. In his first report on diplomatic 
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protection, he investigated that the development of international human rights law 
should oblige states to exercise diplomatic protection. He suggested that Draft 
Article 4 (1) on diplomatic protection has to confer the obligation by stating: 
Unless the injured person is able to bring a claim for such injury before a 
competent international court or tribunal, the State of his/her nationality has a 
legal duty to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured person 
upon request, if the injury results from a grave breach of jus cogens norm 
attributable to another State.226 
Nevertheless, John Dugard’s suggestion of Draft Article 4 was perceived as too 
progressive to be accepted by the rest of the ILC members since state practices are 
lacking.  
In the next meeting of the ILC, the abandoned suggestion was again discussed 
by the members. Italy suggested that a duty of states to perform diplomatic protection 
in the case of breach of jus cogens should be included in the draft articles.227 The 
reason behind the suggestion was that there are extraordinary cases where 
fundamental human rights violations are involved such as the right to life, torture, 
slavery and racial discrimination. In this case, it is highly probable that injured 
individuals are unable to resort to international judicial or quasi-judicial organs to 
receive redress. Denying diplomatic protection in such cases means leaving the 
individual without any remedy and thus would contradict to the principle of 
individuals’ dignity in which international community sacredly adheres to.228 
The positions of ILC members when facing Italy’s suggestion were divided, 
with the number of disagreeing members equals to the supporting ones. Eventually, 
the compromise was reached between the members and the modified provision was 
included and recognised as Draft Article 19 in the final draft articles published in 
2006 under the title “recommended practice”. 
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According to Article 19 of the 2006 ILC Draft Articles, in the practice of 
diplomatic protection the states are encouraged to: 
1. Give due consideration to the possibility of exercising diplomatic protection, 
especially when a significant injury has occurred. 
2. Take into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured persons with regard to 
the resort to diplomatic protection and the reparation to be sought. 
3. Transfer to the injured person any compensation obtained for the injury from the 
responsible state subject to any reasonable deductions. 
Draft Article 19 did not embody the currently existing customary international law, 
but it is a provision stipulated by ILC purely influenced by the development of 
contemporary international human rights law.  
The provisions of Draft Article 19 are aspects of diplomatic protection which 
have not yet obtained the status of international customary law and are still unlikely 
to emerge into the binding law at the present. In other words, there are still no 
obligations for states to exercise diplomatic protection under international law. 
Nevertheless, they are desirable practices and necessary to foster the integration 
between diplomatic protection and international human rights law. In order to 
achieve these provisions as customary international law, more state practices through 
national law are desperately needed. The commentary of the 2006 ILC Draft Articles 
provided that although there is no obligation under international law, national law 
may oblige a state to extend diplomatic protection to a national. The suggestion 
stipulated in the commentary implied that there must be a provision of national law 
that either renders the right to diplomatic protection to the nationals or impose the 
duty to the state.229  
According to the research conducted by Special Rapporteur John Dugard, there 
are many states that recognise the right of its nationals to receive diplomatic 
protection when they suffered from injuries abroad, mostly at the constitutional level. 
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Those states are Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, 
China, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Guyana, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam and Yugoslavia.230 Interestingly, the number of Asian 
countries who follow this practice is far less the European countries. How each of 
the states formulated the right in their respective constitution will be elaborated 
below. 
1. Republic of Korea 
Article 2 Section 2 of the Korean constitution expressly states, “It shall be the 
duty of the State to protect citizens residing abroad as prescribed by Act.” This 
provision does not directly point out the duty of state to perform diplomatic 
protection per se. Instead, it has broad coverage to any kind of protections, such 
as consular protection. However, in the case of the comfort women constitutional 
complaint, the Constitutional Court of Korea stated that Article 2 Section 2 leads 
the Korean government to perform an active action on behalf of the former 
Korean comfort women. Specifically, the provision may create a legal obligation 
for the government to exercise diplomatic protection since all the requirements 
under international law, such as exhaustion of local remedies and nationality rules, 
have been fulfilled. In addition, the court stated that the provision covers 
diplomatic protection extended by the state in their relationship with residing 
countries of individuals, in order to ensure fair treatment in all fields guaranteed 
by treaties, international laws and national laws.231 
On contrary to the prevailing interpretation of the court, three judges of the 
court dissented from the majority. Although the provision may be explicit as it 
seems, dissenting judges perceived it as nothing more than an abstract duty of the 
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state toward its citizens. Therefore, the provision in itself does not stipulate a duty 
of concrete action, even the duty to perform diplomatic protection. 232 
Nevertheless, regardless of the dissenting opinion, the constitutional court 
decision reflects that the Republic of Korea acknowledged the duty to perform 
diplomatic protection under its constitution. 
The Constitutional Court of Korea then stated that their interpretation was 
based on recommended practice in Article 19 of the 2006 ILC Draft Articles.233 
This shows that the court has confirmed the existence of sense of legal obligation 
(opinion juris) to carry out the recommended practice in Draft Article 19. 
2. The People’s Republic of China 
Article 50 of The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, under the 
title “Protection of Chinese while overseas”, stipulated that the state protects the 
legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals residing abroad and protects 
the lawful rights and interests of returned overseas Chinese and the family 
members of Chinese nationals residing abroad.  
It should be noted that China along with Korea has a number of nationals who 
became the victims of the comfort women system in World War II. Albeit there 
has not been any history of formal proceeding that shows how the right to 
diplomatic protection under the constitution can improve the situation of former 
Chinese comfort women. The Chinese survivors and their families have seen to 
recognise their rights under the constitution. This was shown when they filed a 
petition to the Chinese Foreign Ministry pushing for diplomatic protection on 
December 21, 2017.234 
3. Russian Federation 
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Russia imposes a positive obligation in Article 61 (2) of its constitution by stating, 
“The Russian Federation shall guarantee its citizens protection and patronage 
abroad.”235 
4. Poland 
Article 36 of the Polish Constitution states that a Polish citizen shall, during a 
stay abroad, have the right to protection by the Polish State.236 The usage of norm 
identifier “shall” means that it is a mandatory obligation for the state to ensure 
the right fulfilment. 
5. Portugal 
Article 14 of the Portuguese Constitution under the title “Portuguese abroad” 
stated that Portuguese citizens who find themselves or who reside abroad shall 
enjoy the state’s protection in the exercise of such rights.237 
6. Hungary 
At first, the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Act XX of 1949), Article 
69 (3), stated that all Hungarian citizens are entitled to enjoy the protection of the 
Republic of Hungary while legally residing or staying abroad. Then, this 
provision was amended in 2011 and become Article XXVII Paragraph 2, stating 
that every Hungarian citizen shall have the right to be protected by Hungary 
during any stay abroad. The change shows that the protection has to be granted 
regardless the legality status of the residence. 
How each state formulated constitutional based diplomatic protection differs 
from each other. Some states simply granted the right to the citizen in explicit 
languages, while other states used the frame of positive obligation. Positive 
obligation framework means placing a duty on the state authorities to take an active 
action to fulfil the constitutional rights. Usually the constitutional provision about 
the grant of right contains formulations such as “nationals of X shall enjoy protection 
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while residing abroad.” Positive obligation has formulations such as “the State shall 
protect the legitimate rights of X nationals abroad.” Most constitutions of states 
provide abstract and loose formulation, thus blurring the line between diplomatic 
protection, consular protection and other types of protection.238 
Since the duty is expressly stipulated in the provision of national law, 
particularly national constitution, it is easier for individuals to protest to the 
government when it does not comply with the obligation. However, the practice of 
directly conferring the duty to the state or the right to the nationals through national 
law is still rare. Thus, there is need to look for another form of norm modifications 
and interpretations in national court decisions or the like. 
4.7. Invocation of Diplomatic Protection  
Providing remedy under national law when the state refuses to exercise 
diplomatic protection or when it is not properly executed almost became the 
obligation under international law as it was suggested in the first report by ILC 
Special Rapporteur, John Dugard in 1999. He suggested that as a complement to the 
states’ obligation to exercise diplomatic protection stipulated in Draft Article 4 (1) 
of his first report, Draft Article 4 (3) states: 
States are obliged to provide in their municipal law for the enforcement of the 
right before a competent domestic court or other independent national 
authority.239 
However, unlike Draft Article 4 (1) of the first report which was modified as Article 
19 (1) in the final draft published in 2006, Draft Article 4 (3) was totally abandoned 
and excluded from the final draft on the grounds of lacking state practice. 
Before the necessity of invocation mechanisms recognised by ILC, the judges 
of ICJ in Barcelona Traction Case realized its importance when it stated: 
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Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise 
diplomatic protection by whatever means and whatever extent it thinks fit, for 
it is own right that the state is asserting. Should the national or legal person on 
whose behalf it is acting considering that their rights are not adequately 
protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort 
to municipal law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause 
of obtaining redress…240 
The statement confirmed that the mechanism to enforce the right to diplomatic 
protection has not existed in international law, and thus the state is recommended to 
provide it through domestic law. The judgment also implied that the discretionary 
nature of diplomatic protection is possible to be controlled by an invocation 
mechanism. 
Imposition of obligation of diplomatic protection on states will not be complete 
if there is no mechanism of enforcement. When the state refuse to perform 
diplomatic protection subsequent to serious injury or in the case when protection was 
performed, but was not appropriately executed, there must be a system that 
empowers an individual to invoke his or her constitutional right. It could be through 
a constitutional complaint before a constitutional court or before domestic courts or 
other independent authorities, when the right is stipulated at the constitutional level.  
The example of a constitutional complaint employed effectively by individuals 
to invoke the right to diplomatic protection is the Constitutional Court of Korea’s 
decision upholding the right of comfort women rendered on August 30, 2011. The 
Constitutional Court of Korea has jurisdiction over a constitutional complaint under 
Article 2 Section 5 of The Constitutional Court Act (last amended on March 20, 
2018). A constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court of Korea will be 
admissible if the complainant met two necessary requirements. First, the request is 
based on the infringement of basic rights guaranteed by the constitution due to the 
exercise or the non-exercise of governmental power, excluding a judgment of the 
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ordinary courts. The second requirement is that any remedy provided by other laws 
must be exhausted before filing the complaint.241 
In a constitutional complaint filed by former Korean comfort women, the 
request was based on the reason that the Korean government has not maximized its 
effort to perform diplomatic protection against Japan on behalf of the complainants. 
The non-exercise of governmental power was claimed to infringe the victims’ right 
enshrined in Article 2 Section 2 of the South Korean constitution. The victims also 
have exhausted any possible remedy by filing a civil and criminal complaint to 
several Japanese domestic courts since 1991. Since the two requirement are met, the 
court was willing to examine the merits of the case and upheld that the Korean 
government inaction infringe the right of the complainants. This invocation 
mechanism did not end in vain. Its effectiveness was proved when the government 
of Korea eventually reached a bilateral agreement with Japan pertaining to the 
comfort women issue in 2015.  
Another option that differs from filing a complaint to a domestic court is to 
enact a statute, which allows individuals submitting a request or petition for 
assistance to the government, to consult what kind of protection and the form of 
reparation to be sought and to be informed about the progress of diplomatic action 
undertaken to protect their interest. It would be accurate to address the ‘government’ 
in question as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since it has the most relevant 
authorities in the case of diplomatic protection. This mechanism is ideal when the 
injury concerned involves grave breaches of human rights.242  
4.8. Judicial Review of Diplomatic Protection 
An invocation mechanism will not be complete without the review mechanism 
in the case when the protecting government does not exercise diplomatic protection 
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properly. The norm comprising this solution can only be formed by a bottom-up 
mechanism as the consideration to limit discretionary power of executive through 
judicial review is purely the domestic affair of a state. The provisions and 
commentaries of the 2006 Draft Articles on diplomatic protection does not have a 
say about this norm. Specifically, none of the recommended practices in Draft 
Article 19 refers to this. Thus, this solution is a norm that has not yet emerged at the 
international level. 
Diplomacy goes beyond the relationship between the state in an international 
environment composed of different value and laws. Therefore, it is undeniable that 
diplomacy is an area where the broad discretion is enjoyed by the government in 
policy making because it has to take into account the situations and nature of the 
dispute, political landscape in and outside the country, international laws and 
common practice.243 However, the Constitutional Court of Korea agrees with the 
idea that the domain diplomacy must be subject of judicial review by stating: 
“Rights guaranteed under the constitution are binding on all state powers, so 
administrative authority should be exercised in a way that fundamental rights 
are guaranteed effectively in accordance with the duty to protect fundamental 
rights, and the domain of diplomacy cannot be completely excluded from 
those subject to judicial review, either. For diplomatic actions associated with 
people’s fundamental rights, if a failure to fulfil the duty to take concrete 
action as reviewed earlier is decided as a clear violation of the constitutional 
duty to protect fundamental rights, it should be declared as an act of 
fundamental rights infringement and thus unconstitutional. Ultimately the 
discretion of the respondent should inevitably be restricted to the reasonable 
scope consistent with the binding force of fundamental rights on government 
institutions, taking into account factors such as the gravity of the violated 
fundamental rights, urgency of the risk of fundamental rights violation, 
possibility of providing a legal remedy and consistency with national 
interest.”244 
Not only in the Republic of Korea, judicial review of diplomatic protection in 
the case of serious violation of human rights was also supported by judgments issued 
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by national courts from various countries. The most salient examples are Germany, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and South Africa. 
1. Rudolph Hess Decision  
This case was about challenging non-exercise of diplomatic protection by 
the government of Germany. Rudolph Hess, the complainant, was sentenced by 
the Allied Forces in the Nuremberg Trial with life imprisonment for his role in 
the Nazi regime. He filed a complaint against the Federal Republic of Germany 
arguing that the government was obliged to perform diplomatic protection on his 
behalf since his detention were against the rule of international law.  
The right to diplomatic protection was not stated clearly in German 
constitution or other regulations. Regardless of the law vacancy, Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) did not declare the 
case non-justiciable on the ground of over-stepping the authority of executive 
organ (acte de gouvernement). Instead, it went far to examine the case merits, 
until the point of measuring whether the duty was performed decently or not. The 
court found that the duty of diplomatic protection was indeed implied under the 
constitution. However, the government of Germany enjoyed a wide discretion on 
how to perform the duty. The court further discovered that the government had 
actually provided a decent efforts to protect the complainant by improving the 
situation of detention, although the result was not what actually desired by the 
complainant.245 
2. Abbasi & Annor v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
Mr. Abbasi, a Guantanamo Bay detainee complained that United Kingdom 
should have exercised diplomatic protection on behalf of him since his arbitrary 
detention violated international human rights, particularly jus cogens norm. 246  
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Thus, the complainant requested the constitutional court to review whether the 
government’s inaction was on the contrary with his constitutional rights. The 
British court accorded with his claim that his human rights are violated. 
Furthermore, although international law did not oblige the state to exercise 
diplomatic protection, the court agreed to assess the inaction of the UK 
government as the complainant requested and founded that there is the scope of 
judicial review of government’s refusal to render diplomatic protection.247  
The court did not deny that diplomatic protection is a discretionary right of 
an executive organ, and thus there is no duty to exercise it. When there is no duty 
stipulated, there will be no reason to conduct judicial review. However, in this 
case, the judicial review was possible to be performed on the basis of the doctrine 
of “legitimate expectation”. 248  The court stated that legitimate expectation 
provided a solid basis for giving legal effect to a settled policy or practice in the 
exercise of administrative discretion. Legitimate expectation means that a person 
may have reasonable expectation of being treated in a certain way by 
administrative authorities because of one of the two alternative conditions has 
been met. First, the authorities have been practicing the treatment consistently 
from the past. Second, the concerned authorities have made an express statement 
to perform the treatment. 
Regarding the first condition, the court found that British citizens have at 
least a legitimate expectation that they will be rendered diplomatic protection if 
the rules (continuous nationality and exhaustion of local remedies) are fulfilled. 
Since the government of the UK act consistently with the rules in respect of 
protection of nationals abroad, the complainant expected the government to act 
accordingly.249  
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The court also found that the second condition of legitimate expectation 
existed. In particular, the UK government has made an express promissory 
statement (commitment) on diplomatic protection policy, even when it falls 
within its wide discretionary power. The express statement brought a 
consequence that it became the subject of judicial review, notwithstanding its 
discretionary nature.250 Conclusively, the British court did not clearly state that 
diplomatic protection is thoroughly within the domain of executive power, but it 
stated that in certain circumstances, it is appropriate for the national court to issue 
a mandatory order, summoning the respondent to take the complainant’s case into 
consideration.251 
3. M. Kujit. v. The Netherlands  
Mr. Kujit, a Dutch national, had been held in pre-trial detention in Bangkok 
on the allegation of drug trafficking. Six years later in 2003, he filed his complaint 
against the Netherlands. He complained that his detention violated erga omnes 
norms and invoked the obligation of the Dutch government to improve his 
situation. 252  In particular, he expected the Dutch government to strive by 
obtaining the redress from the government of Thailand and by undertaking every 
effort to secure his release.253  
The court stated that his complaint could not be condoned since the 
government was unable to command the Thai government on how to treat their 
detainees. Nevertheless, the court expected the Dutch government to continue 
striving to assist the complainant and to undertake all possible measures to secure 
the release of the complainant as soon as possible. In the court’s view, all possible 
efforts and measures have not been fully undertaken. 254 The order to perform all 
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possibilities to improve the complainant’s rights shows that the court had allowed 
itself to restrict the discretionary powers of the executive organ.  
4. Samuel Kaunda and others v. The President of the Republic of South Africa and 
others  
The decision of this case was rendered by Constitutional Court of South 
Africa in August of 2004. The complainant requested that the South African 
government’s inaction of not performing diplomatic protection for their detention 
in Zimbabwe to be declared as a violation of international law norms. They also 
feared that if the government did not perform diplomatic protection, they would 
be extradited by Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea with the probability of facing 
an unfair trial and death sentence. Thus, they expected the South African 
government to negotiate with Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea so that their 
rights of freedom and security as a person, as well as fair trial and detention would 
be ensured.255 
The South African Constitutional Court faced the question whether 
diplomatic protection must be considered as a human right under international 
law, and thus it needs to be performed on behalf of the injured person in the case 
of a grave breach of human rights as a legal duty of the state of nationality.256 The 
court answered the question by stating that the current prevailing view is that 
international law does not recognise diplomatic protection as human rights, and 
thus cannot be enforced as such by holding it as obligation vis a vis state of 
nationality. Thus, the court partially rejected the claim which was based on a right 
to diplomatic protection in international law.257 
Subsequently, the court inquired whether the right of diplomatic protection 
exists under national law derived from South African Constitution and discovered 
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that the right in question is not explicitly provided in the law either.258 The court 
thought that diplomatic protection might be an unenforceable right itself, and thus 
it needs to be enforced through other enforceable rights. The court turned to 
consider whether the right to diplomatic protection can be derived from the rights, 
privileges and benefits of citizenship stipulated in Section 3 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa.259 The finding was that there is no such right to 
diplomatic protection and there is no duty of state to protect as it would be an 
interference with sovereignty of other states to demand the right to diplomatic 
protection through a national constitution. 260  However, it found that South 
African nationals are entitled to request the state for protection under 
international law against legally wrongful acts of a delinquent state. Entitlement 
is based on the reason that individual nationals are not in position to demand 
enforcement of international law by themselves, and thus they need to seek 
protection from the state of nationality. As a consequence, the individuals are 
rightful to have their request considered and answered appropriately. 261  The 
decision whether or not to exercise diplomatic protection must comply to the 
standards to meet the individuals’ legitimate expectation and must not be 
considered arbitrarily.262 
On the contrary with the previous findings, the court argued that it cannot 
dictate the government on how to execute diplomatic protection of its nationals 
when considering the discretionary nature of executive action. However, the court 
has jurisdiction over governmental actions and this includes the authority to 
examine an allegation that the government has failed to respond to a request of 
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diplomatic protection properly. Yet, this does not mean that the court could order 
the government to provide what the court condones as proper protection. 263 
Justice Arthur Chaskalson, a judge of the South African constitutional court 
representing the majority, personally added a statement. He said that what 
justifies judicial review is that the true beneficiary of the right asserted is indeed 
the individual and it corresponds with the duty of the state to protect.264 Based on 
the reason, discretion in diplomatic protection should not be immune from 
judicial scrutiny and the standard of judicial intervention is the irrationality of the 
discretion.265 
Although not all of the examples of court decisions presented above upheld the 
claim of individuals, the courts did not declare the case as non-justiciable in the first 
place. According to the traditional view, diplomatic protection has always been 
deemed as the discretionary right of a state and it is solely under the domain of 
executive authority (acte de gouvernement).  Consequently, the courts should have 
strictly declared any request to review the actions or inactions performed on the basis 
of diplomatic protection, to be non-justiciable.266 However, the dismissal based on 
this reason was not shown by the above-mentioned national courts decisions, as well 
as the Korean constitutional court decision. Thus, the current practices have broken 
the exclusivity of diplomatic discretion, when action or inaction of government in 
the pertaining field inflicts the fundamental rights of nationals. 
The willingness of the courts to deem the case justiciable and to examine the 
merits of the cases may amount to intervention of the executive affairs. These 
judicial interventions are indeed efforts to implement the states obligation to protect 
human rights of their nationals enshrined in all international human right treaties.  
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The national courts are starting to consider the growing importance of human 
rights and the lack of enforcement measures available for individuals to restore the 
rights. The complainants of “diplomatic protection judicial review” or by whatever 
name the procedure was called, shared the same thought that it is necessary to oblige 
national states to exercise diplomatic protection in the case of serious human rights 
violations. In this way, the injured individuals could obtain the access to court and 
effective remedy under international human rights law.267 
There are two conclusions to be drawn from the national court cases. First, 
currently some states are willing to stipulate the right to diplomatic protection of its 
nationals and mandatory duty in order to perform the protection under their national 
law, particularly at the constitutional level. Second, the current development shows 
that national courts can review the exercise or non-exercise of diplomatic protection 
and whether the states have responded properly to a request of diplomatic protection. 
In this way, diplomatic protection can be optimized to enforce human rights of 
individuals enshrined in international law.  
The three aforementioned mechanisms are ways to humanize diplomatic 
protection. Until now, the prevailing view is that diplomatic protection is merely a 
state-centric mechanism in which individuals have no contribution. The three 
practices mentioned above have still accorded the status of lex ferenda and only time 
will answer when it will emerge as customary international law. It needs more 
consistent and continuous state practices, as well as opinio juris to make it happen. 
It should be noted that all of the three practices are intertwined with each other. 
Conferring the right to diplomatic protection to nationals can only be achieved if 
there is such an invocation mechanism to demand the fulfilment of the right. A 
written right and an invocation mechanism are also meaningless if there is no such 
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forum to assess whether the government has actually performed its obligation to 
fulfill the right. 
4.9. Striking the Balance between Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda of 
Diplomatic Protection Practices 
This section will talk about how progressive development on diplomatic 
protection through the dilution of its state-centric characteristic still has a long way 
to go since the law as it exists (lex lata), has not undergone any dramatic changes to 
that direction. This is because the obvious reluctance of some states to incorporate 
the progressive law to their national legal systems and the law itself still has certain 
imperfections to secure the balance between individuals’ and states’ interest. Those 
two problems have to be discussed in order to find a way to compromise between 
the traditional view and progressive view.  
Judicial review is probably the most significant of all three solutions discussed 
previously, since proponents of the traditional view of diplomatic protection perceive 
the mechanism as the biggest threat to the discretionary power of the executive. 
Regulation of the right or obligation to perform diplomatic protection, even the 
invocation mechanism equipped to an individual, would only be seen as 
constitutional embellishments without the authority of judicial review. Judicial 
review is the main goal of the two other solutions since it is the final resort to control 
the discretionary right to diplomatic protection and dilute its state-centric nature. 
However, in reality there are many national courts who rejected to perform judicial 
review of diplomatic protection. The tendency could be inferred from these 
following cases.  
1. Isabelita C. Vinuya etc. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo 
et al. (The Philippines) 
It can be inferred from the previously presented case examples that European 
and African countries were proved to be more progressive in accepting the idea 
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to review the governmental discretion. On the other hand, reluctance could still 
be seen in Asian countries. In contrast with the Korean constitutional court 
decision, Philippines former comfort women’s request to review the state’s 
inaction to protect them was dismissed by the Supreme Court in the Vinuya v. 
Philippines case.  
The petitioners, Philippine former comfort women, asked the Supreme Court 
to perform judicial review on the question whether a Philippine executive organ 
choice for not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms 
of reparation against Japan constituted a grave abuse of discretion. The court 
responded by saying that from a domestic law perspective, an executive organ 
has the exclusive prerogative to decide whether to espouse a petitioners’ claim 
against Japan. Based on this reason, the court declared that the petition lacks merit 
and had to be dismissed.268 
Political question doctrine in the Philippines domestic law prohibited the 
judicial body to review the discretion of a Philippines executive organ. The 
doctrine was originated from US law and was associated with the separation of 
powers in a state. The doctrine suggested that three branches of a state (executive, 
legislative and judicial) have to act only within the scope of authority given by 
the constitution and must not trespass on each other’s authority.  
The Supreme Court of the Philippines cited the United States Supreme Court 
decision in the case of Baker v. Carr as the starting point of political question 
doctrine development. In that decision, the Supreme Court of the United States 
explained that solving any case involving a political question was the domain of 
the executive branch. It was not assigned to the judicial branch and judicial 
intervention on that matter is never be accepted based on various reasons. First, 
solving a political question is textually assigned to the executive organ as a 
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commitment based on the constitution. Second, legal systems are probably 
lacking discoverable and manageable standards to solve it. Third, on several 
occasions it is impossible to decide on a case involving a political question 
without an initial policy determination through non-judicial discretion. Fourth, 
there is the impossibility of the court to undertake independent resolution of the 
case since intervening the authority of the executive body as a coordinate branch 
to the judicial body would amount to rummaging the independence of executive 
itself.  Fifth, there is a worry that a conflict triggered by a contravening 
pronouncement from the executive organ to the judicial organ will occurs, 
following the judicial intervention.269 
The Supreme Court of the Philippines continued to reiterate some cases from 
the United States Supreme Court to support its consideration on foreign relation 
cases. For instance in the Oetjen v, Central Leather Co., one of the categories of 
cases involving political questions are foreign relations. It is prevalent that the 
constitution strongly established the conduct of foreign relations to the executive 
and legislative, the political branches of the government. Thus, what political 
bodies may have performed in the exercise of their political power must not be a 
subject to judicial inquiry.270 Moreover, in Chicago and S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., as the Supreme Court of the Philippines cited, foreign 
relations are delicate, complex and involves large elements of forecasting since it 
has the ability to advance or imperil the welfare of people of a certain nation, 
once it is decided. The judicial organ often has neither aptitude, facilities nor 
responsibility to issue the decision on it.271 
According to Article VIII Section 5(2)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of the Philippines, the Court possess the authority to construe or invalidate 
treaties and executive agreements in certain cases involving foreign relations. 
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However, to review whether the Philippine government should perform an 
interstate diplomatic protection claim of its nationals against a foreign state is a 
foreign relations matter. The constitution has assigned this matter not to the courts, 
but to the executive branch. In this case, the executive organ has already decided 
to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan through the San 
Francisco Treaty 1951 as a means to secure the best interest of the country. Such 
a decision was not for the national courts to question. Petitioners could not 
disprove the said decision by the instant petition for certiorari either.272 
The court took side on government rebuttal, which explained that San 
Francisco Treaty 1951 as a peace treaty between Allied Forces and Japan was not 
intended for the complete and adequate reparation of the suffering caused by 
Japan during the war, but for security purposes. The treaty compromised 
individual claims in the collective interest of the free world in order to prevent 
the widespread of communism and fascism by the Axis Power. Japan who 
occupied the strategic position in Far East was no exception.273 
When deciding not to espouse the comfort women claims, the executive organ 
has considered the above-mentioned political motive which constituted original 
intent of the peace treaty. Consequently, the government found that the espousal 
would be adverse to the Philippines foreign policy interest and could upset its 
relationship with Japan. For the court to overturn the discretion of the executive 
organ would be equal to assessing a foreign policy judgment by a coordinate 
political branch to the court. The non-subordination relationship between the 
court and executive body hindered the court to assess the foreign policy 
judgments made by executive discretion since the constitution confers wide 
discretion to exercise the authority.274 
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Furthermore, at the international level, the only chance for individuals to bring 
a claim within the international legal system is when he or she is able to persuade 
the government to espouse his or her claim. Even then, it is not the individual’s 
rights that are being asserted through the espousal, but rather the state’s own 
rights. The court did not deny that the state has a duty to protect its nationals and 
act on his or her behalf when the human rights are injured. This view is endorsed 
by a part of the international community, for example, the proposal of ILC Special 
Rapporteur John Dugard written in the ILC First Reading Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection which contains the idea of defining diplomatic protection 
as a legal duty when it stems from the grave violation of jus cogens norm. 
However, the status quo shows that there is no sufficient evidence to establish the 
general international obligation for states to exercise diplomatic protection on 
behalf of their nationals abroad. Although the practice is desirable, neither state 
practice nor opinio juris has evolved to such direction. Even if it is an 
international duty like what John Dugard stated, it is merely a moral and not a 
legal duty.275 The absence of an international legal obligation prompted the court 
to argue that intervention or assessment to the discretion of exercising diplomatic 
protection could not be justified.  
As a final statement, the court asserted that it is not within its authority to order 
the executive organ to take up petitioners’ demand. It is only able to urge and 
advise the executive organ to consider the demand.276 This means that the court 
is not in the capacity to declare the constitutionality of executive discretion in a 
diplomatic field. In this way, the court showed adherence to the traditional view 
of diplomatic protection. 
2. Cases of American victims of Japanese Slave Labourers and Prisoners of War 
(the United States) 
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The cases involved American victims of Japanese slave labourers during 
World War II. These were not related to the dismissal of claims against the 
government in respect of its omission for not performing diplomatic protection 
on behalf of the claimants, but they were related to the intervention of the US 
government to prevent claims against Japanese companies and Japan at the local 
remedy level. 
The cases were mainly disputed under the Northern District of California, 
United States, under California Code of Civil Procedure (CalCCP) Section 354.6. 
as an implementing regulation from the San Francisco Treaty 1951. The 
regulation created a basis of claims for the Second World War victims of slave 
labourers and extended the statute of limitations for filing such claims to 2010.277 
The total number of lawsuits filed by former slave labourers was over two 
dozens and they were directed against Japanese corporations and the Japanese 
government that had employed slave labours during the war. At first, they were 
filed through various districts courts in the United States, but the Federal Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the lawsuits to Judge Vaughn 
Walker on the Northern District Court of California based on a Transfer Order 
dated June 5, 2000.278 
However, on September 21, 2000, Judge Walker dismissed the lawsuits filed 
by the former Japanese slave labourers on the grounds that the claims had been 
extinguished by the San Francisco Treaty 1951, including the claims arising out 
of actions taken by Japan and its nationals during the war.279 The court relied in 
the treaty waiver clause on Article 14(b) which states: 
Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive 
all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers 
and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals 
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in the course of prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for 
direct military costs of occupation.280 
The court based the dismissal on a Statement of Interest filed by the US 
government to intervene in the proceedings. The US government has the 
authority to file the Statement Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 517 which 
permits the Attorney General to represent the interests of the US by intervening 
in any case pending in a federal court. The Statement of Interest was thrown out 
when a litigation involves a matter of critical national importance. 
The Statement of Interest explicitly expressed that California Code of Civil 
Procedure (CalCCP) Section 354.6 was an impermissible intrusion under the 
federal government’s foreign affairs authority. The government thought that the 
litigations under the statute could bring a critical situation to the national 
interests of the US. In particular, leaving open the possibility of future claims 
until 2010 would be an obstruction to the current peaceful condition based on 
some reasons. First, the statute enabled endless filing of claims and could 
complicate relations between the countries involved, particularly since it created 
judicial forums that generated negative commentary about the Japanese 
government and Japanese corporations. Second, the flow of uncontrolled 
reparation claims would result in futility since Japan was undergoing a difficult 
financial condition at the time. Even if Japan was forced to compensate all the 
claims, it would wreck Japan’s economy and create misery and chaos of 
democratic Japan which can become the seeds of communist flourishment. In 
other words, it would be contrary to the prevention of wide-spreading 
communism as purposes and policy of the United States in the field of foreign 
relations.281 
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Even though the cases did not involve direct judicial review of diplomatic 
discretion, these cases show that the domestic court in the US does not have any 
courage to institute a proceeding when the interest of the executive branch is at 
stake. Since the matters of foreign relations are inside the domain of the 
executive branch, the court as an equal political branch to the executive branch 
has to respect executive decision by not intervening in its discretion, particularly 
in respect to foreign policy. It could also be implied that the US government was 
not willing to institute any interstate claims based on diplomatic protection 
against Japan on behalf of American nationals since it had negated the 
probability by extinguishing the claims at the local remedy level and the court 
had already declared that it did not have the authority to stop the executive action. 
3. HMHK v. The Netherlands (The Netherlands) 
The case started in 1983, when K, a Dutch national made an agreement with 
X, an undercover police officer of the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
agreement required K to deliver a consignment of narcotics to X in the German 
territory. In May of 1983, when delivering the consignment to X, K was 
apprehended by a German police and put into the custody. In October of 1983, 
K’s counsel begged the Dutch Secretaries of State so that Justice and Foreign 
Affairs could initiate arrangement with German authorities to drop the 
proceeding against K and to return him to the Netherlands. The Secretary of State 
for Justice responded to the request in December of 1983 by stating that as K 
had voluntarily entered to the German territory and had been arrested for drug 
offences there, there was no basis for intervention by the government of the 
Netherlands. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs to whom the request was also sent, 
did not give any response.282 
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Upon the rejection, K sued the Secretary of State for Justice to the District 
Court on the basis that he was entitled to diplomatic protection during the stay 
abroad. The District Court dismissed the application holding that there was 
insufficient evidence to suggest that his entry to Germany was involuntary and 
therefore the Secretary of State had not acted unlawfully. The District Court held 
further that the provision of diplomatic protection to nationals by the executive 
branch was purely discretionary as it fell within the power of executive in respect 
to conducting foreign relations. Thus, K was not automatically entitled to 
diplomatic protection. 
K then appealed to The Hague Court of Appeal on November 22, 1984. 
However, the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that a state was not obliged, 
under international law, to provide diplomatic protection to its nationals abroad. 
Furthermore, although under Dutch law the state is obliged to protect its 
nationals abroad, the state and its diplomatic representative had a wide discretion 
in determining the level of protection. Assessing whether that discretion had 
been exercised in an appropriate manner was primarily a matter for parliament 
and not the court. The court could only intervene if the assistance was below the 
reasonable level of expectation. 
The judges’ consideration in this case shows that Dutch courts adhere 
dominantly to the traditional view of diplomatic protection. The courts did not 
have the courage to deny the wide discretion possessed by executive organ in 
providing diplomatic protection for its nationals abroad. However, it stated the 
little glimpse of hope that someday the courts would like to intervene, if the 
assistance was below a reasonable level. What is deemed as a reasonable level 
was not explained by the courts. Nevertheless, its development was seen in the 
prior explained case of M.Kujit v. The Netherlands in 2003 that involved the 
court’s statement to recommend the executive on performing all possibilities to 
improve the complainant’s rights. 
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4. Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs) 
Khadr was a minor Canadian national arrested in Afghanistan in 2002 
because he was alleged to be involved in Al-Qaeda activities. He was detained 
by the US forces in Guantanamo Bay. His family brought an application of 
mandamus to Federal Court of Canada to request the Canadian government to 
extend consular and diplomatic protection to Khadr. The complainants argued 
that the minister of foreign affairs, by failing to provide those protection, had 
infringed the rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
contravened its duties regulated in the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Act (DFAIT Act). The claimant also alleged that the 
government has infringed on the rights of Khadr under ICCPR and Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), as well as its obligation under Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations 1963. As the response of this complaint, the 
government of Canada filed an application for an order to strike the application, 
alleging the absence of cause of action.283 
The court rejected the argument that the government infringed on the rights 
of Khadr under Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms since the charter did 
not have extraterritorial reach. The court stated that there could be a probability 
whether the government was liable for violations of human rights abroad even if 
it does not inflict those violations itself, provided there was a sufficient 
connection between the acts of the Canadian government and the deprivation of 
rights. However, in this case, the court did not find any sufficient connection 
between the acts of the Canadian government and deprivation of Khadr’s right. 
Moreover, Canada was under no positive obligation to ensure the right to life, 
security and liberty stipulated in Section 7 of the charter. Thus, none of his rights 
under the charter were violated by the government.284 
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The court also stated that there was no obligation of the Canadian 
government under ICCPR and CRC to provide diplomatic protection to Khadr. 
However, it is recognised that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
conferred the individual rights to Khadr. The right scope was only in the field of 
consular protection and not including the right to diplomatic protection.285 
The states shown above strongly adhere to the traditional view. Thus, it can be 
concluded that they persistently object the norm offered by the progressive 
proponents, particularly the permissive attitude on performing judicial review of 
diplomatic protection. Theoretically, the contributions of all state practices are 
equally significant to the creation of customary international law. However, in reality 
the practice of larger and more powerful states have been given greater significance 
than the practice of smaller states because bigger states usually are leaders of states 
blocks and they are relatively better in publicizing their practice.286 This can be 
shown in the contribution of the US and Canada that have been discussed previously. 
Consequently, this is probably why the position of diplomatic protection as solely 
discretionary right to the state has been conquering the international legal system for 
years and hindering the growth of progressive norms. 
All of the above-explained court decision have commonality in depicting the 
court refusal to assess exercise or non-exercise of diplomatic protection by state of 
nationality based on two arguments. First, all the courts refuse to review diplomatic 
protection since it has remained a prerogative right of the state and the discretionary 
domain of executive branch. Assessing executive discretion is deemed as trespassing 
on the authority of the executive branch and it will be a disrespectful move to the 
coordinated political branch who supposedly have equal powers. Second, as a crucial 
obstacle to judicial review, there is indeed no legal duty of state under international 
law to perform diplomatic protection when significant injuries occur. Neither the 
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legal duty is stipulated from the decision of international courts and codified 
customary international law in draft articles on diplomatic protection, nor is it 
conferred by international human rights conventions. 
The status quo shows diplomatic protection solely as the right of state prevails 
over diplomatic protection as the right to individuals. This is because international 
law does not either confers the individual right to diplomatic protection or obliged it 
as a mandatory duty of states. However, the proliferation of national law of states 
that put diplomatic protection in one or both of those progressive categories for the 
sake of the development of human rights triggers the debate among international law 
scholars. Some international lawyers are refusing the idea that the proliferating 
domestic laws will significantly lead to the creation of an international obligation to 
exercising diplomatic protection. They are called proponents to the traditional or 
positivist view. Their arguments were based on ICJ’s consideration in the Barcelona 
Traction Case which asserted that the existence of domestic remedies to control the 
discretion of the state in the field of diplomatic protection remains within the domain 
of national law and does not have any influence internationally. 
The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its 
citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the 
performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding 
sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the province of 
municipal law and do not affect to position in internationally.287 
The opinion in Barcelona Traction was endorsed by a part of the ILC members in 
their report published in 1998.  
As regards to which law governed diplomatic protection, it was generally 
agreed that it was international law. In this context, it was noted that some 
governments in their constitutions committed themselves to their nationals to 
exercise diplomatic protection. The view was also expressed that such national 
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laws did not affect the discretionary right of the State to exercise diplomatic 
protection.288 
In short, ILC underlined that it is still uncertain in what sense and how far the said 
practices in domestic law will shake the unwavering perception of diplomatic 
protection as a discretionary right of state. In addition, Special Rapporteur Bennouna 
observed one more proof that weakens the normative change through domestic laws. 
It is the fact that some constitutional texts only stipulated the duty of states to perform 
diplomatic protection as a moral duty, rather than a legal obligation, since political 
considerations and the degree of appropriateness will always obviously influence the 
willingness of state of nationality.289 To some extent, it is true since most provisions 
about the latter also lacks of sanctions required in formation of legal duty. Thus, how 
that moral duty can elevate to an international legal duty is impossible to the 
positivist proponents. 
On the contrary, other international lawyers believe that the recognition of an 
individual right to diplomatic protection in the domestic legal systems is a proof of 
a strong practice that someday will influence the creation of emerging customary 
international norms. The proponent of this progressive view is obviously John 
Dugard who recommended the inclusion of right to diplomatic protection and 
invocation mechanism into the draft articles. Through his report, he also compiled 
and identified the states who adheres to this practice.290  
It is undeniable that most of the customary international law norms such as the 
determination of territorial sea width and the doctrine of state responsibility has been 
developed almost thoroughly by the decisions of international courts. However, such 
norm like state immunity is more influenced by the judgments of domestic courts.291 
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This fact shows that there is a possibility that customary international law norm could 
flourish not only from international practices, but also from the national practices of 
the states. 
The suggested solutions to ‘humanize’ diplomatic protection, such as provision 
of individuals’ right to diplomatic protection at the constitutional level, invocation 
mechanisms and judicial review, have not been codified as a new obligatory norms 
in the ILC Draft Articles of Diplomatic Protection. They are emerging mostly from 
constitutional court decisions, and thus they can be addressed as phenomena of 
global constitutionalism. Global constitutionalism is a circumstance when the 
decision of constitutional courts of states in the international community influence 
the formation of customary international law norms. The process involves the act of 
imitation of constitutional practice of one state by other states in identical cases. The 
process will repeat continuously until a sense of legal obligation formed among 
states, and thus the imitated substantial norms be adhered internationally.292 
The attitude of only referring to the customary international law regarding 
diplomatic protection from the international court decisions and other international 
practices ends up on over-emphasizing the state-centric nature of the norm since they 
are always restricted by the sovereignty of states. On the other hand, the international 
human rights are reflected better in the domestic court decision since domestic level 
is mostly where the individuals can actively participate in defending their rights. In 
this way, it can limit the overly wide discretion that empowers the diplomatic 
protection practice. 
At the level of scholastic debate, judicial review of diplomatic protection is 
considered as a taboo by adherents of the traditional view. For instance, the Special 
Rapporteur Mohamed Bennouna of ILC submitted a preliminary report in 1998 
which recommended that diplomatic protection must not be a subject to judicial 
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review and even after the exercise, it must not be amended by the decision of national 
court. This is based on the reason that the intention of the state of nationality is 
clearly influenced by political considerations and the degree of appropriateness so 
that its execution does not override interests of the state of nationality.293 
In contrast, progressive proponents have been trying to convince the traditional 
proponents who seem to be sceptical towards judicial review by trying to confirm 
the misunderstanding between them. First, judicial review does not aim to negate the 
discretionary right of the state, but only to control and limit the discretion based on 
the legitimate expectation of nationals. Second, judicial review does not really aim 
to enforce individual’s right to diplomatic protection, which the positivist scholars 
perceive as mere human rights idealistic, but to reach a closer and rational objective, 
which is to ensure due process of law. Consequently, due process assurance will lead 
to the goal of international human rights law, which is the enforcement of the 
violated rights. This notion is in accordance with the suggestion by international 
jurist, Orrego Vicuna, in his report to the International Law Association Committee 
on diplomatic protection. 
The discretion exercised by a government in refusing to spouse a claim on 
behalf of the individual should be subject to judicial review in the context of 
due process.294 
Ensuring due process means that the wide discretion possessed by the state in 
deciding diplomatic protection should be controlled and limited by a certain 
threshold so it will not constitute an arbitrary treatment of nationals.  
Another apprehension of the traditional proponents is if international law 
obliges states to facilitate the individual request on judicial review of diplomatic 
protection, there will be floods of requests for the exercise of diplomatic protection 
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and will lead to excessive intervention of executive discretion by judicial organs.295 
Intervention through judicial review should be restricted or even avoided if it is 
subjected to the substantive merits of political decisions, such as diplomatic 
protection, primarily because judges who would impose the decision are not elected 
by the citizens. This practice is not in line with democracy which requires that the 
choice of substantive political decision is made by elected representatives who sit in 
an executive chair, rather than by unelected judges. Moreover, the normative and 
prescriptive views of the judiciary are too limited to be utilized in evaluating the 
highly political nature of executive discretion.296 
Currently, the best way to alleviate this apprehension is to limit judicial review 
of diplomatic protection only for those resulted from the case of grave violations of 
human rights or jus cogens norms. Rights other than human rights may be exempted 
from this system. The second solution is the limitation to natural person as the subject 
to protect and the third is the limitation of the level of gravity, even in the case of 
human rights violation.  
Implementation of those solutions were seen in the case of Josias van Zyl and 
others v. The government of the Republic of South Africa and others. The 
complainants were shareholder of various mining companies in Lesotho. In 
execution of the Lesotho Highlands Water Projects, the property rights of the 
applicants were expropriated without any compensation.297 The complainants then 
requested the South African government to perform diplomatic protection on behalf 
of them. The government responded by sending a note verbale to the government of 
                                                          
295  Vasileios Pergantis, “Towards Humanization of Diplomatic Protection,” in The Impact of Human 
Rights Law on General International Law, edited by Kamminga M.T. and Scheinin M. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Publishing, 2006), 393. 
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297  Josias van Zyl and others v. the Government of the Republic of South Africa and others, Case No: 
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Lesotho asking to consider the complainants’ situation.298 However, further requests 
of diplomatic protection were refused.299 
This case is different from other examples explained since it did not involve 
gross infliction of human rights, such as torture and physical abuses. Subsequently, 
the court also found that unlike the human rights violation, the true beneficiaries in  
the Josias van Zyl case are juridical persons, namely the companies. Consequently, 
the case should be set aside because the states have more advanced obligation to 
protect natural persons more than legal persons. Moreover, South African 
constitutional court stated that expropriation which is categorized as an international 
delict, should be distinguished from the infringement of international human rights 
in terms of gravity and thus due to the insignificant level of gravity, it should not be 
subject to a judicial review. Therefore, the court rejected the claim of right to 
diplomatic protection, as well as invocation of government legal obligation on behalf 
of the complainants. 300 This case clearly limits that an obligation of state to perform 
diplomatic protection only restricted to the situations of grave human rights 
violations.  
Nevertheless, proponents of the traditional view still perceive the limitation has 
unclear and inexact standards, particularly about the level of gravity for the 
violations which made the court declare whether or not the violated rights deserve to 
be protected under the mechanism of diplomatic protection. This matter, as perceived 
by John Dugard, has to be determined by giving a wide margin appreciation to the 
states.301 However, such deliberation means adding a new work burden to the states. 
Moreover, the international dispute settlement mechanism for the possible dispute 
that occurs in the process of measuring whether the margin of appreciation is wide 
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299  Ibid., paras. 13, 24, and 60-62. 
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- 133 - 
 
or narrow, does not exist.302 Progressive proponents admits that these flaws remain 
unsolved. 
Judicial review also has its limit on the level of judgment implementation. 
Judges can declare that the action or inaction relating to diplomatic protection is 
unconstitutional but it cannot specifically order the executive organ to perform 
diplomatic protection according to judicial appropriateness. Judicial review can only 
urge and exhort the executive to do so.303 This flaw also has not been denied by the 
proponents of progressive development. 
Furthermore, it is true that foreign relations envisaged in diplomatic protection, 
as asserted in the Vinuya case, are delicate, complex and involve large elements of 
prophesy. It is a decision that the judicial system has neither aptitude, facilities, nor 
responsibility. In the Khadr case, the Supreme Court of Canada also described 
foreign relations as complex and ever-changing circumstances and the impact of 
granting the request of diplomatic protection, to secure the complainant’s 
repatriation, on Canadian foreign relations with the US could not be assessed by the 
court, but must be left to government’s discretionary powers to decide.304 
The judiciary could assess what diplomatic protection can do to improve the 
human rights of individuals, but it could not properly assessed the impact of the 
performance to foreign relations. Diplomacy aims to cool down the heated situation 
within foreign relations. It is also pragmatic by nature that what is central in the law, 
in the sense of what is the wrongful or harmful and what is the right, is not obligatory 
in the eyes of diplomacy. As a consequence, what is deemed as a just move by the 
law may not be executable in diplomacy. Furthermore, since diplomacy prioritizes 
the present over the past or “what’s done is done” principle, retaliation principle 
recognised by law cannot be applied to diplomacy.305 This tendency is obviously 
                                                          
302  Gaja, G. “Droits des etats,” 31. 
303  Vinuya etc. v. The Honorable Executive Secretary, 38. 
304   Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2010 SCC 3, 2010, 64-65, paras.39-40. 
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seen in the case of comfort women, where the states of nationality tend to forget 
invoking Japan’s legal responsibility on behalf of maintaining a cordial relationship 
with Japan. Therefore, unless there is guarantee that judicial aim will accord to the 
diplomatic aim and there is a safeguard to national interest applied by the court, 
judicial review of diplomatic protection will never be sufficient to accommodate 
both human rights and national interests. 
In short, the war between positivism who adheres to the traditional view and the 
progressive view who tried to adjust the said doctrine with the development of 
human rights, has not come to an end. However, the current situation shows that one 
view cannot be dismissed and then replaced by another view. The traditional view is 
still useful to solve the issue of individual representation in front of the international 
legal system and to guard the national interest of the states by preventing unnecessary 
and excessive intervention. Meanwhile, the progressive view cannot be abandoned 
either since it is in line with the goal of contemporary international law, which is the 
advancement of human rights of the individuals, rather than preserving the sovereign 
power of the states.306 Thus, compromise between the two is needed and the best 
solutions available is by leaving the discretion diluting mechanism as recommended 
practices, rather than mandatory. The limitation of judicial review based on the 
gravity of the violations and limitation on the subject of protection should also be 
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Chapter 5. Revising Diplomatic Protection System in 
Indonesia 
5.1. Formulating a Proper Interpretation of the Japan-
Indonesia Peace Treaty 
Indonesian comfort women activism was raised in 1993 and demanded the 
Indonesian government espouse their claims against Japan. However, the Indonesian 
government rejected the demands on the grounds that the waiver clause in the peace 
treaty had extinguished all of the claims. This circumstance showed that the function 
of the waiver clause is to nullify all the claims against Japan in respects to its conduct 
committed throughout World War II, either filed by the Indonesian government or 
by Indonesian nationals. In other words, it also aims to hinder the espousal of 
Indonesian nationals’ claims against Japan through an interstate mechanism such as 
diplomatic protection. As a result, after Japan paid the amount of reparations  
specified in the treaty,307 other claims which were not presented before the payment 
was made, would be deemed invalid or expired. This position has been adopted by 
the Indonesian government until the present day. 
However, the prohibition of slavery in the comfort women case is a jus cogens 
norm and should prevail over the waiver clause stipulated in Article 4 Paragraph 2 
of the Japan-Indonesia Peace Treaty 1958. This stance is in accordance with Article 
53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that said, “A treaty is void if, at 
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law.” Thus, the Indonesian government should have considered the 
existence of serious international violations of peremptory norms in the case, before 
declaring that it shared the same peace treaty interpretation with Japan. 
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This interpretation also does not comply with the prevailing international law 
norms that assert non-applicability of the expiry period in respect of claims arising 
from serious crimes under international law. This principle was introduced in the 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity (GA RES 2391 (XXIII) of November 26, 1968). It can be 
applied in the case of comfort women since the latter falls within the category of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. It is also stipulated in the contemporary 
international treaty, such as Article 29 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, that those categories of crimes shall not be subject to any statute of 
limitations.308 Now, the principle has evolved as a part of customary international 
law, particularly in terms of jus cogens. 
The existence of this non-applicability of statutory limitations principle as a part 
of customary international law has been recognised by the ILC in their studies of the 
crimes against comfort women. In the reports resulting from investigations into the 
comfort women cases by special rapporteurs discussed in the previous sections of 
this thesis, non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity invalidated the statute of limitations in the case of claims for compensation 
for damages caused by the pertaining crimes.309 Another report from the Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Theo van Boven, endorsed that 
the statutes of limitation shall not run concurrently during periods when no effective 
remedies exist for violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Civil claims 
relating to those violations shall not be subject to statutes of limitations.310 Non-
                                                          
308  Article 29 of “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” conclusion date July 17, 1998, 
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2178 (2002): 3, 
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310  United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Administration of Justice and 
the Human Rights of Detainees: Revised Set of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
- 137 - 
 
existence of effective remedies remains obvious in the case of comfort women 
throughout Asia, thus their claims remain valid until these days. 
This basis in international law was used in the case of the complaint brought by 
former Philippines comfort women to the Supreme Court in 2010. Former 
Philippines comfort women, as the petitioners in the case, argued that the waiver of 
claims manifested as agreed measures in the Treaty of Peace between the Philippine 
government and Japan is void on the grounds that prohibition of crimes against 
humanity, sexual slavery and torture constituted in the comfort women system are 
violations of jus cogens norms. Their status as jus cogens norms meant that no 
derogation is possible, including derogation generated by The Peace Treaty. 311 
Furthermore, they also asserted that the acceptance of unofficial “apologies” made 
by Japan and funds from the AWF were contradictory to international law, mainly 
the basic principles and guidelines on the right to remedy and reparation. 
This is how Indonesian comfort women should support their arguments to 
reiterate their claims and ensure a proper interpretation of the Japan-Indonesia Peace 
Treaty. Until now, the struggle of Indonesian comfort women has relied only on the 
sentimental anger against the Japanese occupation as well as opposition to Japan 
involvement in Indonesian political and economic policy. The activists have not 
voiced any legal basis in international law to counter the statement made by the 
Indonesian government, especially pertaining to the statement that the peace treaty 
has negated the claims of the comfort women. Demanding protection from the 
government without any legal basis is an exercise in futility. Furthermore, the 
activists have not utilized the basic international principles on the right to remedy 
                                                          
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Theo van 
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and reparation312 to counter the acceptance of the AWF fund by the Indonesian 
government in 1997.313 
This human-right based interpretation can help to solve the current problem 
faced by former Indonesian comfort women by declaring the validity of the women’s 
claims under international law, but is still stuck at an abstract, normative level, 
without any possibility of implementation within national law. The interpretation can 
be manifested into reality only if Indonesia introduces national regulations of 
diplomatic protection and an invocation mechanism based on the commentaries and 
the recommended practices of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006. 
5.2. Addressing Diplomatic Protection as the Right of 
Nationals and the Legal Duty of States 
In the deliberation of constructing Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006, 
Indonesia is one of the states that insisted that diplomatic protection should remain 
a sovereign prerogative of the state, complete with full discretion since it must run 
parallel with the long-standing principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Regarding the relationship between diplomatic protection and human rights, 
Indonesia considers them two separate issues, since diplomatic protection should not 
be marginalized by human rights considerations and vice versa.314 
The Republic of Korea has a slightly different view on the issue of the legal 
duty to exercise diplomatic protection. Korea neither denied the necessity of legal 
duty, nor has it approved the concept either. The representative of Republic of Korea 
in the General Assembly meeting on the issue of diplomatic protection in 1998, 
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Choung Il Chee, stated that there was a need for more state practices and opinio juris 
before the issue could be considered by the ILC to be included in the draft articles.315 
This difference shows that the Republic of Korea is more welcoming of the 
progressive developments in perceiving the issue of diplomatic protection since it 
recognized the probability of evolving norms that make diplomatic protection the 
legal the duty of states. The progressive attitude is perhaps the reason why the 
Republic of Korea conferred the duty to exercise diplomatic protection to the state 
at the constitutional level. The provision of the right through Article 2 Section 2 of 
the Korean constitution was shown to be potent in the Korean constitutional court’s 
interpretation of the pertaining provision in the comfort women case. The provision 
of Article 2 Section 2 per se does not directly point out the duty of state to perform 
diplomatic protection, but the Korean constitutional court chose to interpret it 
progressively according to the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006 so that 
diplomatic protection become a type of protection derived from the duty to protect  
mandated in the said provision. 
Unlike Korea, Indonesia adopts a positivist view. There is neither any provision 
of Indonesians’ right to diplomatic protection stipulated at the constitutional level or 
lower, nor in the history of such progressive interpretations of the existing 
constitution by any domestic courts.  Likewise, national law does not impose positive 
obligations on the governmental authorities to protect the rights of Indonesian abroad. 
As suggested in the ILC special rapporteurs’ research and reports, it is best to 
enshrine such right at the constitutional level. However, amending the constitution 
will take a long time. Thus, the best alternative is deriving the right from one of the 
pre-existing rights in the Indonesian constitution followed by the creation of a new 
provision concerning diplomatic protection at the statutory level.  
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Among the fundamental rights established in the Indonesian constitution, the 
right to diplomatic protection is most possibly derived from the preamble of the 
Indonesian constitution which states that the formation of the government of the 
Republic of Indonesia aims to protect all the people of Indonesia.316 Furthermore, 
there is also stipulated obligation of the state in the field of protection, advancement, 
upholding and fulfilment of the human rights of Indonesian people in Article 28I (4) 
of the constitution. Those two constitutional provisions are likely to become the basis 
from which the regulation of diplomatic protection at a lower statutory level can be 
derived.317 
Indonesia may also refer back to the Foreign Relations Act under Law No. 
37/1999, which contain the provision regarding the right to consular protection. 
However, as the scope of foreign relations should be broader than the scope 
mentioned therein. There is still a room to insert the provision regarding the right to 
diplomatic protection into the pertaining statute. In this way, victims of unsolved 
human rights problems by foreign countries, such as the Indonesian comfort women, 
will have a legal basis to urge the government to protect them. 
5.3. Attributing the Tools to Invoke Diplomatic Protection  
There are two ways to invoke diplomatic protection, as explained in the 
previous chapter, the constitutional complaint mechanism and the administrative 
complaint mechanism. The Republic of Korea chose the constitutional complaint 
mechanism to enable individuals whose constitutional rights are infringed as a result 
of governmental action or inaction to seek redress. The constitutional complaint 
mechanism is one of the five jurisdictions provided for by Article 2 of the Korean 
Constitutional Court Act, other than jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality 
of statues upon the request of the ordinary courts, impeachment, dissolution of a 
political party, and competence dispute between state agencies. 
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Article 68 (1) of Korean Constitutional Court Act stipulated that any person 
whose basic rights guaranteed by the constitution are infringed due to exercise or 
non-exercise of the governmental power, excluding judgment of the ordinary courts, 
may file a constitutional complaint to the constitutional court. Provided, any remedy 
should be exhausted in advance.  
This mechanism was used effectively to render the decision upholding comfort 
women’s constitutional right in 2011. It was utilized again in 2016, to object to the 
results of the presumed attempt at exercising diplomatic protection, through Japan-
Korea bilateral agreement reached in December of 2015, as it was not accepted by 
the victims. In this newest constitutional complaint case, Lawyers for a Democratic 
Society represented 29 former comfort women and 41 relatives of both surviving and 
deceased comfort women. They claimed that the agreement was unconstitutional on 
the grounds that it infringes on the human dignity of the former comfort women. 
They stated that through the agreement, the government of the Republic Korea is 
preventing the former comfort women from asking Japan to compensate them for 
their damages.318  
Unlike Korea, the Indonesian Constitution, particularly Article 24C (1), only 
confers jurisdiction to the constitutional court over four specific matters. Those 
matters are reviewing laws against the constitution, determining disputes over the 
authority of state institutions, deciding on the dissolution of a political party and 
deciding disputes over the results of general elections. However, the court does not 
have jurisdiction over constitutional complaints regarding the government’s 
omissions. In other words, it is not able to review governmental action or inaction 
against the constitution, particularly when the action or inaction is not provided for 
in the written domestic regulations. 
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The absence of jurisdiction to examine the case in terms of a constitutional 
complaint forces Indonesian lawyers to wrap matters of constitutional complaint in 
the clothes of judicial review. This means that the delinquent governmental act has 
to be linked normatively with any written regulation from which the act was 
legitimized. Nonetheless, some governmental acts are not regulated in written 
national regulations because they are simply deemed discretionary acts. The same 
nature is embodied by diplomatic protection. The decision of the government to 
exercise diplomatic protection is purely discretionary and how government should 
perform such protection is not regulated in any statutory law. The decision is 
influenced by various considerations, including whether or not such a decision will 
be beneficial to the country’s political situation and diplomatic relations with 
delinquent states. 
Non-existence of constitutional complaint mechanism in the Indonesian 
constitutional law system has left the former Indonesian comfort women powerless 
without any remedy to enforce their rights. They could not protest when the 
Indonesian government accepted AWF’s fund in 1996 and refused to distribute the 
funds to individual comfort women. They can only voice their protests in 
international forums involving the Japanese government, but not in a formal 
international human rights forum sponsored by the United Nations since they have 
no backing from the Indonesian government. This is proved by the complete absence 
of any comment by the Indonesian government pertaining to the comfort women 
issue when UN human rights treaty bodies held multiple universal periodic review 
sessions involving Japan. These series of omissions constituted the violation of 
Indonesian comfort women’s constitutional rights and were in contradiction with the 
obligation of the Indonesian government to protect, uphold and fulfil the human 
rights of the Indonesian people defined in Article 28I (4) of the Indonesian 
constitution. 
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There are two ways to insert the provision of constitutional complaint in 
Indonesian constitutional law system. The first way is by amending the constitution.  
However, the process will take a long time because in a political configuration with 
a multi-partite system such as Indonesia’s, accommodating all the opinions and 
interests of huge numbers of political parties will make reaching a consensus a 
herculean task.  
The second way is by revising the Indonesian Constitutional Court Act (Law 
No. 24/2003 as amended by Law No. 8/2011) by inserting the explicit provision for 
constitutional complaints.319 This is more feasible than the first solution. However, 
if the revision is undertaken, it would deal with a debatable legitimation issue since 
Article 24C (1) of the existing constitution has specifically limited the authority of 
the court. A compromise solution might be sought by expanding the judicial review 
authority of the court, stipulated in the constitution and Constitutional Court Act, not 
only over the constitutional question of reviewing statutes against the constitution, 
but also over constitutional complaints. This expansion should be declared through 
legislative interpretation by the lawmakers320 or through judicial interpretation by 
the constitutional court in its decisions. However, in the current circumstances where 
at debate about the validity of the method still exists between law scholars, a 
moderate solution is not utilizing the interpretation method generally and 
permanently in all cases. Instead, either a judicial or legislative interpretation must 
be carried out on a case per case basis or upon request of citizens. 321   
In the drafting process of the current Indonesian constitutional court act, some 
scholars suggested the inclusion of constitutional complaint mechanism to the 
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material jurisdiction of the court by modelling the current practices in South Africa 
and Germany. However, the suggestion was rejected by the government because of 
the apprehension about excessive case accumulation within the Indonesian 
constitutional court. There are also worries that this newly granted authority will 
overlap with the administrative court’s authority.322  
Such apprehensions are refutable because excessive case backlog can be 
avoided by requiring the exhaustion of all remedies available prior to the 
presentation of the constitutional complaint. Second, the overlap can be prevented 
by dividing the line of authority clearly through regulations and exhaustion of all 
available remedies via other institutions. Furthermore, instead of worrying about the 
overlap of authority, there is still an urgent problem that we have to deal with, namely 
the existence of many injustices that cannot be resolved due to the lack of such 
procedure in the general court system. Thus, the provision of a constitutional 
complaint mechanism is an important alternative to solve such problems.323 
Another option is providing a regulation to empower a special administrative 
complaint against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who obviously hold discretionary 
power over diplomatic protection. However, this is still deemed a new practice with 
several weaknesses as shown in the case of Korea. Former Korean comfort women 
use this mechanism by filing a suit against the government before the Seoul Central 
District Court, but it was dismissed on June 15, 2018 on the grounds that the Korean 
government has wide discretion over the matters and that judicial intervention would 
trespass the executive domain. Judges acknowledged the deficiency of the 2015 
Korea-Japan bilateral agreement, but the plaintiffs have no rights to demand 
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compensation of damages.324 This mechanism has proven ineffective in the Korean 
case since the administrative court did not dare to intervene the discretion of the 
executive branch. Other than this, there have not been many state practices pertaining 
to this mechanism yet. All prevailing state practices positioned constitutional 
complaints as a tool to invoke diplomatic protection, such as South Africa in the 
Kaunda case, Germany in the Rudolph Hess case, the United Kingdom in the Abbasi 
case and the Netherlands in the Kujit case. 
5.4. Fostering State Practices in Human Rights Based 
Diplomatic Protection in Asia 
Diplomatic protection of comfort women in Korea is still flawed since it was 
not executed well and the agreement with Japan reached in 2015 has remained 
controversial up to now. However, the effort of the Korean judicial system to limit 
the discretion of the executive branch has pressed the Korean government to open a 
diplomatic channel with Japan for the purpose of discussing the issue. The efforts of 
the Korean government to hear the voice of the former comfort women, which 
subsequently resulted in a refusal to the AWF funds also needs to be appreciated. 
This policy shows that the Korean government still realizes the importance of 
individual reparations in the case of the gross violations of human rights. Overall, 
what the Republic of Korea has done for the sake of the former comfort women is 
still relatively more significant than efforts by other states which have done nothing, 
as if the issue did not actually exist. The measures taken by the Republic of Korea 
are in accordance with the recommended practices stipulated in the Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection 2006 and its commentaries. 
 It is recommended that Indonesia follows the practices of the Republic of Korea, 
at least in opening the door to limit the discretion of the government in the sphere of 
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diplomatic protection. More specifically, Indonesia should revise its national laws 
so that it conform with the recommended practices stipulated in Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection 2006 and its commentaries. The revision is urgent since the 
comfort women issue encompasses a serious human rights issue that has not been 
resolved and should not be neglected by the international community, particularly 
by Asian countries, from which most of the victims came. Currently, the issue is 
gradually disappearing as the number of Indonesian survivors declines. There has 
not been any media disclosure of the issues since the early 2010s, nor has a protest 
to Japan been delivered by the Indonesian government in any international forum.  
If Indonesia follows the practice of Korea, other states of nationality of the 
victims, such as China, Taiwan and Malaysia will follow. The accumulation of 
comfort women claims through diplomatic protection proclaimed by a significant 
number of states of nationality will encourage the mass invocation of Japan’s 
international legal responsibility, and thereby result in voluntary admittance of the 
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Conclusion 
There are two points that can be concluded from this research. First, the current 
prevailing view is that diplomatic protection is solely a discretionary right of the 
state and there is no obligation in international law to provide such protection. 
However, emerging state practices through three stages, provision of the right to 
diplomatic protection to individuals or deeming it as a compulsory obligation for 
states in national law, invocation of the right to diplomatic protection through 
constitutional or administrative tracks and judicial review of diplomatic protection 
discretion by competent judicial body, play a significant role in providing the 
missing link between diplomatic protection and international human rights. It is 
because those domestic mechanisms have the ability to control the discretion to 
exercise diplomatic protection that they can be utilized effectively to enforce the 
individual rights that have been violated and via which reparations can be secured. 
Considering its importance, this progressive development must not be dismissed 
offhandedly. 
On the other hand, the traditional view should be maintained since it is effective 
in resolving the issue of individual representation in front of the international legal 
system and protects the national interest of the states by preventing unnecessary and 
excessive intervention. The traditional view is still necessary because progressive 
practices still have imperfections, such the lack of standards to define which cases 
of diplomatic protection deserve a judicial review in term of gravity and rights’  
beneficiaries, inability of the judiciary to safeguard national interests alongside 
human rights idealism, inability of the judiciary to bind the executive with its 
decisions and inability of the judiciary to consider the aims of diplomacy. Unless 
those imperfections are improved, there is still a long way in terms of  generating an 
international obligation of diplomatic protection. 
The best solution to implement now is to maintain the balance between the 
traditional and progressive view by keeping the progressive practices as 
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recommendations, rather than declaring them as an obligation. This is in line with 
the norms stipulated in the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006 and its 
commentaries. It is also important to limit judicial review of diplomatic protection 
only to certain circumstances based on the gravity of the violations and based on 
who is the beneficiary of the violated rights. However, it is recommended that states 
implement the practices to solve long-standing cases of grave violation of human 
rights, such as the comfort women case, in order to ensure due process and further, 
the goals of contemporary international law, namely the advancement of the human 
rights of individuals. 
In particular, Indonesia should implement some concrete moves to revise its 
national laws, in order to comply with the recommended practice provided by Draft 
Article 19 on Diplomatic Protection 2006 and its commentaries, as well as emerging 
state practices from the global constitutionalism phenomenon in order to solve the 
long-standing suffering of Indonesian comfort women. It is also recommended that  
Indonesia follows in the footsteps of the Republic Korea since its practices are 
identical to the recommended practices stipulated in the draft articles and since 
Republic of Korea is the first state in Asia to legitimize the judicial intervention with 
regard to discretion of diplomatic protection through the constitutional court decision 
on behalf of human rights advancement. 
The initial step is to realize that the current interpretation of the Japan-Indonesia 
peace treaty contravenes international law, followed by the provision of the right to 
diplomatic protection or compulsory obligation for the state at the constitutional 
level or through the Indonesian Foreign Relations Act (Law No. 37/1999) and other 
laws. This step must be followed by empowering nationals to invoke the stipulated 
rights, either through a constitutional complaint or through the administrative 
complaint mechanism. This can only be achieved possibly through the amendment 
of the constitution, amendment of the Indonesian Constitutional Court Act (Law No. 
24/2003 as amended by Law No. 8/2011) or through legislative and judicial 
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interpretation to expand the constitutional court jurisdiction over the constitutional 
complaint. An administrative mechanism can also be enacted but only through the 
legislation of totally new regulations. Finally, it is recommended that Indonesian 
judicial organs follow progressive development on permitting judicial review of 
executive discretion pertaining to diplomatic protection. In this way, former 
Indonesian comfort women will be facilitated and empowered by sufficient tools to 
invoke their rights in front of the government. In addition, this may improve the 
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한국과 인도네시아는 일제 점령 하 식민지를 거쳤다는 점에서 
역사적인 동일성을 가진다. 두 국가의 여성들은 식민지 시기 일본의 
인권침해 행위에 고통을 겪었으며, 이와  같은  피해자들은 “일본군 
위안부”라고 불리고 있다. 그 이후 해당 문제는 일본과 피해자들이 속한 
국적국들 사이에서 일본이 법죄에 대해 법적인 책임을 지는지 여부와 전후 
평화조약 상의 조건으로 문제가 해결되었는지 여부에 관한 법적인 논쟁으로 
비화되었다. 
여러 학자들이 외교적 보호권을 이행하지 않는 국적국 정부의 
부작위를 국민의 기본권 침해라고 분석하는 반면, 정부는 외교적 보호 
의무를 지지 않는다는 의견도 상존하는 실정이다.  본고는 상기 문제의 
법적인 문제를 살펴보고, 세 가지 분석을 시도하고자 한다. 우선 첫번째로 
한국과 인도네시아의 위안부에 관련된 외교적 보호권이 인권 분야의 
강행규범 위반에 대응하는 규범이 될 수 있는지 논의한다. 그 다음으로는 
국제법에서 외교적 보호권을 의무로 변화시킬 수 있을지 분석한다. 
마지막으로는 한국과 인도네시아의 위안부 사례에서 상기 분석한 개념을 
적용할 수 있는지 종합적인 평가를 수행하고 국제법적 함의를 도출하고자 
한다.  
현재 대세적인 견해로 비추어 볼 때, 외교적 보호권은 국가의 
재량권이며 국제법적인 의무에 이르지는 않는다. 그러나 국가실행의 
측면에서는 다음과 같은 세 가지 단계를 통해 새로운 방법을 모색할 수 있을 
것이다. 첫째, 국내법을 통한 강제적 외교적 보호의 의무 제공, 두번째, 헌법 
또는 행정법을 통한 외교적 보호를 받을 권리 발동, 그리고 세번째, 관할 
법원에서 외교적 보호에 관한 재량에 대한 사법심사를 제안할 수 있을 것이다. 
상기 세 가지 국가실행은 외교적 보호권과 국제 인권을 연결할 수 있는 
역할을 수행한다. 이러한 국내 메커니즘은 집행부의 재량권을 통제하고 
외교적 보호권의 국가중심적인 특성을 희석시킨다. 결과적으로 외교적 
보호권은  침해된 인권을 보호하기 위해 효율적으로 활용될 수 있으며, 
피해자들은 손해배상을 확보할 수 있게 될 것이다. 이것은 2006 년에 
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국제법위원회가 채택한 외교적보호권에 관한 조문 초안 제 19 조 및 전체 
주석에 구체화된 국제법의 진보적인 실행으로 볼 수 있다. 
국적국은 피해자의 권리 집행 시 정당한 절차를 보장하기 위해 
위안부 사건의 해결을 위한 진보적인 국가실행을 이행해야 한다. 이와 같은 
국가실행이 축적된다면 국제법에 따라 피해자가 적절한 손해배상을 받을 수 
있는 더 큰 기회가 열릴 것이다. 나아가 진보적인 실천을 준수하는 것은 
동시대 국제법의 목표, 즉 개인의 인권의 보장 및 발전에 도달하는 데 기여할 
것이다. 
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